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This dissertation presents evidence of five studies showing that sovereign fixed income
markets are not always price efficient. 
The emerging local currency debt market has grown to a large size of more than 1.5
trill ion US Dollars at the end of 2012. The factors that can predict developed market
govern ment bond returns can also predict emerging market government bond returns.
Changes in an adapted Merton model for government bonds can predict emerging market
country credit default swap returns.
The euro crisis has highlighted the importance of political risk in government bond
markets. Changes in political risk can predict future government bond returns. Market
participants should avoid bond markets with higher political risk and rather invest in bond
markets with lower political risk. Government bond returns are 3.8 percentage points
higher in the second half of the calendar year than in the first half of the calendar year.
This seasonal pattern is largely explained by an opposite pattern in not seasonally
adjusted U.S. inflation which is 3.0 percentage points lower in the second half of the
calendar year. 
The swaption market has become the largest non-cleared interest rate derivative
market with a (notional) size of 30 trillion USD as of April 2014. Although swaption models
are different from equity options models, the swaption market contains volatility risk and
jump risk premiums consistent with equity options. Combining the two risk premiums in a
“riding the swaption curve” strategy provides a strong diversification.
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Preface 
 
Sovereign fixed income markets already started to draw my attention at the age of 10 when 
my father Wim Duyvesteyn bought his first 30-year Dutch government bond.  I was looking 
on a daily basis at the Dutch teletekst pages for bond prices and yields trying to monitor the 
investment return of my dad. When I noticed that my own savings rate was declining, my 
mother Jeanette van Leeuwen explained to me that the level of the interest rate and the year-
on-year inflation are related. Already at an early age my parents took my interest in financial 
markets seriously. I was able to structurally follow the important developments in the macro-
economic news and key market indicators watching the Dutch “10-uur journaal” on daily 
basis. My interest for option markets and volatility were also aroused in this period when my 
father started to harvest the volatility risk premium using equity options. Together with my 
dad I experienced the risk of such an investment strategy live in 1998 during the Russian and 
LTCM defaults. 
 
Another element in my youth was a constant flow of activities related to creativity and out-
of-the-box thinking and acting. I think playing fantasy roleplaying games with my brothers 
Arnoud and Korneel and my sister Angeli stimulated me to become more creative and to be 
prepared for the unexpected. I had my first experience with computers and programming with 
my best primary school friend Paul van der Knaap writing code on the commodore 64 before 
being able to play a game. My first view of the beautiful city of Rotterdam was with my 
godfather Cor and godmother Els Kuijvenhoven in the Euromast tower. 
 
At the Sint Stanislas College in Delft my interest for economics did not diminish. In addition 
I developed not only an interest for beta oriented subjects like mathematics and physics but 
also for languages like German and old Greek. I also enjoyed the subjects economics 1 and 2 
sitting next to my friends Stijn Verslype and Vincent van der Valk respectively, not only 
because of the interesting material but also because of the interesting teachers Kees van 
Niekerk and Aad Duifhuis.  
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After high school my mother Jeanette van Leeuwen spent a lot of time with me to select a 
university and a follow-up study. I was in doubt between a more technical study in Delft and 
a more economic related study in Rotterdam. I found out that I could combine both in 
econometrics at the Erasmus University. While travelling to university I became friends with 
Martijn van der Voort, Robin Bul and Robert Al, all coming from the same region near The 
Hague. In the weekends we often met at the Plein in The Hague. We started to work together 
in the many project groups during the study and produced several good research reports. 
 
Specifically two teachers during my study, Philip Hans Franses and Dick van Dijk, were able 
to transmit their enthusiasm for econometrics to me. Nico van der Sar got me highly 
interested in investing and the challenge to profit from inefficiencies in the markets. I even 
tried to harvest the value premium myself by buying relatively cheap stocks. Unfortunately it 
was difficult to attain a desirable diversification in my personal portfolio because of its 
relatively small size. Nico van der Sar also made me enthusiastic about reading and 
understanding academic articles and it was the first time that I heard the Portuguese language 
during his telephone calls with his Brazilian wife. I also had the honor to work on Nico’s 
computer next to the famous professor Winfried Hallerbach that later was to become my 
colleague. Finally, it was Olaf Penninga who got me interested in Robeco while presenting 
the company at the university. 
 
In 1999 I decided to apply for an internship at Robeco supervised by Philip Hans Franses 
from the university. My master thesis was based on a study called country allocation 
emerging equity markets supervised at Robeco by Jouke Hottinga and Ronald Wuijster. The 
model based on my research is still used at Robeco and known as the Carma model. After my 
internship and graduation I decided in 2000 to apply for a job at the research department of 
Peter Ferket. Working in a team on applied financial research appealed to me more than 
working alone on a PhD project. I also decided to broaden my financial knowledge with the 
CFA study material. If the first years I was able to learn a lot from experienced professionals 
like David Blitz, but I also had time left for other activities like the Robeco zomerconcerten 
and Rotterdam film festival with amongst others my colleague Daniel Haesen. 
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With the help of Jouke Hottinga and Olaf Penninga I learned a lot about the fixed income 
markets. One of my responsibilities was to monitor, evaluate and enhance the multi factor 
model Robeco was and is still using to predict interest rate changes. The model is used 
directly in the large investment fund Lux-o-rente managed by Maurice Meijers, Kommer van 
Trigt and later also by Olaf Penninga. One of my innovations has been the addition of a 
seasonal factor in July 2002. Chapter 4 of this dissertation provides a deeper understanding of 
the seasonal pattern in bond returns on which the factor is based. Super quant intern Ana-
Maria Morarescu1 provided excellent research assistance in this project. 
 
In 2003 I travelled to Brazil with my friend Robin Bul and met my wife Jaqueline Vitor 
Duyvesteyn. After learning the Portuguese language and travelling a lot to Brazil and back 
my wife decided to move to the Netherlands in 2005 and we married in 2006. The strong 
connection with the country further stimulated my interest for emerging market countries and 
also for travelling. 
 
In 2007 the super quant intern Robert Berry2, a PhD from Princeton university, joined 
Robeco. Under the supervision of Gerben de Zwart and myself Robert investigated the 
volatility risk premium in the swaption market. This internship initiated my decision to start 
writing papers with the ultimate goal to bind these together in a PhD dissertation. This was a 
new ambition after passing the final CFA exam and learning the Portuguese language. The 
valuable insights from the internship of Martin Scholtus3 in 2008 also helped me to better 
understand the swaption market technicals and to improve the quality of the paper. I want to 
thank Gerben for his continuous effort to cooperate on the paper and to finally bring it to its 
current status. I am also grateful to the family of Gerben for the hospitality in Rijnsburg 
during the numerous weekends that we have devoted to the study. The paper co-authored 
with Gerben de Zwart led to a publication in the Journal of Banking and Finance in 2015 and 
to Chapter 6 of this dissertation. 
 
                                                
1
 http://www.robeco.com/en/careers/super-quant/super-quants-generation-2014.jsp 
2
 http://www.robeco.com/en/careers/super-quant/super-quants-generation-2007.jsp 
3
 http://www.robeco.com/en/careers/super-quant/super-quants-generation-2008.jsp 
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When Gerben de Zwart left Robeco I continued doing research and writing papers in 
cooperation with my new colleague Martin Martens. Martin had a lot more experience with 
writing academic articles because of his former career at the Erasmus university. In 2010 
with the help of super quant intern Erwin Hazeveld4 Martin and I applied the famous Merton 
model on countries. This research project ultimately led to Chapter 5 of my dissertation. 
 
In 2011 I investigated whether the interest rate prediction multi-factor model of Robeco 
could also be applied on emerging markets. The results confirmed the evidence for developed 
markets and led to a new paper with Martin Martens that was published in the Journal of 
Fixed Income in 2014. Chapter 2 of my dissertation is based on this publication. At Robeco 
the research also led to the launch of a new product end of 2012 called emerging Lux-o-rente, 
managed by Maurice Meijers and as of recently by Paul Murray-John, Paul van der Worp and 
myself. The cover photo of this dissertation is related to the so called quant duration product 
line of Robeco that also uses a wave photo in the marketing material5. The wave also relates 
to the dynamic nature of the sovereign fixed income market and the various curves that can 
be identified. 
 
With my colleague Rikkert Scholten I developed a country sustainability ranking at Robeco 
in cooperation with RobecoSAM. In 2015 this ranking became the basis of a new 
government bond index of S&P6. Patrick Verwijmeren, Martin Martens and I analysed the 
predictive power of one of the components of the ranking, political risk, in 2013. The results 
were promising and we wrote a paper on it which is serving as Chapter 3 of my dissertation. 
 
In 2015 I was able to base my dissertation on the five aforementioned empirical studies on 
sovereign fixed income markets. I am very grateful for the time spent by my promotor 
Patrick Verwijmeren, co-promotor Martin Martens and inner doctoral committee members 
Mathijs van Dijk, Dick van Dijk and Onno Steenbeek to provide me with useful feedback to 
further improve the quality of my dissertation. 
 
                                                
4
 http://www.robeco.com/en/careers/super-quant/super-quants-generation-2010.jsp 
5
 http://www.robeco.com/en/professionals/strategies-products/quant-fixed-income/index.jsp 
6
 http://www.sustainability-indices.com/index-family-overview/esg-indices/index.jsp 
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Dear family, friends and colleagues, you have helped and stimulated me in various ways to 
bring my dissertation to completion. I want to thank all of you and I will never forget your 
support. I want to thank a few persons in name since it is not possible to mention all of you. 
First of all I want to thank my wife Jaqueline Vitor Duyvesteyn for the love, support, 
understanding and help to keep up the discipline to work on my papers. Without you I would 
have never been able to finish the dissertation. Second, I want to thank my parents Wim 
Duyvesteyn and Jeanette Duyvesteyn - van Leeuwen for the love and support I always could 
count on. Third, I want to thank Martin Martens and Gerben de Zwart for the continuous 
energy and drive to finish the five papers. Fourth, I want to thank Eliane Haseth for keeping 
track of all the necessary paperwork and deadlines accompanying the publication of a PhD 
dissertation. Finally I want to thank Patrick Verwijmeren for taking the responsibility of 
being my co-promotor and the many stimulating meetings at the university with useful 
feedback. 
 
After finishing and defending my PhD dissertation my newest challenge is taking care of my 
son Arthur and my daughter Valentina, both just born on July 3rd 2015. I want to thank my 
mother-in-law Marlene Vitor Ribeiro for helping Jaqueline and me in taking care of the 
children in the first months. That way Marlene has helped me to be able to allocate enough 
time and energy to finish the final work on this dissertation. I also want to thank my fresh 
brother in law Andreas for bringing Marlene to us from Germany and for his unlimited care 
and positivism. Finally I want to thank my brothers in law Leandro and Jackson to help me 
improve my Portuguese language skill and to check the Portuguese abstract (resumo) of my 
dissertation. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The sovereign fixed income market is very large and therefore empirical research to better 
understand it is important. Doeswijk, Lam and Swinkels (2014) show that the relative size of 
the market varied between 20% and 40% from 1959 to 2012 within a multi-asset market 
portfolio. The size of the market stood at USD 33 trillion or 36% at the end of 2012. This 
dissertation contains five contributions to the academic literature on the sovereign fixed 
income market. The common feature of these empirical studies is the price efficiency of the 
market. The five studies cover a wide range of fixed income markets including developed 
and emerging bond markets, nominal bonds and inflation-linked bonds, and cash instruments 
and derivatives. 
 
The large sovereign fixed income market is important for many institutional and individual 
market participants. Governments finance their fiscal budget in this market, central banks 
need the market to implement a monetary policy, pension funds and insurance companies 
have to calculate the present value of their liabilities and asset managers and investors want 
to achieve positive returns using the fixed income market. New developments in this market 
and new research findings call for new research. The new local currency government bond 
market of emerging countries has grown to a large size about USD 1.5 trillion in 2015. 
Important question is whether default risk or interest rate risk is the most important driver of 
this new market? If interest rate risk is more important the bond returns may be predicted 
with the same factors that can predict developed market bond returns. Comparing the new 
local currency bond market to the older U.S. dollar denominated bond market, can we also 
apply the adapted Merton model on emerging markets and use its output to predict returns?  
New research shows that the level of political risk is an important risk factor for the 
sovereign fixed income market. Do bond returns also react to the changes in political risk? 
We also observe a new and pronounced seasonal pattern in bond returns that has not been 
covered by the academic literature yet, can we explain this pattern?  
8_Erim Duyvesteyn BW Stand.job
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The swaption derivative market is not well understood yet by certain large investors.7 
Nevertheless, the swaption market has become the largest non-cleared interest rate derivative 
market with a notional size of USD 30 trillion.8 Although swaption market models are 
different from equity option models, can we also find evidence of the volatility and jump risk 
premiums in swaption markets? And how do these premiums interact? 
 
This dissertation can be linked to two strands of the academic literature. Chapters 2-5 are 
related to predicting the bond risk premium (BRP) and Chapter 6 is related to the volatility 
risk premium (VRP) in bond markets. 
 
In the first of these strands of literature, the BRP is explained by the term, default, and 
liquidity premiums. Fama and French (1993) show that the default premium and the term 
premium are both priced for stocks, government bonds and corporate bonds. In addition, 
Longstaff (2004) and Montfort and Renne (2013) show that a liquidity factor is also priced in 
developed government bond markets. For liquid governments bonds with no or low default 
risk the BRP is similar to the term premium. 
The expectations hypothesis for bond markets proposed by Lutz (1940) assumes a term 
premium of zero. The rationale behind the hypothesis is that government bonds with different 
maturities all have the same return as a short term cash investment. However, government 
bonds show an annual excess return of 0.9% over cash based on an updated international 
dataset from Dimson, Marsch and Staunton (2002) for the period 1900-2013. This result is 
not consistent with the expectations hypothesis. MacAuley (1938) was already familiar with 
this empirical finding9. Alternative hypotheses to the expectations hypothesis are the liquidity 
hypothesis by Hicks (1946), the segmentation hypothesis by Culbertson (1957) and the 
preferred habitat hypothesis by Modigliani and Sutch (1966). The liquidity hypothesis 
assumes relatively higher forward rates to compensate for the higher risk of longer holding 
periods. The segmentation hypothesis assumes that individual investors tend to focus only on 
government bonds with particular maturities. The preferred habitat hypothesis is similar to 
                                                
7
 http://fd.nl/economie-politiek/799364/bestuurders-pensioenfondsen-blunderen-met-complexe-derivaten 
8
 ISDA, Apr 2014, Size and Uses of the Non-Cleared Derivatives Market 
9
 Macaulay (1938, p. 33): “The forecasting of short term interest rates by long term interest rates is, in general, 
so bad that the student may well begin to wonder whether, in fact, there really is any attempt to forecast.” 
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the segmentation hypothesis but improves by combining it with other theories. All three 
alternative hypotheses allow for a positive term premium and a positive BRP.  
 
Fama (1984a, 1984b) has shown that the size of the BRP varies over time. The obvious 
research question is whether the size of the BRP can be predicted. Dyl and Joehnk (1981) 
published the first paper on using the term spread to predict bond excess returns. Fama and 
Bliss (1987) show that a forward rate can also be used to predict bond excess returns and 
Fama (2006) confirms the 1987 finding and explains the predictive power with a mean 
reversion of interest rates to a longer term trend. Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005) further extend 
this idea by combining the predictive power of multiple forward rates. Ilmanen (1995; 1997) 
includes equity momentum, term spread and bond momentum as predictors of government 
bond excess returns. Ludvigson and Ng (2009) find that the joint information in a large 
database of macro-economic data can predict bond returns. Finally, Kamstra, Kramer and 
Levi (2015) document a seasonal pattern in U.S. Treasury returns that coincides with the 
number of reported cases of Seasonal Affective Disorder (SAD). The disorder is related to 
the amount of day light varying over the year in the northern hemisphere. Bond returns are 
better in the fall when investors get depressed and sell equities for bonds and worse in spring 
when equity and bond positions are reversed. 
 
Chapter 2 in this dissertation, “Emerging government bond market timing”, contributes to the 
literature by investigating the predictability of the BRP for emerging government bond 
markets. In recent years many emerging market countries have issued government bonds in 
their own local currency. Contrary to the older emerging government bonds issued in U.S. 
dollars this new market behaves itself more like developed market government bonds with a 
larger exposure to the term and liquidity premiums than to the default risk premium. Ilmanen 
(1997) shows that developed markets can be predicted with the bond momentum, equity 
momentum and term spread factors. Chapter 2 confirms that these three factors can also 
predict the emerging local currency bond markets. Hence, also in this respect these emerging 
bond markets behave in a similar way to the developed markets. The same three factors 
cannot predict emerging government bonds issued in U.S. dollars, however. The study also 
confirms that the three factors could be used to predict developed markets in the 15 years 
following the Ilmanen (1997) study. This shows that the emerging government bond market 
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does not fully incorporate the information that triggered recent bond and equity returns, and 
that the steepness of the curve contains information about future bond returns. 
 
Chapter 3, “Political risk and expected government bond returns”, focuses on the default risk 
premium within the older emerging government bond market issued in U.S. dollars and the 
newer EMU bond market issued in euros. In the recent euro crisis country spreads between 
European countries with the same currency (i.e. the euro) and a single central bank 
reappeared. These spreads almost disappeared when the euro was introduced in 1999, but 
returned in 2009 and almost led to the demise of the euro. Political risk is an important driver 
of sovereign default risk. A recent study by Bekaert et al. (2014) shows that the level of 
political risk can explain a third of the spread between emerging market dollar bonds and 
U.S. Treasuries. Chapter 3 of this dissertation shows that changes in political risk can predict 
government bond returns. Countries with decreasing political risk achieve higher future risk-
adjusted returns than countries with increasing political risk. The result is consistent for both 
the developed EMU bond market and the emerging dollar debt market. Hence, the bond 
market does not efficiently incorporate changes in political risk. 
 
In Chapter 4, “Inflation and seasonality in bond returns”, a new seasonal pattern in 
international developed government bond returns is documented. Bond returns are 3.8 
percentage points higher in the second half of the calendar year than in the first half of the 
calendar year. We contribute to the literature by explaining this new seasonal pattern in 
international government bond returns with an opposite seasonal pattern in the not seasonally 
adjusted U.S. inflation rate. The seasonal pattern in inflation is mainly driven by the 
underlying fuel components. More demand for heating oil and gasoline in the first half of the 
year is a likely determinant for the seasonal pattern in inflation. The fuel components can also 
explain why the seasonal pattern of U.S. bond returns was not significant between 1952 and 
1979. In the same period, U.S. inflation did not demonstrate a significant seasonal pattern 
either. The absence of a free-floating oil price in that period probably explains the absence of 
the seasonal pattern in the two fuel components. 
 
Chapter 5, “Forecasting sovereign default risk with Merton’s model”, focuses on predicting 
the default risk premium using the famous Merton model (1974). This model estimates the 
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default risk of a company based on its corporate bonds and debt, equity, and equity volatility 
as inputs. Gray, Merton and Bodie (2007) have adapted the model to use it for government 
bonds. This new model estimates the sovereign default risk of a country using both the 
emerging market government bonds denominated in the local currency and U.S. dollars and 
the currency volatility as inputs. The local currency debt acts like the equity of a country and 
the U.S. dollar debt acts like the real debt. Gapen et al. (2008) show the model spread level is 
highly correlated with the market spread level. Chapter 5 contributes to the literature by 
showing that changes in the model spread are correlated with changes in CDS market spreads 
and can even predict these spread changes after correcting for structural risk premiums over 
time. Hence, information from the emerging government bond market can be used to predict 
sovereign CDS market returns, which indicates that the CDS market is not fully price-
efficient. 
 
The second strand of literature is on the bond market related volatility risk premium. Similar 
to the demand of a positive BRP, investors require a negative VRP. Buyers of volatility 
related instruments like options have a limited downside when the option premium decreases 
to zero and an unlimited upside when volatility increases. Volatility tends to behave 
asymmetrical with small declines and large and sudden increases. Therefore, sellers of 
volatility demand a risk premium. Duarte, Longstaff and Yu (2007) find evidence of a 
volatility risk premium in the fixed income market. Cremers, Halling, and Weinbaum (2014) 
find that the VRP in the equity market can be attributed to two types of risk: volatility risk 
and jump risk. Volatility risk is related to the market price of equity volatility, also called 
vega; jump risk is related to large changes in the price of the equity, also called gamma.  
 
Chapter 6 of this dissertation, “Riding the swaption curve”, complements the literature on the 
VRP. The volatility risk and jump risk premiums in fixed income markets are consistent with 
the results of Cremers, Halling and Weinbaum (2014) for the equity volatility market. 
Contrary to equity volatility, the model to hedge fixed income volatility related instruments 
like swaptions is not evident. We contribute to the literature showing that the results are 
robust for the Black (1976), Vasicek (1977) and SABR (Rebonato et al. 2009) models all 
assuming a different behavior of interest rates. We also compare our work with riding 
strategies on the yield curve instead of the swaption volatility curve, like the study of Dyl and 
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Joehnk (1981). Yield curve riding strategies buy longer-dated bonds and sell these before 
maturity. Riding the swaption curve and riding the yield curve have in common that their 
respective forward curves are not realized over time. 
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2. Emerging government bond market timing 
 
Based on Duyvesteyn and Martens (2014), published in the Journal of Fixed Income. We are 
grateful for the useful comments from Olaf Penninga, Kommer van Trigt and seminar 
participants at Robeco. 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Emerging Market (EM) countries can issue debt in U.S. Dollars or in their local currency. 
EM dollar debt will be affected by the U.S. yield curve and the country specific credit spread. 
For a U.S. investor EM local currency debt returns will depend on the local yield curve 
dynamics and the exchange rate. In this study we show that well-known predictors for 
developed government bond excess returns – bond momentum, equity momentum and term 
spread – can also predict the excess returns of government bond debt of emerging countries 
issued in local currency10. The results for the bond markets of emerging countries Brazil, 
Mexico, South-Africa, Poland, Malaysia and South-Korea are interesting for a number of 
reasons. First, EM local currency debt is a rapidly growing asset class, with the amount 
outstanding more than 1.5 trillion U.S. Dollars11. Second, many emerging countries currently 
have debt-to-GDP ratios that are lower and thus better than most developed countries. Third, 
the average correlation between the total returns in dollars of the local currency debt of the 
six EM and U.S. treasuries is just one percent offering diversification benefits of adding EM 
to a portfolio of U.S. treasuries. In contrast, the same correlation between EM Dollar debt 
and U.S. treasuries is 50 percent. With current yields much higher for local currency 
emerging bonds than for developed bonds, emerging local currency bonds are attractive to 
invest in. Finally, we show that active duration management can add value. The fact that 
equity momentum and term spread can predict EM bond returns suggests that these markets 
                                                
10
 Following Ilmanen (1995), all excess returns are in local currency terms. It is a proxy for the bond’s currency-
hedged returns for a foreign investor. This way the focus is on returns driven by yield pick-up and yield 
changes, not on the more volatile currency returns. 
11
 Source: September 2012 local markets guide of JP Morgan. The U.S. $1.5 trillion relates to index-eligible 
local markets (GBI-EM Broad market capitalization). Total EM local currency debt accounts for over 80% or 
U.S. $7.9 trillion of the outstanding U.S. $9.6 trillion EM debt stock for sovereign and corporate and local 
currency instruments. 
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have matured because the underlying interest rates respond similarly to growth and inflation 
dynamics as they do in developed markets. 
 
Dyl and Joehnk (1981) have published the first paper on using the term spread to predict 
bond excess returns. Ilmanen (1995; 1997) includes equity momentum and term spread as 
predictors of government bond excess returns. Ilmanen (1997), Yamada (1999), Luu and Yu 
(2012) and Moskowitz et al. (2012) provide evidence that bond momentum can predict the 
developed bond market returns of Australia, Canada, Germany, Japan, the U.K. and the U.S.. 
In this study we show that bond momentum, equity momentum and term spread can also 
predict the excess returns of government bond debt of emerging countries issued in local 
currency. As far as we know we are the first to investigate the predictive power of such 
factors for emerging debt. We also provide an update of the predictive power of equity 
momentum and term spread for developed bond markets. 
 
The term spread or yield curve steepness is first used by Dyl and Joehnk (1981) as a predictor 
for bond excess returns. Subsequently, Fama and Bliss (1987), Campbell and Shiller (1991), 
and Ilmanen (1995; 1997) also use it to predict developed bond returns. Ilmanen uses the 
term spread as an overall proxy for the bond risk premium. The larger the term spread, the 
more attractive government bonds are. He also argues that the term spread is sometimes 
influenced by the market’s (unobservable) rate expectations, and hence it will be a noisy 
proxy for the bond risk premium. Therefore, it is better to combine the term spread with other 
predictor factors to get a more robust prediction for the future bond returns. In this study we 
combine the term spread with two other predictors of future bond returns: bond momentum 
and equity momentum. 
 
Ilmanen (1995; 1997) shows that past equity returns also predict government bond returns. 
His explanation is that investors are more risk-averse (fearful) when their current wealth is 
low relative to their past wealth. Conversely, greater wealth near business cycle peaks makes 
investors less risk-averse (greedy). Recent stock market performance is seen as a proxy for 
the (unobservable) aggregate level of risk aversion. If recent stock market performance has 
been poor, current wealth is low(er), and investors are more risk-averse. They therefore 
12_Erim Duyvesteyn BW Stand.job
 
19 
 
prefer (government) bonds and drive up the prices of these bonds. Similarly positive stock 
returns are followed by negative bond returns. 
 
Evidence that bond momentum can predict government bond returns is provided by Ilmanen 
(1997) for the U.S., Yamada (1999) for Japan, and Luu and Yu (2012) and Moskowitz et al. 
(2012) for Australia, Canada, Germany, Japan, the U.K. and the U.S.. An often cited 
explanation for the success of momentum strategies is that market participants under react to 
new information. Related to the under reaction are conservativeness and anchoring biases of 
investors. Momentum expects positive (negative) bond returns to be followed by more 
positive (negative) bond returns. 
 
By testing the predictive ability of term spread, equity momentum and bond momentum for 
EM debt we also provide insight to what extent EM interest rates behave in a similar way to 
interest rates from developed markets. A prime example is equity momentum. Ilmanen 
(1995; 1997) uses a negative sign for equity momentum as a predictor for developed bond 
returns, due to the aforementioned relation between the stock market performance, current 
wealth, and the level of risk-averseness of investors. Keim and Stambaugh (1986), and Hong 
et al. (2012), however, use a positive sign for equity momentum as a predictor for U.S. credit 
market returns. Hence if we find that equity momentum with a negative sign can predict EM 
interest rates, we can conclude that EM interest rates behave in a similar way as interest rates 
from developed markets. The credit risk of EM countries has at best a minor impact on 
interest rate dynamics. 
 
Miyajima et al. (2012) find that EM local currency government yields have behaved more 
like safe haven yields since 2008: Domestic factors like the monetary and fiscal policy have 
tended to dictate the dynamics of the yields and EM yields have dropped, rather than 
increased, in response to worsening global risk sentiment. We confirm this conclusion by 
showing that the returns of EM local currency debt related to yield pick-up and yield changes 
(not exchange rates) have a substantial average correlation of 31% with U.S. treasury returns, 
compared to just 6% with U.S. High Yield (HY) credits.  
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2.2 Methodology 
 
We predict government bond excess returns with three factors: bond momentum, equity 
momentum and term spread12. 
 
The bond momentum and equity momentum factors are initially based on 1-month total 
returns (including coupons and dividends) in excess of the cash return based on 3-month 
LIBOR rates. Later on we also analyze 3-month bond and equity momentum to reduce 
transaction costs. For each country and each factor we compute each month whether the 
factor is positive or negative. For each factor and each country we then take either a long or a 
short position that will earn or pay the excess bond return for the coming month. Given a 
positive bond momentum or a positive term spread we take a long position; given a positive 
equity momentum we take a short position. We take short positions after negative excess 
bond returns or a negative term spread, and a long position after negative equity returns. 
 
We use investment strategies to evaluate the predictive power of factors since we are 
interested in the economic significance of the predictive power of these factors. The 
alternative to strategies is to use predictive regressions (further split in in-sample and out-of-
sample regressions), providing statistical evidence. See Thornton and Valente (2012) for an 
excellent discussion on the differences between these two methods. They show that the 
Cochrane and Piazzesi’s (2005) forward rates factor, found to be successful in in-sample 
predictive regressions for excess bond returns does not have economic value in an investment 
strategy. 
 
We aggregate the individual country strategy returns to get a portfolio view on the predictive 
power of bond momentum, equity momentum and term spread. We look at multi-factor 
                                                
12
 The factors are all based on data from financial markets. Ilmanen (1997) mentions that financial market 
variables are better predictors of government bond returns than macro-economic fundamentals. He argues that 
market-based variables are forward-looking while macro-economic data describe past events. Ludvigson and 
Ng (2009) indicate that whereas existing theories imply that there should be a relation between rational variation 
in bond risk premia and macro-economic fundamentals, there is little empirical evidence of a link between the 
macro-economy and bond risk premia. Ludvigson and Ng provide evidence of such a link by using dynamic 
factors based on more than 100 macro-economic time-series. 
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strategy returns per country, combining the returns from the bond momentum, equity 
momentum and term spread strategies. Finally we put it altogether in a portfolio of countries 
and strategies. We do so separately for developed and emerging markets. All combinations 
are equal weighted assuming no superior predictive power for an individual country or factor. 
2.3 Data 
 
We focus on the same six developed markets as in Luu and Yu (2012) and Moskowitz et al. 
(2012): Australia, Canada, Germany, Japan, the U.K. and the U.S.. These are the most liquid 
developed bond markets. For EM we focus on Brazil, Mexico, South-Africa, Poland, 
Malaysia and South-Korea. Besides covering 6 time-zones and 4 continents, the swap 
markets needed for active duration management are well developed for all six countries13. 
The first five countries also have the maximum (capped) weight of 10 percent each in the JP 
Morgan GBI-EM diversified index which is often used by investors to track the local 
currency government debt market for EM. According to the World Bank classification South-
Korea is considered to be a developed market, which led the major index providers JP 
Morgan and FTSE to include the country in their developed markets index universe for 
respectively bonds and equities. However, due to accessibility issues and in particular a lack 
of full currency convertibility two other major index providers Barclays and MSCI still 
consider South-Korea as emerging market for respectively bonds and equities. South-Korea 
currently has the most liquid bond futures market after Germany, the U.S., Japan and the 
U.K. according to Bloomberg volume data. Hence for all countries active duration 
management taking both long and short positions is feasible in practice. 
 
For both developed and emerging markets we use monthly data starting in January 2001. 
Only data for South-Africa is available from 1999. In January 2001 data for Poland and 
South-Korea become available, marking the starting date of the analysis. By looking at the 
same period for developed and emerging it is easier to compare results. For developed we 
                                                
13
 The 2010 triennial report of the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) shows that Brazil, Mexico, South-
Africa, Poland, Malaysia and South-Korea all have a turnover in excess of one billion USD a day in OTC 
interest rate derivatives. See www.bis.org/publ/rpfxf10t.htm. Note that EM local currency debt bond returns 
expressed in dollars depend on both EM yield dynamics and exchange rate returns. By using swaps (or futures 
for South-Korea) we purely focus on exploiting the predictability in the yield dynamics. 
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will report some key results in Appendix 2.A with data starting in 1973. For each country the 
equity market return is measured by its MSCI total return index and the bond market return is 
measured by its JP Morgan total return index. Both indices are expressed in the local 
currency. 3-month LIBOR rates to calculate excess returns are obtained from Bloomberg. 
Data on U.S. HY credits are obtained from Barclays, including the returns in excess of 
maturity-matched U.S. treasuries. 
 
The term spread is defined as the 10-year government bond yield minus the 3-month LIBOR 
rate for developed markets, whereas for emerging markets we use the index yield instead of 
the 10-year yield14. If the bond yield exceeds the LIBOR rate the strategy goes long in the 
bond market. If the bond yield is below the LIBOR rate the strategy takes a short position. 
Bond and equity momentum are defined as the total return of the local government bond and 
equity market indices in the preceding month in excess of the return on the 3-month LIBOR 
cash investment. These excess returns are comparable to the returns of futures contracts on 
equity and bond indices. Following Ilmanen (1995) all excess returns are in local currency 
terms. It is a proxy for the bond’s currency-hedged returns for a foreign investor. This way 
the focus is on returns driven by yield pick-up and yield changes, not on the more volatile 
currency returns. 
 
The investment strategies have a monthly rebalancing frequency and take either long or short 
positions in each government bond index in excess of the LIBOR rate. The sample 
characteristics of the buy-and-hold (always long) are provided in Table 2-1. Developed and 
emerging bond markets posted on average annual excess returns over LIBOR of respectively 
2.5 and 2.6 percent per annum from January 2001 to December 2012, reflecting both coupons 
and capital gains due to predominantly declining interest rates.  
 
                                                
14
 For Brazil, Malaysia and Mexico we need to use the bond index yield instead of the 10-year bond yield due to 
limited data availability and quality. For consistency we also use the bond index yield for the other 3 EM 
markets. Results using the 10-year bond yield for Malaysia, South Africa and South Korea are similar to using 
the bond index yields. When there is no LIBOR available a particular country we use the 3-month T-bill rate of 
that country. 
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Table 2-1: Developed and emerging markets buy-and-hold characteristics 
 Country Excess  
return p.a. Volatility p.a. Sharpe ratio First month 
Panel A: Developed bond markets 
Australia 1.1% 4.0% 0.27 Jan 2001 
Canada 3.4% 4.0% 0.86 Jan 2001 
Germany 3.0% 4.1% 0.74 Jan 2001 
Japan 1.6% 2.0% 0.79 Jan 2001 
United Kingdom 2.5% 5.4% 0.46 Jan 2001 
United States 3.3% 5.1% 0.65 Jan 2001 
Portfolio developed 2.5% 3.5% 0.71 Jan 2001 
 
Panel B: Emerging bond markets  
Brazil 2.0% 4.9% 0.41 May 2003 
Poland 2.7% 3.9% 0.70 Jan 2001 
Malaysia 0.9% 3.3% 0.26 Jan 2002 
Mexico 3.4% 5.6% 0.61 Jan 2002 
South Africa 2.8% 6.8% 0.41 Jan 2001 
South Korea 2.5% 3.9% 0.65 Jan 2001 
Portfolio emerging 2.6% 3.3% 0.78 Jan 2001 
Note: Sample statistics for the excess bond returns over local LIBOR rates. The ‘Portfolio developed’ and 
‘Portfolio emerging’ are equal weighting the excess returns of the 6 developed and 6 emerging countries, 
respectively. The first month depends on the data availability of a total return bond index and a 3-month LIBOR 
rate. For Brazil we start in May 2003 despite there being index returns from January 2002 to December 2002, 
because no index eligible government bonds were outstanding from January 2003 to April 2003. The final 
month is December 2012. 
 
Table 2-2 shows the correlations between the various markets. Canadian and U.S. excess 
bond returns have the highest correlation at 86 percent whereas Brazilian and Japanese 
excess bond returns have the lowest correlation at just 4 percent. The average correlation 
across developed markets is 63 percent and across emerging markets it is 35 percent. 
Between developed and emerging markets the average correlation is just 26 percent, 
illustrating the diversification benefits of adding emerging local currency debt to a portfolio 
already containing developed government bonds. The average correlation across developed 
markets since June 1973 (not reported here) is on average 35 percent. Compared to the 63 
percent correlation from 2001 onwards this shows that correlations across developed markets 
have increased over time. 
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Table 2-2: Developed and emerging markets buy-and-hold excess return correlations 
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Australia 100% 
     
       
Canada 69% 100% 
    
       
Germany 69% 73% 100% 
   
       
Japan 36% 44% 36% 100% 
  
       
U.K. 67% 80% 79% 41% 100% 
 
       
U.S. 71% 86% 75% 38% 76% 100%        
              
Brazil 15% 27% 13% 4% 28% 26%  100%      
Poland 27% 29% 33% 6% 33% 32%  40% 100%     
Malaysia 30% 25% 31% 18% 24% 30%  32% 40% 100%    
Mexico 20% 34% 18% 15% 23% 31%  48% 36% 27% 100%   
South Africa 23% 26% 27% 21% 31% 28%  44% 38% 34% 40% 100%  
South Korea 39% 35% 35% 21% 36% 37%  27% 21% 30% 36% 33% 100% 
Note: Correlations between monthly bond returns in excess of local LIBOR rates. The starting month is January 
2001, except for Brazil, Malaysia and Mexico which start n May 2003, January 2002 and January 2002, 
respectively. The final month is December 2012. 
2.4 Predicting excess bond returns 
 
Table 2-3 shows for each of the 12 countries the predictive ability of 1-month bond 
momentum, 1-month equity momentum, and the term spread. Of all information ratios (IRs), 
33 are positive and only 3 are negative. Summarizing the results for developed countries in 
the equally weighted (EW) portfolio, bond momentum has an IR of 0.34, equity momentum 
an IR of 0.68, and the term spread has an IR of 0.56. Hence all three factors are successful in 
predicting developed government bond excess returns from 2001 to 2012. Table 2-9 in 
Appendix 2.A shows that this is also the case for the much longer 1973-2012 period, with IRs 
of 0.78 for bond momentum, 0.34 for equity momentum, and 0.59 for term spread. Hence 
equity momentum and term spread have continued to work after Ilmanen’s (1995) 
publication. Luu and Yu (2012) and Moskowitz et al. (2012) already showed this for bond 
momentum. 
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Table 2-3: Performance of bond momentum, equity momentum and term spread 
  Bond momentum  Equity momentum  Term spread 
 Country Excess  
return Vol IR 
 Excess  
return Vol IR  
Excess  
return Vol IR 
Panel A: Developed bond markets 
Australia 0.4% 4.0% 0.11  2.8% 3.9% 0.71  -0.7% 4.0% -0.17 
Canada 2.0% 4.1% 0.48  1.8% 4.1% 0.45  2.6% 4.1% 0.65 
Germany 1.6% 4.1% 0.39  1.5% 4.1% 0.36  1.8% 4.1% 0.43 
Japan 0.3% 2.1% 0.17  0.8% 2.0% 0.38  1.6% 2.0% 0.79 
United Kingdom 0.4% 5.5% 0.07  4.0% 5.3% 0.75  1.6% 5.4% 0.29 
United States 1.0% 5.2% 0.19  1.7% 5.2% 0.32  2.5% 5.1% 0.49 
Portfolio developed 1.0% 2.8% 0.34  2.1% 3.1% 0.68  1.6% 2.8% 0.56 
 
Panel B: Emerging bond markets 
Brazil 2.0% 4.9% 0.41  1.5% 4.9% 0.30  1.8% 5.0% 0.36 
Poland 1.3% 4.0% 0.32  1.3% 4.0% 0.33  -2.4% 3.9% -0.60 
Malaysia 1.3% 3.2% 0.40  0.7% 3.3% 0.22  1.3% 3.2% 0.41 
Mexico -1.4% 5.7% -0.25  1.6% 5.7% 0.28  2.5% 5.7% 0.44 
South Africa 1.2% 6.8% 0.18  2.8% 6.8% 0.41  2.9% 6.8% 0.42 
South Korea 0.9% 3.9% 0.22  2.3% 3.9% 0.59  3.0% 3.8% 0.78 
Portfolio emerging 1.3% 2.4% 0.52  1.7% 2.6% 0.64  1.4% 2.4% 0.56 
Note: Annualized gross performance of active duration management for excess government bond returns based 
on 1-month bond excess return momentum, 1-month equity excess return momentum, and term spread. Term 
spread is defined as the 10-year government bond yield minus the 3-month LIBOR rate for developed markets 
and as the JP Morgan bond index yield minus the 3-month LIBOR rate for emerging markets. Bond momentum 
and equity momentum are defined as the total return of the local government bond and equity market indices in 
the preceding month in excess of the return on a 3-month LIBOR cash investment. The signs of bond 
momentum and term spread are positive, and the sign of equity is negative. The sample period is January 2001 
to December 2012, with the exceptions that Brazil starts in May 2003 and Malaysia and Mexico start in January 
2002. 
 
For emerging countries the EW portfolio results show bond momentum has an IR of 0.52, 
equity momentum an IR of 0.64, and term spread has an IR of 0.56. Hence the factors found 
to successfully predict developed bond market excess returns, also can predict EM local 
currency bond excess returns. The results for the portfolios also show the risk reduction due 
to diversification when combining the results for six countries. 
 
Ilmanen (1995) suggests that term spread is an overall proxy for the bond risk premium, but 
that it is also a noisy proxy. Therefore, it is better to combine the term spread with other 
predictor factors to get a more robust prediction for future bond returns. Table 2-4 shows the 
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results when averaging the returns for the three single-factor strategies of each country. The 
multi-factor strategy has a positive IR for each of the 12 bond markets, ranging from 0.04 
(Poland) to 0.87 (South-Korea). The portfolio results are even stronger. For developed 
markets the EW combination of the results for the 6 developed countries provides an IR of 
0.79 (1.03 from 1973 to 2012, see Table 2-10 in Appendix 2.A), whereas for EM the IR is 
1.07. These IRs are substantially higher than when only using term spread, achieved by 
reducing volatility. For developed markets and EM an investor can earn on average an extra 
return of respectively 1.5 and 1.4 percent per annum by following this multi-factor active 
duration strategy. The cumulative excess returns of the multi-factor strategy and that of each 
of the three single-factor strategies are shown in Figure 2-1 for developed markets and in 
Figure 2-2 for emerging markets. These graphs show that the strategies earn gradually over 
time, and hence are robust over time. 
 
Table 2-4: Multi-factor strategy for developed and emerging market 
 Country 
Multi-factor strategy 
Excess                                     Information 
return p.a.         Volatility                 ratio 
Sharpe ratio 
buy & hold 
Sharpe ratio 
buy & hold + 
multi-factor 
strategy 
Panel A: Developed bond markets 
Australia 0.8% 2.4% 0.36 0.27 0.40 
Canada 2.2% 2.9% 0.73 0.86 0.89 
Germany 1.6% 2.7% 0.61 0.74 0.82 
Japan 0.9% 1.4% 0.66 0.79 0.82 
United Kingdom 2.0% 3.3% 0.61 0.46 0.64 
United States 1.7% 3.3% 0.53 0.65 0.68 
Portfolio developed 1.5% 2.0% 0.79 0.71 0.83 
 
Panel B: Emerging bond markets 
Brazil 1.8% 3.4% 0.52 0.41 0.55 
Poland 0.1% 1.8% 0.04 0.70 0.59 
Malaysia 1.3% 2.2% 0.57 0.26 0.46 
Mexico 0.8% 3.1% 0.24 0.61 0.63 
South Africa 2.3% 3.2% 0.72 0.41 0.65 
South Korea 2.1% 2.4% 0.87 0.65 0.80 
Portfolio emerging 1.4% 1.3% 1.07 0.78 0.99 
Note: Performance statistics for the multi-factor strategy which is an equal weighted portfolio of the 1-month 
bond momentum, 1-month equity momentum, and term spread strategies. The portfolios developed and 
emerging are equal weighting the results of the 6 developed and 6 emerging countries, respectively. The final 
month of the sample period is December 2012. For the starting month for each country see Table 2-1. 
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Figure 2-1: Cumulative excess return factors and multi-factor strategy dev. markets 
 
 
Figure 2-2: Cumulative excess return factors and multi-factor strategy emerging markets 
  
 
Note: Cumulative gross performance of 1-month bond momentum, 1-month equity momentum, term spread, 
and the multi-factor strategy that equally weights the returns on the three single-factor strategies. Term spread is 
defined as the 10-year government bond yield minus the 3-month LIBOR rate for developed markets and as the 
JP Morgan bond index yield minus the 3-month LIBOR rate for emerging markets. Bond momentum and equity 
momentum are defined as the total return of the local government bond and equity market indices in the 
preceding month in excess of the return on a 3-month LIBOR cash investment. The signs of bond momentum 
and term spread are positive, and the sign of equity is negative. The sample period is January 2001 to December 
2012. 
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The final two columns in Table 2-4 also show that combining the buy and hold portfolio with 
the multi-factor investment strategy as an overlay adds value. Besides the already mentioned 
1.5 and 1.4 percent additional annual returns, the Sharpe ratios rise from 0.71 to 0.83 for 
developed bond markets (1973-2012: from 0.33 to 0.70), and from 0.78 to 0.99 for emerging 
bond markets. The buy-and-hold portfolio we have defined here is currency hedged. For 
investors who do not hedge the currency risk though, the Sharpe ratios rise from 0.74 to 0.89 
for developed markets and from 0.77 to 0.87 for emerging markets. 
2.5 Taking into account transaction costs 
 
So far we ignored transaction costs and used a 1-month setting for both bond and equity 
momentum. Of course, such a fast setting will result in frequent trades. We analyze the 
impact of transaction costs on the results and add the slower 3-month setting resulting in 
lower turnover and lower costs. We asked brokers for transaction cost estimates for 
developed and emerging markets. Based on this information we use conservative estimates of 
transaction costs: For developed markets we use a one basis point bid-ask spread on the yield, 
which translates approximately to seven basis points at the bond index level assuming an 
index duration of seven years. For emerging bond markets we use a five basis point spread on 
the yield, leading to 22.5 basis points costs for the bond index assuming an index duration of 
4.5 years. Hence, a switch from long to short or short to long costs 22.5 basis points. 
 
The results in Table 2-5 show that term spread has the lowest turnover with 0.7 trades per 
market per year for developed markets. As a result the net IR of 0.54 is similar to the gross 
IR of 0.56 we reported in Table 2-3. One-month bond and equity momentum, however, have 
more than 10 trades per country per year. For developed bond markets the net IR for bond 
momentum at 0.06 is therefore substantially lower than the gross IR at 0.34. For emerging 
markets the net IR of bond momentum is negative due to the higher transaction costs for 
emerging markets: the gross IR of 0.52 becomes a net IR of -0.48. Also the net IR for 1-
month equity momentum is negative at -0.38. 
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Table 2-5: Investment strategy and transaction costs 
 
Term 
spread 
Bond 
1-month 
Bond  
3-month 
Equity 
1- month 
Equity  
3-month 
Strategy 
1-month 
Strategy  
3-month 
Panel A: Developed bond markets 
Gross excess return 1.6% 1.0% 1.2% 2.1% 1.8% 1.5% 1.5% 
Gross IR 0.56 0.34 0.40 0.68 0.57 0.79 0.70 
Turnover 0.7 11.1 5.6 10.2 5.2 6.2 3.5 
Transaction costs 0.1% 0.8% 0.4% 0.7% 0.4% 0.4% 0.2% 
Net excess return 1.5% 0.2% 0.8% 1.4% 1.4% 1.1% 1.3% 
Net IR 0.54 0.06 0.27 0.45 0.45 0.57 0.58 
 
Panel B: Emerging bond markets 
Gross excess return 1.4% 1.3% 1.6% 1.7% 2.7% 1.4% 1.9% 
Gross IR 0.56 0.52 0.57 0.64 0.99 1.07 1.27 
Turnover 1.4 10.7 5.2 11.7 5.5 5.3 3.3 
Transaction costs 0.3% 2.4% 1.2% 2.6% 1.2% 1.2% 0.7% 
Net excess return 1.0% -1.1% 0.5% -1.0% 1.5% 0.2% 1.2% 
Net IR 0.43 -0.48 0.17 -0.38 0.54 0.18 0.78 
Note: Performance and turnover statistics taking into account transaction costs. “Model 1-month” is equally 
weighting the returns from the term spread, 1-month bond and 1-month equity momentum strategies. “Model 3-
month” replaces the 1-month momentum strategies by the 3-month momentum strategies. Turnover is expressed 
as the number of trades per country per year. Transaction costs for switching from a long (short) to a short 
(long) are assumed to be 7 basis points for developed markets and 22.5 basis points for emerging markets. 
 
Turnover is about halved by switching from 1-month to 3-month momentum. For developed 
markets this increases the net IR for bond momentum. For emerging markets using the 3-
month setting is a substantial improvement moving the net IRs into positive territory at 0.17 
(bond momentum) and 0.54 (equity momentum). Whereas for developed markets the multi-
factor strategy IR is similar when basing the multi-factor strategy on 1-month or 3-month 
bond and equity momentum, for emerging markets we clearly see an improvement. The net 
IR improves from 0.18 to 0.78, and transaction costs drop from 1.2 percent to 0.7 percent per 
annum. 
2.6 Global or local bond momentum 
 
Correlations between (developed) bond markets have risen over time. Ilmanen (1995) has 
already investigated the predictive power of global factors. A global factor has the same 
signal for each country. The motivation is that if bond markets move closely together the 
implicit country allocation from for example local bond momentum may not be helping 
performance. In fact Ilmanen and Sayood (2002) find that cross-sectional momentum does 
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not work: If one country has an above average bond return, more often than not the other 
countries will catch up, rather than the higher return country continuing to have a higher 
return. Global bond momentum also avoids the potential noise of measuring the return 
momentum of a single country. 
 
To test the impact of a higher correlation between bond markets over time, we compare 1-
month local bond momentum with 1-month global bond momentum. For the latter we simply 
take the average 1-month excess return of all the six bond markets in the developed or 
emerging universe. Figure 2-3 shows that for developed global bond momentum has 
performed better. This result means that between countries there is more likely mean-
reversion than momentum, confirming the conclusion of Ilmanen and Sayood (2002). Figure 
2-4 shows a similar result for emerging markets. Hence also for EM between countries there 
is more likely mean-reversion between the bond returns from the different countries than 
momentum. 
 
Figure 2-3: Global and local bond momentum in developed bond markets 
 
Note: Cumulative gross performance 1-month local and global bond momentum. Local momentum takes each 
month for each country a long or a short position depending on whether the excess bond return in the previous 
month was positive or negative, respectively. Global bond momentum uses the previous month’s average excess 
bond return of the six individual bond markets and takes a long or short position in all six markets depending on 
whether this average excess bond return is positive or negative, respectively. 
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Figure 2-4: Global and local bond momentum in emerging bond markets 
 
Note: See Figure 2-3 
2.7 EM local currency debt vis-à-vis EM USD debt 
 
We show that well-known predictors for developed government bond markets also work for 
excess returns of EM local currency debt. This suggests that interest rates in emerging 
markets have similar drivers as those in developed markets. In this section we look in more 
detail at the contemporaneous return correlations between EM local currency debt on the one 
hand and U.S. treasuries and U.S. HY on the other hand. We also include EM hard currency 
(dollar) debt in this comparison. All six emerging markets that we analyze also have USD 
debt outstanding. We decompose the EM dollar debt total returns into U.S. treasuries returns 
and EM credit returns. We decompose the local currency debt total returns into local rates 
returns and exchange rate returns. Note that so far we have predicted the rates part of EM 
local currency returns and those of developed markets. Table 2-6 shows the correlations 
between the various components of EM local currency returns and EM dollar returns on the 
one hand, and U.S. treasuries returns and U.S. high yield credit returns (in excess of U.S. 
treasuries) on the other hand. 
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Table 2-6: Correlations EM government bond and credit returns 
  Brazil Poland Malaysia Mexico South Africa South Korea Average 
Panel A: correlation with U.S. treasuries 
Dollar debt U.S. treas 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 Excess -20% -29% -4% -38% -22% -1% -19% 
 Total 7% 54% 66% 48% 41% 85% 50% 
         
LC debt Rates 26% 32% 30% 31% 28% 37% 31% 
 FX -18% -7% -5% -20% -7% -2% -10% 
 Total -13% 1% 11% -2% 3% 8% 1% 
         
Panel B: correlation with U.S. high yield excess return over treasuries 
Dollar debt U.S. treas -49% -49% -49% -49% -49% -49% -49% 
 Excess 40% 60% 59% 80% 69% 16% 54% 
 Total 38% 14% 12% 34% 33% -32% 17% 
         
LC debt Rates 23% 6% -15% 21% 5% -5% 6% 
 FX 52% 42% 47% 51% 45% 55% 49% 
 Total 50% 36% 27% 48% 37% 42% 40% 
         Note: Total EM dollar debt returns (‘Dollar debt’) are decomposed in a part attributable to U.S. Ttreasury 
returns (‘U.S. treas’) and the return in excess of duration matched U.S. treasuries (‘Excess’). EM local currency 
(LC) debt returns expressed in dollars are decomposed in a part attributable to local interest rates (‘Rates’) and 
exchange rate (FX) returns. This table shows the correlations of these return components with U.S. treasury 
returns (Panel A) and U.S. high yield excess returns over duration-matched treasures (Panel B). 
 
Panel A of Table 2-6 focuses on the correlations with U.S. treasuries returns. For EM dollar 
debt by construction the U.S. treasuries component is 100% correlated with U.S. treasuries 
returns. The credit part is as expected negatively correlated with U.S. treasuries returns15. The 
total return correlation is 50%. For EM local currency debt the interest part of the returns has 
a correlation of 31% with U.S. treasuries returns16, whereas the currency component has a 
negative correlation of -10%. The total return correlation is just 1%. Hence, from a 
diversification perspective a U.S. investor already owning U.S. treasuries is better off adding 
EM local currency debt to the portfolio than adding EM dollar debt. 
 
Panel B focuses on the correlations with U.S. high yield credit returns in excess of duration-
matched U.S. treasuries. As expected, the credit part (‘Excess’) of EM dollar debt has a 
correlation of 54% with the excess returns on U.S. high yield. Interestingly, the currency 
component of the EM local currency returns also has a high correlation of 49% with U.S. 
high yield. Hence both EM credit and currency returns have credit-like return characteristics. 
                                                
15
 Gueye and Sy (2013) also find a negative relationship between U.S. interest rates and EM bond spreads. 
16
 Miyajima et al. (2012) find that at least a quarter of the decline in EM bond yields can be attributed to lower 
U.S. Treasury yields. 
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Whereas total returns on EM dollar debt are more highly correlated with U.S. treasuries, the 
total returns on EM local currency debt are more highly correlated with U.S. high yield. This 
underscores the importance of separating the interest rate and currency part of EM local 
currency debt for the analyses in all previous sections. 
 
These conclusions have consequences for the sign of equity momentum as predictor of bond 
returns. For the interest rate part of local currency debt we need to use the negative sign that 
is also used in Ilmanen (1995; 1997) for developed government bond returns. For excess 
returns of EM USD debt (the credit part of the dollar debt returns) we need to use a positive 
sign as is also used in Hong et al. (2012) for U.S. credits. 
 
Table 2-7 shows the results of using equity momentum with a negative sign. For the interest 
rates component of EM local currency debt we see the IR of 0.64 already presented in Table 
2-3. In contrast the currency part cannot be predicted by equity momentum. For EM USD 
debt we find as expected a negative IR (-0.32) for the excess returns because we should have 
used a positive sign for equity momentum given that dollar debt excess returns are highly 
correlated with U.S. high yield credits. Table 2-7 also shows the importance of separating the 
U.S. rates and credit components in dollar debt by looking at credit returns in excess of 
duration-matched U.S. Treasury returns. Not doing so gives a near-zero IR of -0.05. 
  
Table 2-7: Equity momentum applied to EM debt returns 
 Brazil Poland Malaysia Mexico South Africa South Korea Portfolio 
LC debt Rates  0.30 0.33 0.22 0.28 0.41 0.59 0.64 
LC debt FX -0.49 0.06 -0.28 0.16 0.24 0.13 0.10 
Dollar debt total -0.08 0.08 -0.06 0.02 -0.09 -0.09 -0.05 
Dollar debt excess -0.10 -0.43 -0.28 -0.37 -0.13 -0.36 -0.32 
Note: This table shows the IRs from predicting the various return components of EM local currency debt and 
EM dollar debt by 1-month equity momentum. Total EM dollar debt returns (‘Dollar debt’) are decomposed in a 
part attributable to U.S. treasury returns (‘U.S. treas’) and the return in excess of duration matched U.S. 
treasuries (‘Excess’). EM local currency (LC) debt returns expressed in dollars are decomposed in a part 
attributable to local interest rates (‘Rates’) and exchange rate (FX) returns. 
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2.8 Conclusion 
 
We show that EM local currency debt excess returns can be predicted with bond momentum, 
equity momentum and term spread. Also after taking into account transaction costs it is 
possible to apply an active duration strategy on EM interest rate swaps. For the period 2001 
to 2012 such an overlay strategy has a net IR of 0.78 and adds 1.2 percent per annum to the 
return on a buy-and-hold index. Hence well-known predictors of government bond returns of 
developed markets can also predict the yield dynamics of EM local currency debt. 
 
The fact that predictors for developed bond markets can also predict EM local currency debt 
returns suggests that the rates component in EM local currency debt behaves like developed 
government bond yields. Indeed, we find that the correlation between EM local currency debt 
excess returns and U.S. treasury returns is 31 percent, whereas it is just 6 percent between 
EM local currency debt excess returns and U.S. High Yield returns in excess of maturity-
matched U.S. treasuries.  
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Appendix 2.A: Longer history for developed government bond markets 
 
The results for developed markets cover the 2001-2012 period to match the sample period for 
emerging debt. In this appendix we show several results for developed markets for the much 
longer 1973-2012 period. We extend the history before 1985 with data from Datastream 
(from Jan 1980 – Dec 1985) and a broker (from May 1973 - Dec 1979). For excess return 
calculations when LIBOR rates are not available we use 3-month Eurocurrency rates from 
Reuters and broker data.  
 
Table 2-8: Developed markets buy-and-hold characteristics 
 Country Excess  
return p.a. Volatility Sharpe ratio First month 
Australia 0.6% 5.8% 0.11 May 1974 
Canada 1.9% 7.4% 0.26 May 1974 
Germany 2.4% 4.6% 0.52 Jun 1973 
Japan 2.2% 5.6% 0.40 Jun 1973 
United Kingdom 1.2% 8.9% 0.13 Jun 1973 
United States 1.3% 6.8% 0.18 Jun 1973 
Portfolio developed 1.5% 4.5% 0.33 Jun 1973 
Note: Sample statistics for the excess returns over local LIBOR rates. The ‘Portfolio developed’ is equal 
weighting the results of the 6 developed and 6 emerging countries, respectively. The first month depends on the 
data availability of a total return bond index and a 3-month rate. Corresponding table in the text: Table 2-1, 
panel A. 
 
Table 2-9: Performance of bond momentum, equity momentum and term spread 
  Bond momentum  Equity momentum  Term spread 
 Country 
Exces
s  
return  
Vol IR 
 Excess  
return  Vol IR  
Excess  
return  Vol IR 
Australia 2.0% 5.8% 0.34  1.3% 5.8% 0.22  0.9% 5.8% 0.15 
Canada 3.4% 7.4% 0.47  2.6% 7.4% 0.35  1.8% 7.4% 0.24 
Germany 4.0% 4.5% 0.88  0.5% 4.7% 0.10  2.9% 4.6% 0.62 
Japan 2.5% 5.5% 0.44  1.4% 5.6% 0.25  2.7% 5.5% 0.49 
United Kingdom 2.0% 8.9% 0.23  -0.6% 8.9% -0.06  1.0% 8.9% 0.12 
United States 2.6% 6.8% 0.38  2.5% 6.8% 0.37  3.2% 6.8% 0.47 
Portfolio developed 2.8% 3.6% 0.78  1.2% 3.6% 0.34  2.1% 3.6% 0.59 
Note: Annualized gross performance of active duration management based on 1-month bond excess return 
momentum, 1-month equity excess return momentum, and term spread. Term spread is defined as the 10-year 
government bond yield minus the 3-month LIBOR rate. Bond momentum and equity momentum are defined as 
the total return of the local government bond and equity market indices in the preceding month in excess of the 
return on 3-month LIBOR cash investment. The signs of bond momentum and term spread are positive, and the 
sign of equity is negative. The final month of the sample period is December 2012. For the starting month for 
each country see Table 2-8. Corresponding table in the text: Table 2-3.  
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Table 2-10: Multi-factor strategy for developed markets 
 Country 
Excess  
return p.a. Volatility 
Information 
ratio 
Sharpe ratio 
buy & hold 
Sharpe ratio buy & 
hold + strategy 
Australia 1.4% 3.1% 0.44 0.11 0.32 
Canada 2.6% 3.9% 0.67 0.26 0.54 
Germany 2.4% 2.6% 0.93 0.52 0.88 
Japan 2.2% 3.4% 0.65 0.41 0.57 
United Kingdom 0.8% 4.7% 0.18 0.13 0.21 
United States 2.8% 3.8% 0.73 0.18 0.52 
Portfolio developed 2.0% 2.0% 1.03 0.33 0.70 
Note: Performance statistics for the multi-factor strategy which is an equal weighted portfolio of the 1-month 
bond momentum, 1-month equity momentum, and term spread investment strategies. The portfolio is an equal 
weighting the results of the 6 developed countries. Corresponding table in the text: Table 2-4, Panel A. 
 
Figure 2-5. Cumulative excess return investment strategy and factors developed markets 
 
Note: Corresponding table in the text: Figure 2-1. 
 
Table 2-11: Investment strategy and transaction costs 
Term 
spread 
Bond 
1-month 
Bond  
3-month 
Equity 
1- month 
Equity  
3-month 
Strategy 
1-month 
Strategy 
3-month 
Gross excess return 2.1% 2.8% 1.9% 1.2% 1.5% 2.0% 1.8% 
Gross IR 0.59 0.80 0.51 0.33 0.39 1.03 0.87 
Turnover 1.2 10.3 5.3 11.4 6.0 5.3 3.4 
Transaction costs 0.1% 0.7% 0.4% 0.8% 0.4% 0.4% 0.2% 
Net excess return 2.0% 2.1% 1.6% 0.4% 1.0% 1.7% 1.6% 
Net IR 0.57 0.59 0.41 0.11 0.28 0.84 0.76 
        Note: Performance and turnover statistics taking into account transaction costs. “Strategy 1-month” is equally 
weighting the returns from the term spread, 1-month bond and 1-month equity momentum strategies. “Strategy 
3-month” replaces the 1-month momentum strategies by the 3-month momentum strategies. Turnover is 
expressed as the number of trades per country per year. Transaction costs for switching from a long (short) to a 
short (long) are assumed to be 7 basis points for developed markets. Corresponding table in the text: Table 2-5, 
panel A. 
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3. Political risk and expected government bond returns 
 
Based on Duyvesteyn, Martens and Verwijmeren (2015). We are grateful for the useful 
comments from Roland Beck (discussant), Paul Beekhuizen, Geert Bekaert, John Coppock, 
Helene Samyschew (discussant) and participants at the 2015 European Sovereign Debt 
Crisis conference in Monaco organized by the Luxembourg School of Finance and the 2015 
18th annual conference of the Swiss Society for Financial Market Research in Zurich. 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The importance of political risk in developed government bond markets has recently been 
highlighted. Examples are the euro crisis and the October 2013 debate between the 
Republicans and Democrats on the U.S. debt-ceiling. These recent political developments 
have had a large influence on bond prices. During the U.S. debt ceiling debate, U.S. bond 
markets were clearly pricing in an increased possibility of a U.S. default.17 This sharp rise of 
short-term bond yields was reversed as soon as a resolution was found on 16 October, 2013. 
During the euro crisis, stock markets and European bond yields fluctuated heavily depending 
on estimates of whether Greece would leave the Eurozone and whether Italy and Spain 
needed a bailout by the other European countries. Changes in the Greek, Italian, and Spanish 
governments were needed to regain the trust from both investors and other European 
countries. As such, political risk seems to be very important for bond prices, even in 
developed markets. 
In this paper we analyze the relationship between political risk and bond prices. Our 
main contribution is to show that changes in political risk ratings predict the bond risk 
premium. Bonds from countries whose political risk ratings have improved outperform those 
from countries whose political risk ratings have deteriorated. By using political risk rating 
changes one can avoid the largest losses in bad times when credit spreads increase and keep 
up with the market index in good times. In bad times these political risk changes are 
particularly important to be able to distinguish between more stable and riskier countries. 
                                                
17 Nippani and Smith (2014) provide a detailed analysis on this event and the reaction of the financial market. 
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We use political risk ratings from the Political Risk Services (PRS) group. PRS 
collects political information and converts this into risk points based on a subjective analysis 
of the available information.18 The resulting political risk ratings are commercially but not 
publicly available. The ratings cover political risk in a broad sense, including government 
stability, socioeconomic conditions, investment profiles, internal and external conflicts, 
corruption, and law and order. The ratings are updated every month. 
At the end of each month we select the four countries with the highest improvements 
in political risk ratings (‘Best 4’) and the four countries with the highest deteriorations 
(‘Worst 4). We evaluate the portfolio returns in the subsequent month. We find that selecting 
the Best 4 leads to higher bond risk premiums, measured by realized bond returns, especially 
compared to the Worst 4. The return of this investment strategy based on political risk 
changes is called the change in political risk premium. 
We investigate whether the political risk premium is subsumed by other well-known 
factors driving the bond markets. We control for the term premium and the default premium, 
which are found to be priced-in risk factors for corporate bond returns in Gebhardt, Hvidkjaer 
and Swaminathan (2005a). In addition we analyse factors related to momentum, liquidity, 
macro-economic developments and the credit rating. Longstaff (2004) and Renne and 
Montfoort (2013) find priced liquidity measures based on comparing the less liquid bonds 
from respectively U.S. and German government related agencies to liquid government bonds. 
The political risk premium cannot be explained by the risk factors. The unexplained alpha of 
a regression that takes into account the default, term and liquidity premium is 0.8% per 
annum for bonds issued by the euro countries in euros and 7.6% for emerging market bonds 
denominated in U.S. dollars.  
The bond market does not seem to react to changes in political risk in a timely matter. 
A logical explanation is that political risk ratings are not public information, and that it is not 
straightforward to quantify political risk. Changes in political risk ratings also contain 
valuable information for credit agencies. Countries with improving or deteriorating political 
risk ratings on average also get a subsequent improvement or deterioration respectively in 
credit ratings. 
                                                
18
 The PRS group was established in 1979, placing it among the first commercial providers of political and 
country risk forecasts. Several academic studies have made use of their data (see for example Bekaert, Harvey, 
Lundblad, and Siegel, 2014). 
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Our findings are an important contribution to the literature on the price discovery in 
government bond markets. The U.S. bond market reacts quickly to important macroeconomic 
announcements (Balduzzi, Elton and Green, 2001) and order flows (Brandt and Kavajecz, 
2004). Nowak, Jobst and Tamirisa (2011) confirm that economic announcements are also 
important for the price discovery in emerging government bond markets and observe a 
slower absorption of information compared to developed government bond markets. We 
show for both the Eurozone and emerging countries that bond prices also react to changes in 
political risk ratings, but both bond markets are not fully efficient in terms of the speed with 
which they adjust to these changes in political risk. 
We also contribute to the literature on predicting financial market returns using 
changes in political risk. Erb, Harvey and Viskanta (1996) investigate the predictive power of 
various risk measures, including those from PRS. They find predictive power of political risk 
changes for currency returns, but not for bond returns. Perhaps the results for bond returns 
were not significant because of the short sample (1985-1995 for developed markets and 
1990-1995 for emerging markets) that was analyzed, with a limited number of bad times. Our 
paper does find significant predictive power for bond returns by using the much longer 1993–
2014 time period that includes multiple good and bad times. As mentioned earlier our Best 4 
portfolio outperforms the Worst 4 portfolio primarily in bad times. We also focus on bond 
returns with the same currency, eliminating any noise that currencies may have on the 
analysis. We are able to find strong evidence that changes in political risk are important for 
the price discovery in both developed and emerging government bond markets. 
Related to our study is a strand of literature with the focus on the level of political risk 
and the relation with financial markets. We empirically confirm such a link by showing that 
poor political risk ratings are associated with poor credit ratings and high bond yields. Hence, 
unsurprisingly, countries which score poorly on political risk need to pay investors a higher 
bond risk premium. Erb, Harvey and Viskanta (1999) find a strong relation between 
emerging market bond spreads and the composite risk rating of PRS, of which 50% is based 
on political risk. Similar findings are reported by Butler, Fauver and Mortal (2009), who link 
state corruption to higher municipal bond yields, and Qi, Roth and Wald (2010), who show 
that greater political rights are associated with lower corporate bond yield spreads. A more 
recent study by Bekaert, Harvey, Lundblad and Siegel (2014) finds that political risk 
accounts for one third of the sovereign credit spread in emerging market government bonds 
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issued in U.S. dollars, a very significant result underscoring the importance of political risk 
for bond yields.19  
 The remainder of this study is organized as follows. Section 3.2 describes the data, 
including political risk ratings, bond data and credit ratings. Section 3.3 presents the 
methodology. The main results are discussed in Section 3.4. Section 3.5 investigates the 
importance of the components that make up the total political risk ratings. Section 3.6 
concludes. 
3.2 Data 
 
In this section we first describe the political risk ratings. We then present the bond data and 
provide sample statistics on political risk ratings, spread levels and credit ratings. 
3.2.1 Political risk ratings 
The political risk ratings used in this study are produced by the Political Risk Services (PRS) 
group in the International Country Risk Guide20. The political risk rating consists of 12 
components, which are shown in Table 3-1. PRS collects political information and converts 
this into risk points for each individual risk component on the basis of a consistent evaluation 
process. The political risk ratings are made on the basis of a subjective analysis of the 
available information. The ratings are distributed monthly on a commercial basis to 
subscribers. We have a database of the real-time total ratings and the 12 components from 
December 1993 to April 2014. 
To assess political risk, PRS makes the following classification: if the points awarded 
are less than 50% of the total, that component can be considered as very high risk. The 50%-
60% range indicates high risk, 60%-70% moderate risk, 70%-80% low risk and 80%-100% 
very low risk. The same categorization applies to the total score. 
 
                                                
19
 There is more empirical work on the importance of political risk for equity markets. See for example Erb, 
Harvey and Viskanta (1996a), Bittlingmayer (1998), Santa-Clara and Valkanov (2003), Belo, Gala and Li 
(2013), Mei and Guo (2004), Boutchkova, Doshi, Durnev and Molchanov (2012) and Pastor and Veronesi 
(2012; 2013). 
20
 An alternative data source would be the newspaper coverage of policy-related economic uncertainty, see 
Baker, Bloom and Davis (2013) and www.policyuncertainty.com. These data, however, only cover five 
countries of the 35 countries we analyze.  
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Table 3-1: Components of Political Risk Ratings 
Component Max 
points 
Short description what each component assesses 
A   Government Stability 12 Ability to carry out declared program and stay in office 
B   Socioeconomic Conditions 12 Socioeconomic pressures that could constrain government action or  
fuel social dissatisfaction 
C   Investment Profile 12 Factors affecting the legislative risk of investments 
D   Internal Conflict 12 Political violence and its actual or potential impact on governance 
E   External Conflict 12 Risk to the incumbent government from foreign action 
F   Corruption 6 Corruption within the political system. 
G  Military in Politics 6 Involvement is a diminution of democratic accountability 
H  Religious Tensions 6 Single religious group may seek to replace civil law by religious law 
I   Law and Order 6 Strength and impartiality of the legal system and popular observance  
of the law 
J   Ethnic Tensions 6 Tension attributable to racial, nationality or language divisions 
K  Democratic  Accountability 6 How responsive a government is to its people 
L  Bureaucracy Quality 4 Ability to minimize revisions of policy when governments change 
Total 100 0-49.9: Very high risk; 50-59.9: High risk; 60-69.9: Moderate risk;  
70 to 79.9 Low risk; >79.9: Very low risk 
Source: https://www.prsgroup.com/ICRG_Methodology.aspx. This link provides a more detailed description of 
each component. 
3.2.2 Bond data 
This study uses the European Monetary Union (EMU) bond index and the Emerging Market 
Bond Index (EMBI+) of JP Morgan. The JP Morgan EMU government bond index is a 
popular market capitalization weighted index that consists of bonds issued by 11 countries: 
Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Portugal and Spain. All bonds are issued in euros or before 1999 in legacy currencies like the 
German mark and the French franc. The EMU index started in January 1999 with nine 
countries, and contains all fixed rate bonds with a maturity larger than one year. Austria and 
Greece were added in April 2001. Greece was removed in April 2012 because the country did 
not have any remaining outstanding bonds with a fixed coupon and therefore none of 
Greece’s outstanding bonds were index eligible. There is no rating restriction. The very small 
EMU countries in terms of outstanding debt like Malta have not been added to the index. 
Panel A of Table 3-2 provides an overview. 
 The EMBI+ index is J.P. Morgan’s most liquid U.S. dollar emerging market debt 
index. Only issues with a current amount outstanding of USD 500 million or more and a 
remaining life of greater than 2½ years are eligible for inclusion in the index. The index 
started in January 1994. Panel B of Table 3-2 shows all 24 countries that were part of the 
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index at some point in time. Note that by using historical constituents we avoid a 
survivorship bias.  
 
Table 3-2: Composition JP Morgan indexes 
Country Member of index  Country   Member of index 
 
Panel A EMU government bond index 
Austria 4/2001 – current  Ireland   1/1999 - current  
Belgium 1/1999 - current   Italy   1/1999 - current  
Finland 1/1999 - current   The Netherlands   1/1999 - current  
France 1/1999 - current   Portugal   1/1999 – current  
Germany 1/1999 - current   Spain   1/1999 - current  
Greece 4/2001 – 3/2012     
 
Panel B EMBI+ government bond index 
Argentina 1/1994 – current  Nigeria 1/1994 – 9/2006 
Brazil 1/1994 – current  Panama 1/1994 – current 
Bulgaria 1/1994 – 11/2013  Peru 1/1994 – current 
Columbia 5/1999 – current  Philippines 1/1994 – 8/1998; 4/1999 – current 
Croatia 3/2011 – current  Poland 1/1994 – 3/2007 
Ecuador 1/1994 – current  Qatar 11/2000 – 7/2002 
Egypt 5/2002 – 3/2008  Russia 1/1994 – current 
Hungary 4/2011 – current  South Africa 12/1994 – 1/1997; 4/2002 – current 
Indonesia 10/2006 – current  South Korea 4/1998 – 6/2002 
Malaysia 1/2002 – 11/2004  Turkey 7/1999 – current 
Mexico 1/1994 – current  Ukraine 7/2001 – current 
Morocco 1/1994 – 10/2006  Venezuela 1/1994 – current 
 
Note: The JP Morgan EMU government bond index is a market cap-weighted index for fixed rate government 
bonds with a maturity larger than 1 year. There are no rating requirements for inclusion in the index. The JP 
Morgan EMBI+ (Emerging Market Bond Index) is a market cap-weighted index for fixed rate government 
bonds with a maturity larger than 2.5 years. This is the smallest emerging market bond index for USD-
denominated debt in terms of number of countries due to three selection criteria: a country must be at least 
investment grade; the amount outstanding should be at least $500 million; and bond trading must be sufficiently 
liquid. The end date ‘current’ is April 2014. 
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3.2.3 Spread and credit rating data 
Table 3-3 shows the average spread levels, political risk rating levels, and credit ratings over 
the sample period for each country. A clear pattern arises: on average, countries with a poor 
credit rating have higher spreads and lower political risk ratings.21 The worst eight EMBI+ 
countries (sorted by spread) have an average spread of 9.32%, a B+ rating and a political risk 
score of 61. In contrast, the best five EMU countries (sorted by spread) have an average 
spread of 0.12%, an AAA rating and a political risk score of 86.  
 
Table 3-3: Average spread, political risk rating and credit rating 
Panel A: EMU countries 
High spread change Medium spread change Low spread change 
Country Spread Polrisk Rating Country Spread Polrisk Rating Country Spread Polrisk Rating 
Greece 363 75 A-     Austria 22 87 AAA 
Portugal 174 82 A+     France 15 77 AAA 
Ireland 124 86 AA     Finland 13 92 AAA 
Italy 84 77 AA-     NL 10 88 AAA 
Spain 79 77 AA     Germany -1 85 AAA 
Belgium 34 82 AA+     
  
   
Average 143 80 AA-     Average 12 86 AAA 
Panel B: EMBI+ countries 
Argentina 1590 69 B- Morocco 472 70 BB Panama 305 73 BB+ 
Nigeria 1314 47 BB- Hungary 397 74 BB+ Qatar 287 77 BBB+ 
Ecuador 1215 57 CCC+ Croatia 396 72 BBB- Indonesia 277 59 BB 
Venezuela 922 55 B+ Turkey 402 60 BB- S. Korea 242 76 BBB 
Russia 718 62 BB+ Colombia 358 56 BB+ Poland 211 79 BBB+ 
Ukraine 611 64 B Peru 348 63 BB+ S. Africa 184 68 BBB 
Brazil 573 66 BB Philippines 346 64 BB Egypt 157 63 BB+ 
Bulgaria 515 71 BB Mexico 338 70 BBB- Malaysia 110 73 BBB+ 
Average 932 61 B+ Average 382 66 BB+ Average 222 71 BBB- 
Note: The 11 EMU countries are divided in two groups on basis of the average bond spread compared to 
Germany. The left panel contains the 6 countries with the highest spread and the right panel contains the 5 
countries with the lowest spread. The 24 EMBI+ countries are divided in three groups on basis of the average 
bond spread compared to the U.S.. The left panel contains the 8 countries with the highest spread and the right 
panel contains the 8 countries with the lowest spread. Political risk is higher when the (political risk) rating is 
lower. Political risk rating (Polrisk) and average credit rating (S&P, Moody’s and Fitch) are averages over time. 
The average credit rating is rounded and translated to the notation style of S&P. For EMU countries the average 
spread (in basis points) is from Barclays Capital and based on the option adjusted spread calculated by 
comparing each country’s yield curve to the German zero curve (fixed at the beginning of the month causing 
small spreads for Germany at month-end after large interest rate changes). For EMBI+ countries the average 
spread (in basis points) is from JP Morgan and based on the strip spread (the value of collateralized flows (if 
any) are ‘stripped’ from the bond) calculated by comparing each country’s yield curve to the U.S. Treasury 
curve. Averages are based on the period January 1999 – April 2014 for EMU countries and based on the period 
January 1994 – April 2014 for EMBI+ countries. The exact data period for each country is shown in Table 3-2. 
                                                
21
 
Appendix 3.A shows the average political risk ratings also including the average scores on the twelve 
components that make up the total political risk rating. 
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Figure 3-1A shows the average spread over time for the EMU universe. It can be seen that 
the recent crisis period stands out. Figure 3-1B shows the average spread over time for the 
EMBI+ universe for which, contrary to the EMU universe, multiple good and bad times have 
occurred over time. 
 
Figure 3-1A: EMU spread      Figure 3-1B: EMBI+ spread 
  
Note: The graphs show the equally weighted spread development through time. The spread is based on the 
changes of all countries in the index in each month. The spread level of country entries in and exits from the 
index does not influence the spread. 
 
The default and term spread factors for the EMU and EMBI+ universes are shown in Figure 
3-2A and Figure 3-2B, respectively. The default premium is defined as the return of the 
market index over U.S. Treasuries for EMBI+ and over German bunds for EMU. The term 
premium is defined as the return of U.S. Treasuries over cash for EMBI+ and the return of 
German bunds over cash for EMU. The sum of the default premium and term premium is 
equal to the EMBI+ or EMU return in excess of cash. For both EMU and EMBI+ the term 
premium is positive due to generally declining yields in Germany and U.S. over time and the 
average bond index yields being higher than cash. For EMU the default premium starts to 
play a role end of 2007, with negative returns followed in 2012 by positive returns when the 
more risky European bond markets started to recover from the crisis. The default premium 
for EMU is zero over the entire period. Contrary to EMU we do see a positive default 
premium for EMBI+. 
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Figure 3-2A: EMU term and default risk         Figure 3-2B: EMBI+ term and default risk 
  
Note: The graphs show the cumulative term and default risk premiums through time for EMU and EMBI+. The 
default premium is the return of the market index over U.S. Treasuries for EMBI+ and over German bunds for 
EMU. The term premium is the return of U.S. Treasuries over cash for EMBI+ and the return of German bunds 
over cash for EMU. The sum of the default and term premium is equal to the market return over cash. 
 
Table 3-4 shows the average changes in spreads, political risk ratings and credit ratings. 
Again looking at two EMU groups and three EMBI+ groups there is a clear correlation 
between spread changes on the one hand, and credit rating changes and political risk rating 
changes on the other hand. The EMU group with the largest spread increases has an average 
annual spread increase of 9.1%, a drop in political risk ratings of 11.1 points and a rating 
drop of 7.3 notches (a 1-notch upgrade is for example from BB to BB+). The EMBI+ group 
with the largest spread increases has an average spread increase of 0.81%, a drop in political 
risk ratings of 4.8 points and a rating drop of 0.7 notches. At the other end of the spectrum, 
the EMBI+ group with the largest spread decreases has an average spread decrease of 6.0%, a 
rise in political risk ratings of 0.3 points and an average rating improvement of 3.0 notches.  
 
Table 3-4: Changes in average spread, political risk rating and credit rating 
Panel A: EMU countries 
High spread change Medium spread change Low spread change 
Country Spread Polrisk Rating Country Spread Polrisk Rating Country Spread Polrisk Rating 
Greece 4960 -10.0 -14.3     Belgium 39 -1.5 -0.7 
Portugal 132 -18.5 -9.5     NL 17 -11.0 -0.3 
Spain 121 -6.0 -6.0     Finland 6 -3.5 0.7 
Italy 117 -9.5 -5.0     Germany 5 -0.5 0.0 
Ireland 88 -9.0 -7.3     Austria -2 0.5 -0.3 
France 42 -13.5 -1.3     
     
Average 910 -11.1 -7.3     Average 13 -3.2 -0.1 
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Panel B: EMBI+ countries 
High spread change Medium spread change Low spread change 
Country Spread Polrisk Rating Country Spread Polrisk Rating Country Spread Polrisk Rating 
Argentina 432 -15.0 -4.5 Mexico -111 -6.5 3.8 Turkey -253 2.5 4.0 
Venezuela 376 -21.5 -4.5 Malaysia -118 4.5 1.7 Peru -275 2.5 3.7 
Indonesia 29 -3.5 3.0 S-Africa -134 -4.0 0.3 Morocco -280 1.5 1.0 
Nigeria 4 -3.0 0.0 Egypt -154 -4.5 -0.3 Poland -470 -4.0 4.3 
Croatia -11 -5.0 -1.3 Ecuador -165 -4.0 -1.7 Colombia -519 8.5 0.7 
Hungary -25 -2.5 -1.3 Philippines -168 -0.5 3.0 Ukraine -643 -2.0 -2.3 
Panama -46 11.0 2.0 Russia -200 -12.0 3.0 Brazil -909 1.5 5.7 
Qatar -110 1.0 1.3 S-Korea -251 -2.0 3.3 Bulgaria -1419 -8.5 6.7 
Average 81 -4.8 -0.7 Average -163 -3.6 1.7 Average -596 0.3 3.0 
 
Note: The 11 EMU countries are divided in two groups on basis of the average bond change in spread compared 
to Germany. The left panel contains the 6 countries with the largest spread change and the right panel contains 
the 5 countries with the smallest spread change. The 24 EMBI+ countries are divided in three groups on basis of 
the full period change in bond spread compared to the U.S.. The left panel contains the 8 countries with the 
largest spread change and the right panel contains the 8 countries with the smallest spread change. The political 
risk is higher when the (political risk) rating change is negative. Political risk rating change (Polrisk) and 
average credit rating change (S&P, Moody’s and Fitch) are based on the full research period. The average credit 
rating change is translated in a number based on notches, e.g. a downgrade from BBB+ to BBB is translated to -
1. Changes are based on the period January 1999 – April 2014 for EMU countries and based on the period 
January 1994 – April 2014 for EMBI+ countries. The exact data period for each country is shown in Table 3-2. 
 
These results show that political risk is relevant for bond yields. Both for levels and for 
changes there is a clear relationship with ratings and spreads. Countries with good 
(improving) political risk ratings are also countries with good (improving) credit ratings and 
low (decreasing) spreads. In the remainder of this study we will investigate whether the most 
recent political risk ratings are fully incorporated in bond prices, or whether bond prices only 
partially incorporate current political risk. A recent study by Bekaert, Harvey, Lundblad and 
Siegel (2014) shows the importance of the political risk level for the bond market. Therefore 
we focus our research on the changes in political risk. 
3.3 Methodology 
3.3.1 Forming portfolios 
To investigate the importance of political risk for bond prices, and to examine whether 
changes in political risk predict bond prices, we construct portfolios based on 1-year changes 
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in political risk ratings22. At the end of each month23 we rank the countries that are at that 
moment in the index and for which political risk ratings are available. The four countries with 
the largest improvement of the political risk rating represent the Best 4 portfolio, and the four 
countries with the largest deterioration of the political risk rating represent the Worst 4.24 The 
weights for the countries within each of these two portfolios are based on their respective 
market capitalization scaled to add up to 100%. When countries have the same political risk 
rating change they both enter the portfolio, leading to more countries in the portfolio. The 
change in political risk premium is defined as the return of the Best minus Worst portfolios in 
the subsequent month25. The portfolios are constructed for both the EMU and EMBI+ 
universes of countries. 
3.3.2 Risk-adjusted performance 
We need to make sure that the relation between changes in political risk ratings and bond 
prices we document in the next section is really something new. It could be that we are 
capturing indirectly a known premium when constructing two portfolios based on changes in 
political risk ratings. 
 First, we want to control for the default and term premium defined in Section 3.2.3. 
Gebhardt, Hvidkjaer and Swaminathan (2005a) found these premiums to be priced risk 
factors for corporate bond returns and have since become the standard asset pricing model for 
bonds.  
Second, it could be that on average the government bonds in the long and short 
portfolios based on changes on political risk differ in terms of liquidity risk. Longstaff (2004) 
and Renne and Montfoort (2013) find priced liquidity measures based on comparing the less 
                                                
22
 The 1-year look-back period is a compromise between up-to-date information and avoiding too many zero 
changes as PRS often leaves many components unchanged in the monthly updates. With the 1-year look-back 
period the frequency of zero changes is 11% for both EMU and EMBI+. Using e.g. 3-month changes the 
frequency of zero changes rises to 32%. 
23
 The political risk data are available about a week before the end of the month, hence using monthly data we 
actually delay the information. 
24
 Using portfolios is a commonly used technique for examining the cross-sectional importance of a 
fundamental variable isolating the cross-sectional variation from the time-series variation. The alternative would 
be to use predictive regressions. For an excellent debate on predictive regressions vis-à-vis using portfolios see 
Thornton and Valente (2012). They show that the Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005) forward rates factor, found to 
be successful in in-sample predictive regressions for excess bond returns, actually has no economic value in a 
true real-time exercise. 
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liquid bonds from respectively U.S. and German government related agencies to liquid 
government bonds of these countries. 
Third, the changes in the subjective assessments by experts at the PRS group could be 
influenced by changes in market bond yields. In that case we are perhaps selecting portfolios 
based on past bond returns, i.e. momentum. We measure momentum as the return differences 
between Best 4 and Worst 4 portfolios based on 1-year bond returns. 
Finally, we control for the changes in financial and economic risk ratings from the 
PRS group and changes in credit ratings to make sure the political risk rating changes are 
primarily driven by true political risk changes and not financial and economic risk changes in 
disguise, or adjustments by credit agencies. To do so we construct the returns of Best 4 minus 
Worst 4 portfolios based on 1-year changes in financial risk ratings and economic risk 
ratings, and 1-year changes in average credit ratings based on ratings from S&P, Moody’s 
and Fitch. 
To control for all the aforementioned effects we run restricted versions of the 
following multiple regression:  
 
∆ = α+ +  +  + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ +  +   (3-1) 
 
where ∆ is the change in political risk premium, α the unexplained return,  the 
default premium, and  the term premium.  is a liquidity measure based on the 
market cap weighted excess returns of KfW compared to Germany for EMU and the market 
cap weighted excess return of RefCorp compared to U.S. treasuries for the emerging 
markets26. ∆, ∆, ∆, and  represent the returns of the Best 4 minus 
Worst 4 portfolios based on the change in credit ratings, financial risk ratings, economic risk 
ratings, and past 12-month bond returns, respectively. We also consider restricted versions of 
equation (3-1) to analyze the relevance of each individual control factor. We use Newey-
West standard errors to correct for heteroscedasticity and auto-correlation.  
 
                                                
26
 RefCorp is short for the Resolution Trust Corporation which is a U.S. government corporation established to 
rescue savings and loan institutions that failed during the savings and loan crisis. REFCORP provided liquidity 
to these organizations by issuing bonds. KfW is short for Kreditanstalt fur Wiederaufbau (“Reconstruction 
Credit Institute”) is owned by the Federal Republic of Germany and the States of Germany. RefCorp and KfW 
bonds have the same standing as Government bonds in case of a credit event. Hence price differences are only 
due to liquidity differences. 
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3.4 Political risk premium 
3.4.1 Portfolios based on 1-year changes in political risk ratings 
Our main contribution lies in examining the predictive power of changes in political risk 
ratings. We construct portfolios based on 1-year changes in political risk ratings (∆)27. 
Note that a portfolio based on 1-year changes of political risk can be quite different from a 
portfolio based on the level of political risk. First, a portfolio based on the level of political 
risk has a much lower turnover through time. Second, the average monthly rank correlations 
between the rankings based on the level and 1-year change of political risk are only 23% and 
13% respectively for the EMU and EMBI+ universes. 
 The characteristics of the Best 4 improving countries and the Worst 4 deteriorating 
countries are presented in Table 3-5. Strikingly, we observe for both the EMU and EMBI+ 
universes that the Best 4 portfolios outperform the Worst 4 portfolios and the index. For 
EMU, the annualized return is 5.6% for the portfolio of the countries that have shown the 
largest improvement in political risk ratings, at a risk of 4.1% and Sharpe ratio of 0.77. This 
is 1.1% per annum higher than the returns on the portfolio of countries that have shown the 
largest deterioration in political risk ratings, and 0.8% per annum higher than the index.  
For the EMBI+ universe a similar picture emerges. The Best 4 market cap-weighted 
portfolio has higher returns compared to both the index and the ‘Worst 4’ portfolio. 
Compared to the index the return is 4.1% per annum higher, and the Sharpe ratio is 0.82 
compared to 0.52 for the index28. Thus, changes in political risk ratings predict the 
differences between the bond risk premiums of the various countries29. Political risk ratings 
                                                
27
 We have also analyzed results based on the political risk level. Both the return and risk are higher for the 
Worst 4 portfolio and lower for the Best 4 portfolio. The Sharpe ratios of both portfolios do not deviate much 
from the index. The result indicates that political risk is an important risk factor and that knowledge of the 
political risk level is incorporated in the bond market, confirming the results of Bekaert, Harvey, Lundblad and 
Siegel (2014). Contrary to our results for the changes in political risk, forecasting future bond market returns 
with the political risk level is not possible. 
28
 Changing to more concentrated portfolios selecting the Best 3 gives a Sharpe ratio of 0.86 for EMU and the 
same Sharpe ratio of 0.82 for EMBI+. Also the Best 4 equal-weighted (as opposed to market-cap weighted) 
portfolios have a strong performance with a Sharpe ratio of 0.81 for EMU and 0.70 for EMBI+.  
29
 In practice the portfolios we use to determine the changes in political risk premium would incur transaction 
costs. The typical transaction costs are a one basis point bid-ask spread on the yield for developed markets and a 
five basis point spread on the yield for emerging bond markets. Given the turnover and index duration of the 
bond indices these transaction costs would amount to about 10 basis points annual costs for the EMU universe 
and about 50 basis points annual costs for the EMBI+ universe for the Best minus Worst portfolios. Net returns 
are still positive and significant for the EMBI+ universe. 
27_Erim Duyvesteyn BW Stand.job
 
50 
 
also predict credit ratings. For example, for EMBI+ the Best 4 portfolio sees on average an 
improvement in the credit rating during the investment month. These results suggest that 
changes in political risk are not directly incorporated in government bond prices or credit 
ratings. 
 
Table 3-5: Ranking portfolios on 1-year changes in political risk ratings 
 EMU  EMBI+ 
 Index Worst 4 Best 4  Index Worst 4 Best 4 
Return p.a. 4.8% 4.5% 5.6%  10.5% 9.0% 14.6% 
Stdev p.a. 3.8% 4.4% 4.1%  13.9% 19.4% 13.7% 
Sharpe ratio 0.60 0.47 0.77  0.52 0.29 0.82 
Rating  AA+ AA+   BB BB 
Rating change  -0.37 -0.02   -0.31 0.52 
 
Note: Each month the countries are sorted on basis of the one year change of political risk. The four countries 
with the largest increase (or smallest decrease) in political risk ratings are grouped in the Best 4 portfolio and 
the four countries with the largest decrease (or smallest increase) in political risk scores are grouped in the 
Worst 4 portfolio. The portfolios are aggregated on basis of the market cap of the relevant countries. The Sharpe 
ratio is calculated as the total return in excess of the 3-month Euribor rate for the EMU and the return in excess 
of the 3-month U.S. Libor rate for the EMBI+. The rating is based on the average rating of S&P, Moody’s and 
Fitch over the whole sample and in the notation of S&P. The rating change is measured in notches and 
annualized, e.g. a downgrade from AA+ to AA in one year is translated to -1. The sample period is from 
January 1999 to April 2014 for EMU and from January 1994 to April 2014 for EMBI+. 
 
 A potential explanation for these findings is that the importance of political risk has 
been underestimated. Only recently have Bekaert et al. (2014) shown that political risk can 
explain one third of the credit spread. In addition, political risk is difficult to measure30 and 
the political risk ratings that we employ are not public information.  
The predictive power of changes in political risk is best illustrated with an example. 
Obvious events to investigate are large historical defaults like Russia in 1998 and Argentina 
in 2001. The negative bond returns before and during the Russian default were correctly 
predicted by the change in political risk, but also by the change of the economic risk, credit 
rating changes and momentum. Financial risk was the only indicator that selected Russia in 
the best portfolio because of a stronger current account to GDP before the default. The 
political risk change also predicted the negative returns in Argentina before and during the 
default. Economic risk and credit rating changes were also successful in this event, whereas 
                                                
30
 A reviewer pointed out that perhaps the problem of ‘difficult to measure’ is aggravated for smaller countries 
and that the predictive ability of changes in political risk stems from these smaller countries. However 
excluding at each point in time countries with a market cap above 10% actually makes the results somewhat 
weaker. For EMU the Worst 4 portfolio has a Sharpe ratio of 0.25 compared to 0.61 for the Best 4 portfolio. For 
EMBI+ the Worst 4 portfolio has a Sharpe ratio of 0.39 compared to 0.68 for the Best 4 portfolio. 
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financial risk changes and momentum were not successful. Both defaults were not followed 
by quick recoveries.  
Therefore, we have investigated a third case in more detail. Just after the default of 
Argentina in 2001 the financial markets of its larger neighbor Brazil were also plagued by 
turmoil in 2002. The turmoil was primarily caused by the presidential elections in October 
2002. After leading the country for eight years president Cardoso was succeeded by 
newcomer Lula da Silva. Financial markets became nervous when Lula da Silva, a former 
president of a steel workers' union, was leading the polls in 2002, and political risk ratings 
worsened. The yield of Brazilian government bonds more than doubled from 11.7% on 15 
March 2002 to 25.5% on 30 July 2002. The yield remained high until the elections in 
October.  
After the elections the markets were reassured by a sound policy from the new 
president, and political risk ratings improved, leading Brazil to be selected in the ‘Best 4’ 
portfolio. Bond yields declined from 23.9% on 15 October 2002 back to 11.7% on 17 April 
2003.The Brazilian bond market return was 75%, which was substantially higher than the 
emerging U.S. dollar government bond market that had a return of 29%. The other indicators 
we have investigated were less successful in this case. The change in financial risk and 
economic risk selected Brazil in the ‘Worst 4’ portfolio after the elections when the bond 
market recovered. The change in the credit rating and momentum selected Brazil in the 
‘Worst 4’ portfolio before the elections, but kept the country in the ‘Worst 4’ portfolio during 
the recovery. Political risk is the only indicator that successfully predicted the recovery of the 
Brazilian bond market and avoided investing during the crisis. We will further investigate the 
nature of political risk in good and bad times in Section 3.4.3. 
3.4.2 Changes in political risk ratings and price discovery 
We further investigate the price discovery of government bonds related to changes in 
political risk in Table 3-6. We first define a Best minus Worst portfolio based on 1-year 
changes in political risk (∆). As a second step we delay the political risk data by one and 
two months and recalculate the changes in political risk premium. Both for the EMU and 
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EMBI+ universes, ∆ has positive returns and a high Sharpe ratio of 0.41 for EMU31 and 
0.43 for EMBI+. The result for EMBI+ is statistically different from zero. Both for the EMU 
and EMBI+ universes the political risk premium more than halves after delaying the 
information by two months. We conclude that bond markets need a few months to 
incorporate most of the information in the changes of political risk. 
 
Table 3-6: Price discovery change in political risk premium 
 ∆  ∆  ∆  
Panel A.: EMU 
Return p.a. 1.1% 1.0% 0.4% 
Stdev p.a. 2.7% 2.7% 2.9% 
Sharpe ratio 0.41 0.36 0.14 
    
Panel B: EMBI+ 
Return p.a. 5.6% 2.6% 1.7% 
Stdev p.a. 13.1% 11.4% 13.1% 
Sharpe ratio 0.43* 0.23 0.13 
 
Note: Based on 1-year changes in political ratings at the end of each month we form Best 4 and Worst 4 
portfolios and compute the return difference in the subsequent month to create the change in political risk 
premium ∆ . To study the price discovery we delay the information from the change in political risk by 1 to 
2 months, denoted by ∆  to ∆ . The 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels are denoted by ***, ** 
and *, respectively. The sample period is from January 1999 to April 2014 for EMU and from January 1994 to 
April 2014 for EMBI+. 
3.4.3 Changes in political risk ratings and crisis periods 
To better understand the strong performance of the Best 4 portfolios based on past 1-year 
changes in political risk ratings we further investigate the performance in crisis and recovery 
periods. To identify ‘good’ and ‘bad’ times we use the changes in the market cap-weighted 
spread based on the constituents of the EMU and EMBI+ index. A month is allocated to 
‘good’ times if the spread decreased and to ‘bad’ times if the spread increased. Note that 
portfolios based on the best levels of political risk ratings would have relatively good returns 
in bad times and relatively poor returns in good times. The question here is: What about the 
performance of the portfolios based on the past 1-year changes in political risk ratings? 
                                                
31
 The size of the changes in political risk premium for the EMU universe is robust for the shorter sample period 
from January 2008 – April 2014. 
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Table 3-7: Excess return portfolios on political risk changes in good times and bad times 
 EMU  EMBI+ 
 Index Worst 4 Best 4  Index Worst 4 Best 4 
Full sample 2.3% 2.1% 3.2%  7.2% 5.7% 11.3% 
Good times 3.9% 4.5% 4.2%  31.6% 33.9% 32.7% 
Bad times 0.4% -0.8% 2.0%  -25.6% -32.3% -17.5% 
Note: The table shows the excess returns of portfolios formed monthly on changes in the ex-ante available 
political risk ratings. The full sample results are split in periods of good times and bad times based on one 
month changes of the aggregate market cap weighted credit spread. For EMBI+ 140 months are selected as 
good and 104 months as bad. For EMU 99 months are selected as good and 85 months as bad. The sample 
period is from January 1994 – April 2014 for EMBI+ and from January 1999 – April 2014 for EMU. 
 
The results in Table 3-7 show that the outperformance of the Best 4 based on 1-year changes 
in political risk ratings is mostly achieved in bad times. The Best 4 portfolio performs similar 
to the index and the Worst 4 portfolio in good times. In bad times the Best 4 portfolios for 
both EMU and EMBI+ do much better than the index and the Worst 4 portfolios. Hence the 
key finding in Table 3-5 that 1-year changes in political risk ratings result in superior bond 
portfolios is driven by keeping up in good times and doing much better in bad times. 
For EMU, for example, in good times the index has an annualized return of 3.9% and 
the Worst 4 and Best 4 portfolios have annualized returns of 4.5% and 4.2% respectively. 
There is a clear difference, however, in bad times where the Worst 4 portfolio returns –0.8%, 
the index 0.4% and the Best 4 portfolio 2.0%. This difference is statistically different at a 
significance level of 1%, showing that the changes in political risk are mainly important in 
bad times. We see a similar picture for EMBI+. In good times there is little difference 
between the index, Worst 4 and Best 4 portfolios. But in bad times the index loses 25.6% per 
annum and the Worst 4 portfolio as much as 32.3%. The Best 4 portfolio manages to limit the 
loss to 17.5% per annum in periods of rising spreads. Similar to the results for the EMU 
universe the difference between the returns of the Best and Worst portfolios in bad times is 
statistically significant at a significance level of 1%. The results show that the changes in 
political risk are able to predict differences between bond market returns in bad times. In 
such periods both developed and emerging bond markets need time to discover the new price 
that incorporates the changed political landscape. 
29_Erim Duyvesteyn BW Stand.job
 
54 
 
3.4.4 Changes in political risk ratings: really something new? 
The results so far show that changes in political risk ratings are a strong predictor of future 
differences between bond market returns. We now investigate whether changes in political 
risk ratings represent a new important bond factor or whether it represents an existing bond 
factor in disguise. To investigate this we construct a number of Best and Worst portfolios 
based on other characteristics. Table 3-8 contains the characteristics of the Best minus Worst 
portfolios based on 1-year changes in political risk (∆), credit risk (∆), financial 
risk (∆), economic risk (∆), and 12-month momentum (MOM). In addition it shows 
the performance of the default, term and liquidity premium. 
As already observed from Table 3-6 both for the EMU and EMBI+ universes, ∆ 
has positive returns and a high Sharpe ratio of 0.41 for EMU and 0.43 for EMBI+. Of the 
other Best minus Worst portfolios, none has such high Sharpe ratios in both the EMU and 
EMBI+ universe. The EMU universe momentum (MOM) does have a Sharpe ratio of 0.44 
but it has a zero Sharpe ratio for EMBI+. For the EMBI+ universe the Best minus Worst 
portfolios based on changes in economic risk (∆) has a Sharpe ratio of 0.55 but for EMU 
the Sharpe ratio is just 0.10. The Best minus Worst portfolios based on changes in financial 
risk (∆) for EMU has a small negative return but for EMBI+ even a large negative return 
and a Sharpe ratio of -0.41. As explained in Section 3.4.1 selecting bond markets based on 
financial risk put Russia in the Best 4 portfolio during its default in 1998 due to a strong 
current account and Brazil in the Worst 4 portfolio during its 2003 recovery. 
 Of the well-known risk factors for bonds the default premium (DEF) is zero for EMU 
and 5.0% for EMBI+. And the bond risk premium (TERM) for both universes yields about 
2.3% per annum, reflecting partially the declining yields over the sample period. The 
liquidity premium is slightly positive for EMU (Germany) and zero for EMBI+ (U.S.). 
 Hence the main candidates to explain the strong performance of the Best minus Worst 
portfolios based on changes in political risk ratings are the bond risk premium (TERM) for 
both universes; momentum (MOM) for the EMU universe; and the default premium (DEF) 
and changes in economic risk (∆) for the EMBI+ universe.  
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Table 3-8: Characteristics change in political risk premium and alternative return premiums 
 ∆ DEF TERM ∆ ∆ ∆  LIQ 
Panel A.: EMU 
Return p.a. 1.1% 0.0% 2.3% 0.6% -0.2% 0.2% 1.9% 0.3% 
Stdev p.a. 2.7% 2.3% 3.9% 4.4% 2.9% 2.4% 4.3% 0.7% 
Sharpe ratio 0.41 0.02 0.57** 0.14 -0.08 0.10 0.44* 0.38 
Correlation         
∆ 100%        
DEF -47% 100%       
TERM 18% -33% 100%      
∆ 43% -85% 29% 100%     
∆ 14% -38% 9% 43% 100%    
∆ 22% -49% 25% 41% 29% 100%   
 30% -48% 18% 65% 17% 32% 100%  
LIQ 7% 28% -28% -19% 16% -23% -10% 100% 
         
Panel B: EMBI+ 
Return p.a. 5.6% 5.0% 2.2% -1.2% -6.2% 7.7% -0.1% -0.1% 
Stdev p.a. 13.1% 13.9% 4.6% 14.1% 15.0% 13.9% 16.7% 1.6% 
Sharpe ratio 0.43* 0.36 0.48** -0.08 -0.41* 0.55** 0.00 -0.05 
Correlation         
∆ 100%        
DEF -44% 100%       
TERM 8% -17% 100%      
∆ 46% -33% 18% 100%     
∆ -41% 42% -12% -17% 100%    
∆ 34% -22% -1% 45% 5% 100%   
 37% -43% 10% 58% -29% 33% 100%  
LIQ 16% -7% -1% 9% -3% -3% 4% 100% 
 
Note:  is the return of the market index over German bunds for EMU, and over U.S. treasuries for EMBI+. 
 is the return of German bunds over cash for EMU, and of U.S. treasuries over cash for EMBI+.  is 
based on the market cap weighted excess return of KfW compared to Germany for EMU and the market cap 
weighted excess return of RefCorp compared to U.S. treasuries for EMBI+. Based on 1-year changes in political 
ratings at the end of each month we form Best 4 and Worst 4 portfolios and compute the return difference in the 
subsequent month to create the change in political risk premium (∆). Similarly based on credit ratings 
(average rating S&P, Moody’s and Fitch), financial risk ratings, economic risk ratings and 12-month bond 
returns we create the change in credit rating risk premium (∆), the financial risk premium (∆), the 
economic risk premium (∆) and 12-month momentum (). The 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels 
are denoted by ***, ** and *, respectively. The sample period is from Jan 1999 to Apr 2014 for EMU and from 
Jan 1994 to Apr 2014 for EMBI+. 
 
3.4.5 Loadings on risk factors 
We first investigate the loading of the Best minus Worst portfolios based on changes in 
political risk ratings (∆) on the default premium, the term premium and liquidity 
premium which are generally seen as risk factors in the bond literature. The first 3 columns 
of Table 3-9 show the results. 
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Table 3-9: Regression change in political risk premium on alternative return premiums 
 DEF TERM LIQ 3F ∆ ∆ ∆  
Panel A: EMU 
α 1.1% 0.8% 1.0% 0.8% 1.0% 1.2% 1.1% 0.8% 
p-value α 0.07 0.15 0.14 0.22 0.13 0.09 0.12 0.26 
Coefficient -0.56 0.13 0.29 - 0.26 0.13 0.25 0.19 
p-value coefficient 0.00 0.15 0.49 - 0.02 0.44 0.20 0.05 
3F coefficient -0.59 0.06 1.10 - - - - - 
3F p-value  0.10 0.20 0.02 - - - - - 
R2 22% 3% 1% 28% 18% 2% 5% 9% 
 
Panel B: EMBI+ 
α 7.7% 5.1% 5.7% 7.6% 6.1% 3.4% 3.1% 5.6% 
p-value α 0.03 0.14 0.11 0.03 0.05 0.26 0.25 0.09 
Coefficient -0.41 0.23 1.32 - 0.42 -0.36 0.32 0.29 
p-value coefficient 0.01 0.29 0.02 - 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.01 
Multivariate coefficient -0.17 -0.08 1.02 - - - - - 
Multivariate p-value  0.03 0.58 0.03 - - - - - 
R2 19% 1% 3% 21% 21% 17% 11% 14% 
 
Note: This table presents the results of restricted versions of the regression in equation (3-1), 
 
∆ = α+ +  +  + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ +  +  
Based on past 1-year changes in political ratings at the end of each month we form Best 4 and Worst 4 
portfolios and compute the return difference in the subsequent month to create the change in political risk 
premium (∆). Similarly based on 1-year changes in credit ratings (average rating S&P, Moody’s and Fitch), 
financial risk ratings and economic risk ratings we create the change in credit rating risk premium (∆), the 
change in  financial risk premium (∆), the change in economic risk premium (∆) and previous 12-
month bond returns ().  is the return of the market index over German bunds for EMU, and over U.S. 
Treasuries for EMBI+.  is the return of German bunds over cash for EMU, and of U.S. Treasuries over 
cash for EMBI+.  is based on the market cap weighted excess return of KfW compared to Germany for 
EMU and the market cap weighted excess return of RefCorp compared to U.S. treasuries for EMBI+. “3F” is 
the multiple regression on DEF, TERM and LIQ. The constant (!) is expressed per annum. We use Newey-West 
standard errors to correct for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. The sample period is from Jan 1999 to Apr 
2014 for EMU and from Jan 1994 to Apr 2014 for EMBI+. 
 
For both EMU and EMBI+ we find that ∆ loads significantly and negatively on the 
default premium (DEF). Hence on average portfolios based on relatively positive changes in 
political risk ratings invest in the less risky countries. DEF explains around 20% of the 
monthly variation in the returns of ∆. Because for EMU the default premium is zero and 
for EMBI+ strongly positive the alpha for EMU is equal to the Best minus Worst return at 
1.1% and for EMBI+ even larger at 7.7% per annum. Hence controlling for the default 
premium makes the results for political risk changes even stronger. 
 The bond risk premium (TERM) and liquidity premium (LIQ) have limited 
explanatory power for ∆ explaining 3% or less of the variation on monthly returns. Only 
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for EBMI+ ∆ loads significantly on the liquidity factor but due to the slightly negative 
return of the liquidity factor the alpha is 5.7%, 0.1% higher than the return spread for ∆ 
reported in Table 3-8. 
 The results for the multiple regression of ∆ on DEF, TERM, and LIQ are shown 
in the 4th column in Table 3-9 labeled ‘3F’. The explanatory power for EMU rises to 28% but 
alpha remains high at 0.8% per annum. In contrast to only using the significant default 
premium the alpha is no longer significant. Note that the effective sample is quite short for 
Europe (only since the end of 2007 did yields of European countries start to diverge), which 
makes it harder to find a statistically significant result. For EMBI+ the alpha is still highly 
significant at 7.6%. The 3 factors together explain 21% of the variation in monthly returns. 
Hence the risk factors cannot explain the strong performance of Best 4 minus Worst 4 based 
on changes in political risk.  
3.4.6 Other factors explain ∆? 
The risk factors DEF, TERM and LIQ cannot really explain the alphas from ∆. It could 
be, however, that forming portfolios based on changes in political risk ratings is a momentum 
strategy in disguise. We are also interested in the potential overlap between changes in 
political risk changes on the one hand, and changes in credit ratings, financial risk and 
economic risk on the other hand even though there is no literature documenting predictive 
ability of these three factors. The last 4 columns in Table 3-9 show the results. 
 First it is noteworthy that in both cases there is a significant positive loading on 
∆ and momentum. Hence countries with relatively improving political risk ratings are 
also on average countries with relatively improving credit ratings and a better than average 
bond market performance. The alphas, however, are only marginally reduced, although for 
EMU sufficiently to make them insignificant.  
Second for EMBI+ the loading on ∆and ∆ is significant contrary to the 
results for EMU. The loading on ∆ is negative which is mainly caused by its wrong 
position in Russia during the 1998 default whilst ∆ rightly included it in the Worst 4 
portfolio. The positive loading on ∆ suggests that countries with relative improving 
political risk ratings are on average countries with relatively improving economic risk 
ratings. The magnitude of the premium for ∆ at 7.7% (see Table 3-8 Panel B) is such 
that the ∆ alpha of 5.6% is reduced to 3.1%. This causes the ∆ alpha to become 
31_Erim Duyvesteyn BW Stand.job
 
58 
 
insignificant. The return of ∆ is for 75% achieved in Russia while the return of ∆ is 
more evenly coming from multiple countries.  
The results suggest that ∆ is a new important factor for the bond risk premium. 
There is some overlap with momentum and changes in credit ratings but ∆ has much 
stronger performance for both universes. Changes in economic risk ratings are also strong for 
EMBI+ and 46% correlated with  ∆ which could be interesting for further research. For 
EMU, however, ∆ has no predictive power. 
3.5 The relevance of individual political risk components 
 
Table 3-9 shows that yearly changes in political risk ratings are an important determinant of 
the bond risk premium. In this section we look at the importance of the individual political 
risk components shown in Table 3-1. Which components contribute most to the predictive 
ability of the total political risk rating?  
The results in Table 3-10 for both EMU and EMBI+ show that most of the 12 components 
have a low and insignificant alpha based on the regression on the factors DEF, TERM, and 
LIQ. This is no surprise, given the small changes over time of these components (see Table 
3-11 and  
Table 3-12 in Appendix 3.A, row ‘Changes’). The three components that stand out 
with higher returns are the components A, B, and to a lesser extent C denoting government 
stability, socioeconomic conditions and the investment profile, respectively. For EMU the 
risk-adjusted return difference between the most improving countries and most deteriorating 
countries for the socioeconomic conditions component is equal to 0.70%, compared to 0.77% 
based on the total political risk rating. For EMBI+ the risk-adjusted return for the government 
stability component is 7.3% compared to 7.6% for the total political risk rating. 
Hence, the ability of governments to carry out their declared programs and to stay in 
office, socioeconomic conditions (such as unemployment and poverty) that could constrain 
government action or fuel social dissatisfaction, and the legislative risk of investments are 
important factors for both EMU and EMBI+ government bond investors. Huang, Wu, Yu and 
Zhang (2015) find that the relationship between international political crises and the level 
bond yields depends on the government stability and legal investor protection confirming the 
importance of these components for bond market risk. 
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Table 3-10: Alpha of the components of change in political risk premium 
 EMU  EMBI+ 
Total political risk 0.77%  7.6%** 
A. Government Stability 0.04%  7.3%*** 
B. Socioeconomic Conditions 0.70%  5.3%* 
C. Investment Profile 0.38%  1.6% 
D. Internal Conflict 0.15%  -0.4% 
E. External Conflict -0.02%  -2.9% 
F. Corruption 0.00%  0.9% 
G. Military in Politics 0.00%  0.6% 
H. Religious Tensions -0.05%  -0.5% 
I. Law and Order 0.05%**  0.7% 
J. Ethnic Tensions 0.00%  0.6% 
K. Democratic Accountability 0.00%  2.7%* 
L. Bureaucracy Quality -0.01%  2.6% 
Note: This table presents the alphas of the restricted regression in equation (3-1), 
 
∆ = α+ +  +  +   
Based on 1-year changes in political ratings at the end of each month we form Best 4 and Worst 4 portfolios and 
compute the return difference in the subsequent month to create the change in political risk premium  
( ∆ ).  is the return of the market index over German bunds for EMU, and over U.S. Treasuries for 
EMBI+.  is the return of German bunds over cash for EMU, and of U.S. Treasuries over cash for EMBI+. 
 is based on the market cap weighted excess return of KfW compared to Germany for EMU and the market 
cap weighted excess return of RefCorp compared to U.S. treasuries for EMBI+. The constant (!) is expressed 
per annum. The (total) political risk rating is based on the 12 components with the weights listed in Table 3-1. 
We apply the same methodology on the individual components to form Best 4 and Worst 4 portfolios and 
compute the alphas. The 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels are denoted by ***, ** and *, respectively. We 
use Newey-West standard errors to correct for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. The sample period is from 
Jan 1999 to Apr 2014 for EMU and from Jan 1994 to Apr 2014 for EMBI+. 
 
For emerging U.S. dollar debt (EMBI+) we also find democratic accountability and to a 
lesser extent bureaucracy quality and investment profile to be important. 
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3.6 Conclusion 
 
We find political risk to be an important determinant of the differences in global government 
bond risk premiums. First, the level of political risk is closely related to the creditworthiness 
of a country. Countries with high political risk are on average countries with poorer credit 
ratings and higher bond risk premiums. 
 Second, we find that changes over time in political risk are closely related to changes 
in the creditworthiness of a country. Countries for which political risk is improving are on 
average also the countries with improving credit ratings and relatively positive bond returns 
over the past year. Moreover, we find that the bonds from these countries going forward have 
higher returns than the bonds from countries with a relatively worse political risk. That is, 
whereas we find that political risk levels are properly incorporated in bond prices, changes in 
political risk levels contain information about future bond risk premiums. As such, bond 
prices do not immediately incorporate past changes in political risk. These same past changes 
in political risk also have some predictive ability for changes in ratings.  
We therefore conclude that although bond market participants and rating agencies do 
take into account the political risk of a country, in terms of changes in political risk both bond 
prices and ratings are not fully efficient. These findings are robust when accounting for the 
term premium, default premium, and liquidity factors. Bond return momentum, financial risk, 
economic risk and liquidity risk also cannot explain these results. Our conclusion is that the 
change in political risk is a novel driver of future differences in global government bond risk 
premiums. 
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Appendix 3.A: PRS component scores per country 
Table 3-11: Descriptive statistics political risk scores for EMU countries 
 total and components 
 A B C D E F G H I J K L Total 
Max 12 12 12 12 12 6 6 6 6 6 6 4 100 
Changes 2.7 0.8 0.9 0.6 0.3 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 5.1 
Austria 8 9 11 11 11 5 6 5 6 4 5 4 87 
Belgium 8 8 10 11 12 4 6 5 5 3 6 4 82 
Finland 9 9 11 11 12 6 6 6 6 6 6 4 92 
France 8 8 11 10 10 4 5 5 5 3 6 3 77 
Germany 9 8 11 11 11 5 6 6 5 4 6 4 85 
Greece 8 7 10 9 10 2 5 5 4 5 6 3 75 
Ireland 8 9 10 11 11 3 6 5 6 6 6 4 86 
Italy 8 8 10 10 11 3 6 5 4 5 5 3 77 
Netherlands 8 10 11 11 12 5 6 4 6 5 6 4 88 
Portugal 8 8 10 10 10 4 6 6 5 6 6 3 82 
Spain 8 7 11 9 10 4 5 5 5 4 6 3 77 
Note: Average political risk scores and components from January 1999 to April 2014. “Changes” shows the 
average absolute change of a score per country. 
 
Table 3-12: Descriptive statistics political risk scores for EMBI+ countries 
 total and components 
 A B C D E F G H I J K L Total 
Max 12 12 12 12 12 6 6 6 6 6 6 4 100 
Changes 2.7 0.6 0.9 1.0 0.7 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.1 5.8 
Argentina 8 5 6 10 10 2 4 6 3 6 5 3 69 
Brazil 8 6 7 9 11 3 4 6 2 4 4 2 66 
Bulgaria 8 4 10 11 10 3 5 5 4 5 5 2 71 
Colombia 8 4 8 5 9 3 2 5 2 5 4 2 56 
Croatia 7 5 9 11 11 2 5 5 5 5 6 3 72 
Ecuador 7 4 5 8 10 3 2 5 3 4 4 2 57 
Egypt 10 5 7 9 10 2 3 3 4 6 2 2 63 
Hungary 7 7 8 11 10 3 6 6 4 4 6 3 73 
Indonesia 7 6 8 8 10 3 3 1 3 2 5 2 59 
Malaysia 11 8 9 11 11 3 5 4 3 4 3 3 73 
Mexico 8 7 9 9 11 2 4 6 2 4 6 3 70 
Morocco 10 5 8 10 10 3 4 4 6 5 3 2 70 
Nigeria 8 2 5 8 10 1 1 2 2 2 3 1 47 
Panama 8 6 9 10 10 2 5 5 3 5 5 2 71 
Peru 7 5 8 7 10 3 4 6 3 3 4 2 62 
Philippines 8 5 8 8 11 2 3 3 3 5 5 3 64 
Poland 8 6 10 10 11 3 6 5 5 6 6 3 78 
Qatar 11 8 10 11 10 2 4 4 6 6 2 2 77 
Russia 9 5 7 8 9 2 4 5 4 3 3 1 61 
S. Africa 8 5 10 9 11 3 5 5 3 4 5 2 68 
S. Korea 9 7 8 10 9 3 5 6 4 6 6 3 76 
Turkey 9 5 8 8 8 2 3 4 4 2 4 2 60 
Ukraine 7 5 7 10 10 2 5 5 4 4 4 1 64 
Venezuela 8 4 4 8 10 2 1 5 3 5 4 1 55 
Note: Average political risk scores and components from January 1994 to April 2014. “Changes” shows the 
average absolute change of a score per country. 
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4. Inflation and seasonality in bond returns 
 
Based on Duyvesteyn, Martens and Morarescu (2015). We are grateful for the useful 
comments from Olaf Penninga, Laurens Swinkels, Patrick Verwijmeren, Casper Zomerdijk 
and seminar participants at Robeco. 
4.1 Introduction 
 
There is quite a large amount of literature on seasonal patterns in global equity returns and 
explanations for these patterns.32 For government bonds, however, the evidence is limited 
and inconsistent. In addition, the patterns that have been examined for the bond market all 
originate from studies of seasonality in the stock market: The January effect, the Halloween 
effect and the effect caused by Seasonal Affective Disorder (SAD).  Clayton, Delozier and 
Ehrhardt (1989) document that long-term U.S. Treasuries have lower returns in January than 
in the rest of the year.33 Fridson (2000) finds that 10-year U.S. Treasury returns are higher 
from June to November and Athanassakos (2008) finds that Canadian bonds have higher 
returns from May to October. Kamstra, Kramer and Levi (2015) document a seasonal pattern 
in U.S. treasury returns that coincides with the number of reported cases of Seasonal 
Affective Disorder (SAD). They argue that the resulting increased risk aversion during the 
fall leads to higher bond returns and the returns on bonds are likely to be below average once 
the days become longer. 
                                                
32
 Wachtel (1942), Rozeff and Kinney (1976), Gultekin and Gultekin (1983), Keim (1983), Reinganum (1983), 
Berges, McConnell and Schlarbaum (1984), Van den Bergh and Wessels (1985), Kato and Schallheim (1985), 
Aggarwal and Rivoli (1989) and Ho (1990) all document “the January effect”, with higher returns in the first 
month of the year. A recent study by Zhang and Jacobsen (2013) fails to find the January effect for their long 
U.K. data set. Bouman and Jacobsen (2002), Doeswijk (2008) and Andrade, Chhaochharia and Fuerst (2013) 
report on “the Halloween effect”, with higher equity returns from November to April and lower stock returns 
from May to October. Swinkels and van Vliet (2012) show that the Halloween effect is stronger than the 
January effect. Ogden (2003) reports higher equity returns from October to March. Kamstra, Kramer and Levi 
(2003) find below-average stock returns in the fall and relatively higher returns in the winter. They argue that a 
depression related to the decreasing daylight (Seasonal Affective Disorder - SAD) during autumn which 
influences the mood translates into risk aversion during fall and as the days become longer, the risk appetite of 
the investors recovers.   
33
 They point out several problems with the earlier studies on the January effect by Schneeweis and Woolridge 
(1979), Smirlock (1985), and Chang and Pinegar (1986) which all concluded there is no January effect in 
government bond returns. Smith (2002) finds mixed evidence for six developed countries depending on the 
method used. 
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 In this study we conduct a broader investigation of the six most liquid government 
bond markets: Australia, Canada, Germany, Japan, the U.K. and the U.S. We document a 
new semi-annual seasonal pattern in bond returns from 1980-2014: On average, the excess 
bond returns for the six countries are 3.8 percentage points higher in the second half of the 
calendar year. The pattern is statistically significant not just for the equally weighted 
portfolio of six countries but also for each country individually. In contrast, we find no 
evidence of a January effect, only a weak and inconsistent (inverted) Halloween effect, and 
SAD is only significant for Canada, Germany and the U.S. 
 We then proceed to explain the existence of the semi-annual seasonal pattern in 
government bond returns. Our contribution provides the new finding that the non-seasonally 
adjusted U.S. consumer price index (CPI) causes the seasonality of international bond 
returns. U.S. inflation is on average 3.0 percentage points higher in the first half of the 
calendar year. When simultaneously regressing monthly bond returns on the semi-annual 
seasonal and monthly inflation the bond return seasonal is no longer significant. Interestingly 
for the U.S. CRSP bond data from 1952 to 1979, there is no seasonal pattern in the bond 
returns coinciding with the absence of a seasonal pattern in U.S. inflation. 
 Seasonality in U.S. inflation is caused by seasonality in fuel and gasoline prices, 
which affect the housing and transportation components of the CPI. The higher prices in the 
first half of the year coincide with a higher demand for heating oil in the winter and gasoline 
for the U.S summer driving season. The lack of seasonality in U.S. bond returns from 1952 to 
1979 is then also understandable as oil prices were fixed in U.S. dollars until the early 
seventies, barring a few controlled adjustments. The results suggest that global bond markets 
do not properly anticipate seasonality in inflation. 
 The seasonal pattern in the national inflation can also explain the seasonal pattern in 
bond returns for several countries, but the results are weaker than for the U.S. inflation. 
Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2005) show that U.S. macro news is the dominant driver of both 
U.S. and European bond prices. Dahlquist and Hasseltoft (2013) report that global economies 
and international bond markets became more integrated in the last couple of decades. These 
findings support our finding that U.S. inflation and its seasonal pattern are important for 
international bond markets. 
 We add to the literature in at least three ways. First, we document a new seasonal 
pattern in international government bond returns. We find bond returns in the second half of 
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the calendar year to be on average 3.8 percentage points higher than bond returns in the first 
half of the calendar year. Second, we add to the price discovery literature in bond markets by 
identifying a strong relationship between inflation and bond returns, which largely explains 
the seasonal pattern in bond returns. Third, we find that U.S. inflation has more explanatory 
power than domestic inflation for bond returns in Australia, Canada, Germany, Japan, and the 
U.K., which is consistent with the literature on the impact of macroeconomic news on the 
international bond markets34.  
4.2 Data 
4.2.1 Bond data 
We obtain monthly total price indices for the government bonds of Australia, Canada, 
Germany, Japan, the U.K. and the U.S. from Thomson Financial Datastream. For Germany, 
the U.K. and the U.S. the sample starts in January 1980. Japan starts in January 1982, Canada 
in January 1985 and Australia in March 1987. These six countries have the most liquid bond 
markets, where we see Germany as representative of Europe. We compute excess returns as 
the total return minus the cash return of a 1-month Eurocurrency deposit35. For the U.S. we 
also look at the CRSP Fixed-Term Indexes data. This allows us to go further back in time. 
For the U.S. CRSP excess returns we compute the equally weighted average total return of 
U.S. 1-, 2-, 5-, 7-, 10-, 20- and 30-year government bond returns in excess of the 30-day T-
bill return. We use the data from January 1952, which is consistent with other studies36 and 
the CRSP Fama-Bliss discount bond dataset. 
 
As a preview on seasonality in bond returns we compute the average return per calendar 
month for the equally weighted portfolio of the six countries. Figure 4-1 reveals a striking 
                                                
34
 Global economies and international bond markets became more integrated in the last couple of decades 
(Dahlquist and Hasseltoft, 2013). The literature confirms that U.S. macroeconomic news is important for global 
bond prices. Multiple studies on the link between international economic news and international bond markets 
include U.S. economic news and one or more other countries. See for example, Kim and Sheen (2000) 
[Australia], Gravelle and Moessner (2001) [Canada], Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2005) [Euro area], Craine and 
Martin (2008) [Australia], Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold and Vega (2007) [Euro area], Andersson, Overby, and 
Sebestyén (2009) [Euro area, Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Belgium, and U.K.]. 
35
 For Australia we use a 90-day deposit rate before August 1988 because the 1-month Eurocurrency deposit 
rate is not available. 
36
 For example in Kamstra, Kramer and Levi (2015) 
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and strong pattern: Returns are on average much larger in the second half of the calendar year 
than in the first half.  
 
Figure 4-1: Average excess bond returns 
 
Note: The sample period is 1980-2014. The equally weighted portfolio returns are based on the six countries in 
Table 4-1. In the early years when not all six countries have data the portfolio is based on those countries that 
are available. The figure shows the average excess bond return per calendar month. 
 
 
Table 4-1 shows the starting dates and annualized average excess bond returns for the six 
individual countries and the equally weighted return of the six countries (‘EW portfolio’). All 
excess returns per annum are large because bond yields have declined on average for this 
sample period. The final row shows the annualized return and standard deviation for the 
CRSP bond data for the period from January 1952 to December 1979. This will allow us to 
look at seasonal patterns in bond returns for this longer period. For the period January 1980 
to December 2014 we find a 99% correlation between the U.S. bond returns of CRSP and 
Thomson Financial Datastream. 
 
-0.4%
0.0%
0.4%
0.8%
1.2%
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Table 4-1: Sample statistics for excess bond returns 
   Excess bond returns 
Country Start month End month Total H1 H2 
Australia 03/1987 12/2014 2.3% 0.6% 4.1% 
Canada 01/1985 12/2014 3.2% 1.0% 5.4% 
Germany 01/1980 12/2014 2.1% 0.3% 4.0% 
Japan 01/1982 12/2014 2.4% 1.2% 3.6% 
United Kingdom 01/1980 12/2014 2.3% –0.5% 5.2% 
United States 01/1980 12/2014 2.3% 0.4% 4.3% 
EW portfolio return 01/1980 12/2014 2.3% 0.4% 4.2% 
EW portfolio risk 01/1980 12/2014 4.0% 4.0% 3.9% 
United States CRSP 01/1952 12/1979 –0.3% –0.5% –0.1% 
Note: The excess bond return is the annualized return of all government bonds included in the Datastream 
government bond indices. The excess return is the total return minus the cash return of a 1-month Eurocurrency 
deposit from Reuters. For Australia we use a 90-day deposit rate before Aug 1988 because the 1-month deposit 
rate is not available. The final column shows the annualized standard deviation of the monthly returns.All data 
are from Datastream except for the U.S. CRSP data. ‘EW portfolio’ is based on equally weighting the six 
countries provided they exist. EW portfolio risk is the annualized risk of the EW portfolio. United States CRSP 
is based on the equally weighted average total return of U.S. 1-, 2-, 5-, 7-, 10-, 20- and 30-year government 
bonds in excess of the 30-day T-bill return. 
 
Table 4-1 shows the average returns in the first (H1) and second half (H2) of the year for the 
individual countries and the portfolio. The average portfolio return is 0.4% per annum in the 
first half of the year and 4.2% per annum in the second half of the year. This strong seasonal 
pattern is also visible for each country individually. The smallest difference is for the U.S. 
CRSP data over the period 1952-1979. 
A simple explanation of the difference could be a higher bond market risk in the 
second half of the year. However, the annualized bond market risk in the first half of the year 
(4.0%) is slightly higher than the bond market risk in the second half of the year (3.9%) and 
can therefore not explain this large return difference.  
4.2.2 Macroeconomic data 
To examine the seasonal effect we will make use of macro data. We gather non-seasonally 
adjusted data for GDP, industrial production, consumer price inflation (CPI), producer price 
inflation (PPI), consumer confidence, producer confidence, and the unemployment rate. We 
do not apply a publication lag and use the final data including potential data revisions. For 
example Chu, Pittman and Yu (2011) show that U.S inflation linked bond prices fully reflect 
the U.S. inflation data by the end of the corresponding month, before the official 
announcement of the inflation data which is normally about 2 weeks later. That motivates us 
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to not delay the data by one month. We do analyse the impact of the publication lag on our 
key results in Section 4.5.3. The data source is Thomson Financial Datastream, which covers 
non-seasonally adjusted data for all the six countries of interest.  
Table 4-2 shows the first month for which the macroeconomic data are available for 
each country. For GDP, industrial production, CPI and PPI we calculate the relative monthly 
or quarterly change and for the producer confidence, consumer confidence and 
unemployment rate we calculate the monthly absolute change. For GDP we only have 
quarterly data and for three Australian and one Canadian indicators as well. All data are not 
seasonally adjusted. Industrial production and GDP are measured in constant prices to avoid 
a potential overlap with the inflation indicators. 
 
Table 4-2: Start month macroeconomic data 
Country 
Consumer  
price 
inflation 
Producer 
 price 
inflation 
Consumer 
confidence 
Producer 
confidence GDP 
Industrial 
production 
Unem- 
ployment 
Australia 03/1987* 03/1987* 03/1987 10/2007 04/1980* 03/1987* 03/1987 
Canada 01/1985 01/1985 09/2001* 05/1999 04/1980* 02/1995 01/1985 
Germany 01/1980 01/1980 02/1985 02/1991 04/1980* 01/1980 02/1991 
Japan 01/1982 01/1982 01/1982 04/1996 04/1980* 01/1982 01/1982 
U.K. 01/1980 01/1980 01/1980 - 04/1980* 01/1980 02/1983 
U.S. 01/1980 01/1980 01/1980 08/1997 04/1980* 01/1980 01/1980 
U.S. CRSP 01/1952 01/1952 02/1978 - - 02/1957 01/1952 
Note: All data are from Thomson Financial Datastream and are not seasonally adjusted. Inflation, GDP and 
industrial production are measured as the monthly (or quarterly) percentage change. Confidence and 
unemployment are measured as the monthly (or quarterly) absolute change. Consumer price inflation is based 
on the xxCONPRCF Datastream code where xx is the country code, except for the U.K. for which we use the 
RPI index (UKCHAW Datastream code) because of a longer data history. Producer price inflation is based on 
the xxPROPRCF Datastream code where xx is the country code. For the consumer confidence we use the ANZ 
Roy Morgan index for Australia, the Decima Research index for Canada, the DG ECFIN index for Germany, 
the Cabinet Office leading index for Japan, the GfK index for the U.K. and the University of Michigan index for 
the U.S. For the producer confidence we use the AIG index for Australia, the Ivey index for Canada, the IFO 
index for Germany, the Tankan index for Japan, and the ISM index for the U.S. A producer confidence index 
for the U.K. is available on Datastream but is not for free. GDP is based on the xxXGDPR.D Datastream code 
where xx is the country code. Industrial production is based on the xxI66..IG Datastream code where xx is the 
country code, except for Australia for which we use AUQ66..IG code. Unemployment is based on xxMLRT16R 
Datastream code where xx is the country code. *Australian consumer inflation, producer inflation and industrial 
production, Canadian consumer confidence and all GDP data are only available on a quarterly basis. 
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4.3 Methodology 
 
Different methods are proposed in the literature to test for seasonality. We make use of the 
most popular method, which is the regression method.37 More specifically we use the 
following regression: 
$_& = ! + ' + () +          (4-1) 
where $_& is the excess bond return in month or quarter t, α is the intercept term, β is the 
coefficient of the seasonal variable Xt,  ( is the coefficient of control variable Yt, and εt is the 
error term. Most often Xt is a dummy variable that takes on the value of one for the months in 
which higher returns are expected, and zero for other months. This way the regression with 
( = 0  is similar to a mean test on the difference in the mean of the months for which the 
dummy has been assigned a one and the mean of the other months. If the β in equation (4-1) 
is significantly higher or lower than zero we have evidence that bond returns are significantly 
higher or lower in the months for which the dummy variable is one. We will formally test for 
an H1 H2 seasonal pattern using equation (4-1) where 
' = + 0     ,- . ∈  0123, 56, 2&, 78&, 29, 1:3; (<1)1     ,- . ∈  01:>, 7:?, @58, A., BC, 5A; (<2)                      (4-2) 
In addition we will test for alternative seasonal patterns documented in the literature. These 
are the January effect ('=1 only for the month January), the (inverted) Halloween effect 
' = + 0     ,- . ∈  0123, 56, 2&, 78&, BC, 5A;1     ,- . ∈  029, 1:3, 1:>, 7:?, @58, A.;                                (4-3) 
and the SAD factor where ' takes on a different value for each month38. For variables that 
can potentially explain the seasonal pattern in bond returns we will use Yt in equation (4-1). A 
variable explains (to a large extent) the seasonality in bond returns if without it β is 
significantly different from zero and with it β is no longer significantly different from zero. 
Equation (4-1) will be estimated using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and inference will be 
based on Newey-West standard errors39. 
                                                
37
 See for example Bouman and Jacobsen (2002), Ogden (2003), Hong and Yu (2009), Kelly and Meschke 
(2010), Andrade, Chhaochharia and Fuerst (2013) and Zhang and Jacobsen (2013). 
38
 We are grateful to Mark Kamstra for providing the data, see www.markkamstra.com/data.html.  
39
 Jacobsen and Marquering (2008) apply different estimation techniques (OLS, GMM, Maximum Likelihood 
and panel regression) but draw the same conclusions from all methods. 
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4.4 Seasonal patterns in bond returns 
 
Table 4-3 shows the results for the seasonality tests in equation (4-1) with ( = 0. The H1 H2 
seasonal pattern in Figure 4-1 is highly significant with a t-statistic of 2.6, see Table 4-3 first 
column row ‘EW portfolio’. Hence the return difference of 3.8% between the first half of the 
year (H1) and the second half of the year (H2) for the equally weighted portfolio of the six 
countries is significant at the 1% significance level. For the individual countries the seasonal 
pattern is also significant at the 10% significance level. Only for the U.S. bond returns from 
1951 to 1979, the 0.4% higher return in H2 is not significantly different from zero. 
 
Table 4-3: Seasonal tests on excess bond returns 
 
Excess bond returns 
H1 H2 January Halloween SAD 
Australia 3.5% (1.7) 
-1.4% 
(-0.5) 
0.5% 
(0.3) 
0.0036 
(0.9) 
Canada 4.3% (2.2) 
-0.6% 
(-0.2) 
4.3% 
(2.3) 
0.0101 
(2.6) 
Germany 3.7% (2.6) 
-0.6% 
(-0.3) 
0.7% 
(0.5) 
0.0047 
(1.8) 
Japan 2.3% (1.8) 
-2.7% 
(-1.1) 
-0.8% 
(-0.5) 
0.0013 
(0.5) 
United Kingdom 5.7% (2.5) 
-2.3% 
(-0.6) 
2.2% 
(0.9) 
0.0074 
(1.5) 
United States 3.9% (2.0) 
-1.4% 
(-0.5) 
3.8% 
(2.1) 
0.0103 
(3.1) 
EW portfolio 3.8% (2.6) 
-1.7% 
(-0.9) 
1.6% 
(1.1) 
0.0061 
(2.2) 
United States CRSP  0.4% (0.2) 
2.1% 
(0.7) 
-0.8% 
(-0.5) 
0.0012 
(0.4) 
 
Note: This table shows the betas from equation (4-1) with ( = 0, where we regress excess bond returns on four 
different choices of the seasonal. For H1 H2 we use equation (4-2) for Xt in equation (4-1). For the January 
effect Xt takes on the value 1 for Januaries and 0 in other months. For the (inverted) Halloween effect Xt is 
defined in equation (4-3). Finally for the Seasonal Affective Disorder (SAD) Xt is set equal to the 12 monthly 
values from the Kamstra, Kramer and Levi (2015) paper. T-values based on Newey-West standard errors are 
presented inside parentheses. The detailed data description is shown in the note below Table 4-1. 
 
The January effect is not strongly present in the data. None of betas is statistically 
significant, although the average return below zero has the expected sign. The Halloween 
effect is also not significant for the equally weighted portfolio of the six countries. Only for 
Canada and the U.S., the excess bond returns are significantly higher in the months May to 
October. The SAD factor is significant for the equally weighted portfolio, and also 
individually for Canada, Germany and U.S. The latter is consistent with the findings of 
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Kamstra, Kramer and Levi (2015). For Australia, Japan and the U.K., however, there is no 
significant SAD effect. The sign for Australia is even wrong, as the idea of SAD should 
apply in other months for Southern-Hemisphere countries.  
In conclusion, the new H1 H2 seasonal is the most significant and robust seasonal 
effect for the six developed bond markets. We continue with investigating what is driving 
this strong seasonal pattern in bond returns. 
4.5 Explaining the bond seasonal 
4.5.1 Potential explanations 
To understand the reasons behind the strong H1 H2 seasonal pattern in excess bond returns, 
we look at drivers of bond returns that can cause this seasonal pattern. Our primary candidate 
is inflation. Several studies find that (the change in expected) inflation (surprise) is an 
important determinant of government bond returns40. It is common to report and use 
seasonally adjusted inflation figures, except for inflation linked bond markets that we 
investigate in Section 4.6. If a seasonal pattern does exist in the inflation it would be only 
visible in non-seasonally adjusted data, therefore for this research question we use non-
seasonally adjusted inflation data. Besides non-seasonally adjusted inflation, we also look at 
other macroeconomic non-seasonally adjusted variables to investigate whether the variation 
of economic activity can explain the seasonality in bond returns. We consider GDP growth, 
change in the unemployment rate and the industrial production, although Elton, Gruber and 
Blake (1995) find such growth related data to be less important for bond markets than 
inflation. Finally we include consumer and producer confidence, with the former being an 
indicator for investor sentiment and the latter being an indicator of for confidence in the 
economic activity. Doeswijk (2008) links the Halloween effect in equity markets to investor 
confidence and perhaps the same is possible for bond markets. 
 In the first place we test national macroeconomic data for national bond markets. 
Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2005) show that U.S. macro news is the dominant driver of both 
U.S. and European bond prices. Dahlquist and Hasseltoft (2013) report that global economies 
and international bond markets became more integrated in the last couple of decades. The 
                                                
40
 See for example De Bondt and Bange (1992), Campbell and Ammer (1993), Elton, Gruber and Blake (1995), 
Ang and Piazzesi (2003), Brandt and Wang (2003), and Wright (2011). 
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global Cochrane and Piazzesi (CP; 2005) factor, dominated by the U.S. CP factor, predicts 
bond returns better than the national CP factors. Hence we will also use U.S. macroeconomic 
data to see whether these can explain seasonality in bond returns in the other markets. Ang, 
Bekaert, and Wei (2008) find that the inflation risk premium largely explains the variation in 
long-term nominal bond yields. Jotikasthira, Le, and Lundblad (2015) report that GDP 
weighted world inflation41 and U.S. yields together explain over two-thirds of the covariance 
of international bond yields. 
 Kamstra, Kramer and Levi (2015) also consider other bond drivers to explain the 
seasonal pattern in U.S. treasury returns. For example, related to bond issuance, they consider 
debt-to-GDP but this indicator does not display a seasonal pattern. Auction dates and FOMC 
meetings also cannot explain the seasonal pattern in U.S. treasury returns. Related to investor 
sentiment, they investigate the Baker and Wurgler (2006; 2007) index but this index does not 
display a seasonal pattern. Hence, we focus on investigating whether national and U.S. 
macroeconomic data can explain the seasonal pattern in global bond returns. 
4.5.2 Seasonal pattern in macroeconomic variables 
To explain the seasonal pattern in bond returns by seasonality in macroeconomic data two 
conditions need to be met. First, the macroeconomic data should exhibit a similar (inverse) 
semiannual pattern as the bond returns. Second, the monthly bond returns and 
macroeconomic data should be strongly and positively (negatively) related. We first analyze 
the existence of a H1 H2 seasonal in the seven macroeconomic indicators. Table 4-4 shows 
the results for the six countries, the equal weighted portfolio and the U.S. CRSP data before 
1980. 
For the national macroeconomic data averaged over the six countries we see in 
column 7 of Table 4-4 that all macro indicators except for unemployment and real GDP 
growth display a significant H1 H2 seasonal pattern. For example consumer (producer) price 
inflation is on average 2.1% (2.2%) per annum higher in H1 than in H2. The sign of 
unemployment suggests it cannot explain the bond seasonal. A declining unemployment in 
H2 should on average trigger lower bond returns in H2, not higher bond returns. Consumer 
and producer confidence do not show a significant H1 H2 seasonal for respectively three and 
                                                
41
 The equally weighted inflation of the six countries has a correlation of 74% with U.S. inflation. 
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two countries. Moreover, for Australia the sign of producer confidence is significant and 
positive, indicating lower bond returns in the second half of the year. The consumer and 
producer price inflation have the strongest seasonal with t-stats of respectively -5.0 and -3.8 
for the portfolio. Consumer price inflation is the most likely candidate to explain the seasonal 
effect in bond returns given its highest t-stat. In the next Section we will therefore look in 
detail at the consumer price inflation. In Section 4.5.4 we will come back to the other 
macroeconomic data.  
 
Table 4-4: H1 H2 seasonal test for macroeconomic data 
 
Australia Canada Germany Japan U.K. U.S. EW portfolio 
U.S. 
CRSP 
Consumer price  
inflation 
0.1%* -2.7% -0.7% -1.1% -2.6% -3.0% -2.1% -0.3% 
(0.1) (-6.1) (-1.7) (-2.6) (-4.0) (-5.4) (-5.0) (-0.5) 
Producer price  
inflation 
0.9%* -2.4% -1.8% -1.1% -2.5% -3.2% -2.2% 0.3% 
(0.5) (-2.5) (-3.2) (-1.6) (-4.0) (-3.6) (-3.8) (0.3) 
Consumer 
confidence 
3.3 -10.9* -10.3 -3.8 -16.5 -6.2 -7.1 -3.3 
(0.6) (-0.6) (-3.3) (-2.7) (-4.7) (-1.2) (-3.5) (-0.2) 
Producer  
confidence 
10.3 -45.0 -4.8 -23.8 - -2.1 -12.4 - 
(3.0) (-4.3) (-1.6) (-2.0) - (-0.9) (-3.5) - 
GDP 0.3%
*
 -0.2%* 0.6%* 0.4%* 0.0%* 0.2%* 0.2%* - 
(0.6) (-0.5) (1.2) (0.7) (-0.1) (0.7) (0.9) - 
Industrial  
production 
32.4%* -18.4% -17.3% -5.3% -5.4% -8.5% -9.6% -16.6% 
(5.9) (-3.7) (-2.9) (-1.2) (-1.3) (-5.9) (-3.2) (-6.9) 
Unemployment 0.8 0.2 0.1 -0.8 -0.5 -2.0 -0.4 -2.9 (2.3) (0.4) (0.2) (-3.6) (-1.9) (-6.0) (-1.4) (-6.2) 
Note: This table shows the results for equation (4-1) where we regress monthly macroeconomic data on the H1 
H2 seasonal in equation (4-2) and set γ = 0. The betas are annualized. T-values based on Newey-West standard 
errors are presented inside parentheses. The detailed data description is shown in the note below  
Table 4-2. *Australian consumer inflation, producer inflation and industrial production, Canadian consumer 
confidence and all GDP data are only available on a quarterly basis. 
4.5.3 Does inflation explain the bond seasonal? 
Given the results in Table 4-4, we analyze whether consumer price inflation can explain the 
bond seasonal. For this purpose we use the regression in equation (4-1) with the H1 H2 
seasonal for Xt and monthly relative changes in CPI (inflation) for Yt.42 The results are 
reported in Table 4-5. 
                                                
42
 We also look at the 2-step approach where we first regress excess bond returns on inflation and subsequently 
test whether the residuals of this regression still exhibit any H1 H2 seasonal. As expected this leads to the same 
conclusions. 
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The first two columns report the results for national inflation43. These results provide 
a mixed picture. For the U.S. there is a highly significant loading of -0.91 on inflation with a 
t-statistic of -3.4 and no longer a significant loading on H1 H2 for 1980-2014. The original 
H1 H2 return difference of 3.9% with a t-statistic of 2.0 (see Table 4-3 row ‘United States’ 
column ‘H1 H2’) drops to 1.1% with a t-statistic of 0.6 after including inflation. For 
Germany there is also a significant loading on local inflation but the H1 H2 seasonal is still 
significant. For the other countries monthly bond returns do not significantly load on inflation 
and hence the significant loadings (albeit on average smaller) on H1 H2 remain. 
 
The final columns in Table 4-5, however, provide a different pattern. U.S. inflation44 is a 
strong explanatory variable for all international bond returns. Most importantly none of the 
loadings on H1 H2 is significant after controlling for inflation. For the equally weighted 
portfolio the H1 H2 return difference drops to an insignificant 1.3% (t-statistic 0.9), 
compared to 2.8% when including national inflation and 3.8% (see Table 4-3) when not 
including inflation in the regression. Hence these results show that to a large extent 
seasonality in U.S. inflation is responsible for seasonality in international bond returns.45 ,46, 47 
                                                
43
 We have no results for Australia as they report inflation only at a quarterly frequency. 
44
 We have also analyzed U.S. inflation surprise data from Bloomberg (CPI CHNG Index). Although the actual 
seasonally adjusted inflation tends to be lower than expected by the panel of analysts in the second half of the 
year, the surprise data do not have a significant H1 H2 seasonal and surprise data do not have a significant 
impact on the bond market returns. Surprise data cannot help to explain the seasonal pattern in bond returns. 
45
 On a monthly basis the bond return residual of the U.S. and Canada do exhibit a significant exposure to the 
SAD factor, consistent with the findings of Kamstra, Kramer and Levi (2015). On a quarterly basis the exposure 
to the SAD factor becomes insignificant. The link between quarterly inflation and quarterly bonds returns is 
stronger than the link on a monthly basis enabling inflation to explain the bond seasonal pattern even better on a 
quarterly basis.  
46
 To come to our earlier point in Section 4.2.2 on delaying the macroeconomic data by one month: The delayed 
consumer price inflation cannot explain the bond seasonal. The 1-month delayed non-seasonally adjusted U.S. 
CPI  has a significant but weaker H1 H2 seasonal (the difference between H1 and H2 drops from 3.0% to 1.6%) 
and its explanatory power for bond market returns is weaker with a t-stat of -1.9 versus -4.5 for the portfolio of 
all bond markets. This result echoes the findings by Chu, Pittman and Yu (2011) who show that U.S inflation 
linked bond prices fully reflect the U.S. inflation data by the end of the corresponding month, before the official 
announcement of the inflation data which is normally about 2 weeks later.  
47
 Results are similar using first vintage data for the U.S. CPI from the FRED database of the Federal Reserve 
Bank of St Louis. 
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Table 4-5: Explaining the seasonal in bond returns with inflation 
 
National inflation       U.S. inflation 
Inflation H1 H2 Inflation H1 H2 
Australia   -0.47 1.9% 
  (-1.6) (0.9) 
Canada -0.11 4.0% -0.69 2.2% (-0.4) (1.9) (-3.0) (1.1) 
Germany -0.35 3.4% -0.90 0.9% (-2.6) (2.5) (-4.8) (0.7) 
Japan -0.14 2.2% -0.45 1.0% (-1.0) (1.7) (-2.2) (0.7) 
United Kingdom -0.18 5.2% -1.04 2.5% (-0.9) (2.3) (-3.4) (1.0) 
United States -0.91 1.1% -0.91 1.1% (-3.4) (0.6) (-3.4) (0.6) 
EW portfolio -0.51 2.8% -0.85 1.3% (-1.7) (1.8) (-4.5) (0.9) 
United States CRSP -0.14 0.4% -0.14 0.4% (-0.8) (0.2) (-0.8) (0.2) 
 
Note: This table shows the results for equation (4-1) where we regress monthly excess bond returns of the 
equally weighted portfolio of six countries on Xt, the H1 H2 seasonal in equation (4-2), and Yt, the inflation 
(percentage monthly change in CPI). The first two columns show the results for national inflation. The next two 
columns show the results where the U.S. inflation is used for all countries. T-values based on Newey-West 
standard errors are presented inside parentheses. The detailed description of the bond and macro data is shown 
in the notes below Table 4-1 and 
Table 4-2. 
4.5.4 What about other macroeconomic indicators? 
We investigate whether other macroeconomic variables can also explain the bond seasonal. 
Again we first use national data and then U.S. data. We focus on the equally weighted bond 
portfolio of the six countries48. The results are presented in Table 4-6. 
 
                                                
48
 Detailed results for the individual bond markets are available upon request. 
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Table 4-6: Explaining the seasonal in bond returns with macroeconomic data 
 
National data       U.S. data 
Indicator H1 H2 Indicator H1 H2 
Consumer price inflation  -0.51 2.8% -0.85 1.3% (-1.7) (1.8) (-4.5) (0.9) 
Producer price inflation -0.56 2.6% -0.32 2.8% (-3.5) (1.8) (-3.4) (2.0) 
Consumer confidence -0.000057 3.8% -0.000065 3.8% (-0.3) (2.5) (-0.6) (2.6) 
Producer confidence -0.000282 4.8% -0.001163 3.6% (-1.2) (3.2) (-3.3) (2.3) 
GDP -1.3 3.7% -1.1 3.7% (-3.0) (2.7) (-4.7) (2.8) 
Industrial production 0.00088 3.8% -0.02707 3.6% (0.1) (2.6) (-0.9) (2.3) 
Unemployment 0.00343 4.0% 0.00133 4.1% (1.8) (2.7) (1.1) (2.7) 
 
Note: This table shows the results for equation (4-1) where we regress monthly excess bond returns of the 
equally weighted portfolio of six countries on Xt, the H1 H2 seasonal in equation (4-2), and Yt, the monthly non-
seasonally adjusted macroeconomic data. The first two columns show the results where the macro data is 
national. The next two columns show the results where the macro data is based on U.S. data. T-values based on 
Newey-West standard errors are presented inside parentheses. The detailed description of the bond and macro 
data is shown in the notes below Table 4-1 and  
Table 4-2. 
 
The first two rows of Table 4-6 show the same result for the consumer price inflation as the 
‘EW portfolio’ rows in Table 4-5. For U.S. data the excess bond returns of the EW portfolio 
significantly load on consumer price inflation but not anymore on the H1 H2 seasonal. For 
the other macroeconomic indicators, we find that for the national macro data the producer 
price inflation is the most significant, with a t-statistic of -3.5. This also reduces the H1 H2 
loading to 2.6% (from 3.8%) but it remains significant at the 10% significance level with a t-
statistic of 1.849.  
 Other macroeconomic indicators are less successful in explaining the seasonal pattern. 
Both the national and U.S. version of consumer confidence and industrial production have 
very low explanatory power for monthly excess bond returns. U.S. producer confidence and 
GDP growth are significantly related to the average bond returns of the six countries. But the 
absence of a clear seasonal pattern in U.S. producer confidence (see Table 4-4) means it does 
not materially affect the loading on the H1 H2 seasonal. National unemployment does affect 
bond returns, but also in this case unemployment lacks a significant seasonal pattern (see 
                                                
49
 The correlation between CPI and PPI is 64%. In a regression of the bond return on both components CPI 
remains significant, while PPI become insignificant and no additional H1 H2 return differential is explained. A 
multiple regression with all the macroeconomic factors does not further explain the H1 H2 return. 
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Table 4-4).50 Hence we can conclude that none of the alternatives is able to explain the 
seasonal pattern in bond returns. 
4.5.5 What is causing the seasonal in inflation? 
Now that we established that seasonality in bond returns can be largely explained by 
seasonality in consumer price inflation, the logical follow-up question is: What is causing 
seasonality in inflation? 
To understand why U.S. inflation exhibits a seasonal pattern, we analyze the eight 
main components of the U.S. CPI: Food and beverages, housing, apparel, transportation, 
medical care, recreation, education and communication, and other goods and services. 
Results and the data description are shown in Table 4-7. Five of the eight components show a 
significant seasonal H1 H2 pattern with the same sign as the total inflation. Education and 
other goods and services (like tobacco) show a significant opposite pattern with higher 
inflation in the second half of the year51. 
For the three components with the largest weight, food, housing, and transportation, 
we also include the three largest sub-components based on December 2014 weights. Fuels 
and utilities and motor fuel stand out with a very large and significant difference between H1 
and H2. This result is consistent with Gorton and Rouwenhorst (2006) who note that heating 
oil prices are on average higher during the winter months, and gasoline prices increase in the 
second quarter caused by the yearly summer driving season52. A higher demand in the first 
half of the year for fuels seems a plausible explanation for the seasonal pattern in the price 
return of the two inflation components. 
 
                                                
50
 Delaying the macroeconomic data by one month to account for a publication lag does not materially change 
the results. 
51
 For education this can be explained the typical yearly increase of tuition fees in August and September when 
the new educational year usually commences, see McGranahan and Paulson (2006). 
52
 The Association for convenience and fuel retailing (NACS) has a detailed explanation on the impact of the 
summer driving season on gasoline prices related to a typical refinery maintenance period, a larger demand for 
oil and the mandatory switch to a summer-blend in April, more information can be found on the following 
website: 
http://www.nacsonline.com/YourBusiness/FuelsReports/GasPrices_2013/Pages/Gas-Prices-Spring.aspx 
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Table 4-7: Sample statistics U.S. inflation components 
Component Weight Start month End month Jan-Jun (H1) 
Jul-Dec 
(H2) T-stat 
Total 100.0 31/1/1952 31/12/2014 4.4% 2.6% -4.5 
Food and beverages 15.3 28/2/1967 31/12/2014 4.7% 3.5% -2.2 
 -Food at home 8.4 31/1/1952 31/12/2014 4.5% 2.1% -3.6 
 -Away from home 5.8 28/2/1953 31/12/2014 4.0% 4.0% -0.2 
 -Alcohol 1.0 31/1/1953 31/12/2014 3.5% 2.4% -2.6 
Housing 42.2 28/2/1967 31/12/2014 5.4% 3.1% -4.3 
 -Shelter 32.7 31/1/1953 31/12/2014 4.5% 3.7% -1.8 
 -Fuels and utilities 5.3 31/1/1953 31/12/2014 6.9% 0.8% -6.0 
 -Furnishings and operations 4.2 28/2/1967 31/12/2014 3.0% 1.5% -3.4 
Apparel 3.3 31/1/1952 31/12/2014 1.0% 2.5% 1.5 
Transportation 15.3 31/1/1952 31/12/2014 5.8% 1.0% -3.6 
 -New and used motor vehicles 5.7 28/2/1993 31/12/2014 0.3% 0.6% 0.3 
 -Motor fuel 4.0 31/1/1952 31/12/2014 14.8% -5.4% -4.5 
 -Motor vehicle insurance 2.3 31/1/1952 31/12/2014 4.6% 6.0% 1.5 
Medical care 7.7 31/1/1952 31/12/2014 5.8% 4.7% -3.4 
Recreation 5.8 28/2/1993 31/12/2014 2.2% 0.1% -6.1 
Education and communication 7.1 28/2/1993 31/12/2014 0.6% 3.8% 6.3 
Other goods and services 3.4 28/2/1967 31/12/2014 4.6% 5.8% 2.5 
Note: Sample statistics U.S. CPI-U and its eight components, of the three largest components the three largest 
sub components are also shown. The weight is the December 2014 CPI-U weight. The source of the data is the 
bureau of labor statistics of the U.S. department of labor (http://www.bls.gov/cpi/data.htm). The t-values are 
based on Newey-West standard errors for the β in the regression in equation (4-1) with   
γ = 0 and Xt based on equation (4-2). 
 
Can the strong seasonal in fuels and utilities and motor fuel, currently good for about 10% 
weight in the CPI, explain the seasonal pattern in international bond returns? To test this we 
first regress the total inflation return on these two components. The regression provides a 
fitted value based on these two components and a residual inflation that is uncorrelated with 
these two components. The fitted value can be interpreted as the sum of the two components 
weighted with the betas on the total inflation. Subsequently we regress the bond returns on 
the fitted value and we regress the bond returns on the residual inflation. If the fuel 
components are causing the H1 H2 seasonal in bond returns we expect that the fitted value 
can explain the H1 H2 seasonal, and that residual inflation cannot explain the H1 H2 seasonal 
in bond returns53.  
                                                
53
 We also tested for seasonality in the fitted values and residual inflation. As expected the fitted values display 
a strong seasonal pattern with a t-stat of -6.3, whereas residual inflation has an insignificant H1 H2 seasonal 
with a t-stat of -1.0. 
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Table 4-8: Explaining the seasonal in bond returns with inflation components 
 
Residual inflation Two components inflation 
 
Inflation H1 H2 Inflation H1 H2 
Australia -0.09 3.4% -0.47 2.0% (-0.2) (1.7) (-1.8) (1.0) 
Canada -0.21 4.3% -0.66 2.5% (-0.6) (2.1) (-2.7) (1.2) 
Germany -0.65 3.4% -0.87 1.4% (-2.4) (2.3) (-4.0) (1.2) 
Japan -0.42 2.2% -0.32 1.5% (-1.5) (1.4) (-1.8) (1.1) 
United Kingdom -0.48 5.5% -1.20 2.5% (-1.3) (2.2) (-3.8) (1.1) 
United States -0.64 3.7% -0.90 1.5% (-1.6) (1.7) (-3.0) (0.8) 
EW portfolio -0.62 3.6% -0.82 1.7% (-2.1) (2.2) (-3.8) (1.2) 
United States CRSP -0.42 0.0% -0.27 0.6% (-1.7) (0.0) (-0.9) (0.3) 
 
Note: This table shows the results for equation (4-1) where we regress monthly excess bond returns on Xt, the 
H1 H2 seasonal in equation (4-2), and Yt. For the latter we first regress total U.S. inflation (non-seasonally 
adjusted CPI) on two of its components: Fuels and utilities, and Motor fuel. For Yt we then either use the 
residuals of this regression, ‘Residual inflation’ or the fitted values of the regression, ‘Fuel components’. T-
values based on Newey-West standard errors are presented inside parentheses. The detailed description of the 
bond data and U.S. inflation components data is shown in the notes below Table 4-1 and Table 4-7. 
 
The results in Table 4-8 show that the fuel components are indeed causing the H1 H2 
seasonal. In the second column we see that for the equally weighted portfolio the original 
annualized return difference between H1 and H2 is slightly reduced from 3.8% to a still 
significant 3.6%. In the final column we see that the fitted values based on the two fuel 
components reduce the loading on H1 H2 to an insignificant 1.7%. The loadings on the 
residual inflation are insignificant except for Germany and the equally weighted portfolio. On 
the other hand the loadings on the fitted values based on the weighted sum of the fuel 
components are generally highly significant. Hence monthly bond returns are mostly 
influenced by these fuel components, which lends support that it is the (reverse) H1 H2 
seasonal in fuel costs that drives the seasonality in bond returns. 
4.5.6 Why no seasonal from 1952 - 1979? 
The last row of Table 4-3 shows that the U.S. bond market does not exhibit a significant 
seasonal return difference from 1952 – 1979. The last column of Table 4-4 shows that 
consumer inflation also does not show a significant seasonal difference for the same period. 
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Industrial production and unemployment do show a significant seasonal difference with a 
similar sign as in the period from 1980 – 2014, but a regression of the bond returns on these 
indicators does not lead to a significant seasonal in the residual bond returns from 1952 - 
1979. 
Figure 4-2 shows that the difference between the first and second half of the year 
started to deviate since the end of the seventies for both fuel components. The figure 
confirms that the H1 H2 seasonal effect is not significant in the period from 1952 – 1979. 
The figure also visually confirms the stable and significant difference between in the first half 
and the second half of the year since the end of the seventies. The price of oil was directly 
pegged to gold and the U.S. dollar before 1971. After the breakdown of the Bretton Woods 
system in 1971 and the two oil crises in 1973 and 1979, the oil price started to change on a 
monthly basis since 1979. The absence of a free floating oil price in the period from 1952 to 
1979 is a probable explanation for the absence of the seasonal pattern in the two fuel 
components of the consumer price inflation. 
 
Figure 4-2: cumulative H1 and H2 return fuel and utilities and motor fuel components 
 
 
Note: The figure shows the cumulative price returns in the first half and the second half of the year for the fuels 
and utilities and the motor fuels components of the U.S. CPI. 
4.6 Inflation-linked bonds 
 
So far we have studied nominal bonds. We find that nominal bond returns have a significant 
seasonal pattern in returns that can be explained by inflation. In this Section we look at 
inflation-linked bonds (ILBs). Because the coupons and face value depend directly on 
national not-seasonally adjusted inflation, we expect to see no seasonal pattern in U.S. ILBs. 
We also expect to see less seasonality in the ILB returns of the other five countries. But 
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because the seasonality in the bond returns is driven by U.S. inflation, which in turn is driven 
by fuel costs in U.S. Dollars, ILBs of the other five countries may also have a seasonal return 
pattern like nominal bonds. 
 
Table 4-9: Sample statistics inflation linked bonds 
Country Start month End month Excess ILB return Excess nom return 
Australia 31/01/1997 31/12/2014 2.7% 2.6% 
Canada 31/01/1997 31/12/2014 4.8% 5.1% 
Germany 30/04/2006 31/12/2014 2.3% 3.1% 
Japan 30/04/2004 31/12/2014 2.2% 1.8% 
United Kingdom 30/06/1981 31/12/2014 0.9% 3.1% 
United States 31/03/1997 31/12/2014 3.3% 3.6% 
EW portfolio   0.6% 2.9% 
Note: the excess bond return is the annualized return of all government bonds included in the Barclays 
government bond indices. The excess return is the total return minus the cash return of a 1-month Eurocurrency 
deposit from Reuters. Both inflation linked bond data and maturity-matched nominal bond data are from 
Barclays and cover the same data period for each country. 
 
ILB data have less history. An overview is provided in Table 4-9. Given the shorter sample 
period we should first check whether the nominal bonds still exhibit a seasonal pattern over 
the shorter sample period, and that U.S. CPI largely explains this seasonal pattern. 
Subsequently we look at seasonality in ILB returns. If there is seasonality in the ILB returns, 
we can test whether it is also caused by U.S. inflation. 
 
The results in Table 4-10 show in the right panel that despite the reduced sample size shown 
in Table 4-9 there are still clear signs of a significant H1 H2 seasonal for nominal bonds. 
These are the italic numbers in column 4 of Table 4-10. For the equally weighted portfolio 
the annualized return difference between H1 and H2 is equal to 5.7%, which is significant 
with a t-statistic of 2.0. In the final two columns we see that also for this subsample U.S. 
inflation has a significant impact on international bond returns and explains the seasonal 
pattern in these returns. For the equally weighted portfolio the return difference between H1 
and H2 drops to 2.2% with a t-statistic of 0.7. 
 In the left panel of Table 4-10 the results for inflation linked bonds are presented. The 
first column (numbers in italic) shows that only the returns of U.K. ILBs have a significant 
H1 H2 seasonal pattern. The return difference is 4.7% per annum with a t-statistic of 2.0. 
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U.S. inflation does have a significant impact on U.K. bond returns with a t-statistic of -1.8. 
This reduces the H1 H2 difference to 2.1% with a t-statistic of 0.8. 
 
Table 4-10: Seasonal tests on inflation linked bond returns 
 
Inflation linked bonds  Nominal bonds 
 
H1 H2 Inflation H1 H2  H1 H2 Inflation H1 H2 
Australia 1.2% -0.2 0.4%  4.4% -0.7 1.3% (0.5) (-0.5) (0.2)  (1.5) (-2.2) (0.4) 
Canada -0.1% 0.5 1.9%  5.7% -1.2 0.8% (0.0) (1.1) (0.6)  (1.8) (-3.0) (0.2) 
Germany 3.0% -0.2 1.8%  5.3% -0.8 0.6% (1.2) (-0.5) (0.7)  (1.8) (-2.9) (0.2) 
Japan -0.9% 0.7 2.7%  3.2% -0.2 2.0% (-0.3) (1.4) (1.1)  (1.9) (-1.3) (0.9) 
United Kingdom 4.7% -0.9 2.1%  8.0% -1.6 3.6% (2.0) (-1.8) (0.8)  (2.7) (-3.7) (1.1) 
United States -1.0% 0.4 0.5%  5.7% -0.9 1.7% (-0.4) (1.0) (0.2)  (2.0) (-1.8) (0.5) 
EW portfolio 2.3% -0.6 0.5%  5.7% -1.3 2.2% (1.2) (-1.5) (0.2)  (2.0) (-3.2) (0.7) 
Note: This table shows the results for equation (4-1) where we regress monthly excess inflation-linked bond 
returns (left panel) or monthly excess nominal comparator bond returns (right panel) on Xt, the H1 H2 seasonal 
in equation (4-2), and Yt, the monthly non-seasonally U.S. inflation. H1 H2 is a dummy that takes on the value 
of 1 for July to December and 0 otherwise. In the first and fourth columns the results are shown when X is 
based on the H1 H2 dummy alone, the second and third columns and the fifth and sixth columns show the 
results when X is based in the inflation return and the H1 H2 dummy. T-values based on Newey-West standard 
errors are presented inside parentheses. The detailed data description is shown in the note below Table 4-9. 
 
Hence inflation-linked bonds have no seasonal pattern except for the U.K. This makes sense 
because both the denominator (discount rates) and nominator (inflation-adjusted coupons and 
face value) will move in the same direction in case inflation (unexpectedly) changes. Hence, 
there is a mitigating effect which is absent for nominal bonds where only the denominator 
will respond to unexpected inflation changes. The analysis on inflation linked bonds confirms 
the earlier conclusions that the seasonal effect in inflation is mainly responsible for the 
seasonal effect in nominal government bond returns. 
4.7 Conclusion 
 
We document a new seasonal pattern in international bond returns. On average nominal bond 
returns are 4.2% per annum in the second half of the year compared to 0.4% in the first half 
of the year. At the same time, non-seasonally adjusted inflation is on average 2.1% higher in 
the first half of the year. Hence, a logical explanation for the bond seasonal is that bond 
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investors do not properly take into account seasonality in inflation, perhaps because current 
practice is to focus on seasonally adjusted economic figures. Therefore the bond price is on 
average too high at the start of the year and too low in the middle of the year. The bond price 
drops on average in the first half of the year when the inflation is higher and the price rises in 
the second half of the year when inflation is lower. 
 We do not always find a significant time-series relationship between a country’s bond 
returns and local inflation. But we do find a strong relation between U.S. inflation and 
international bond returns. Regressing monthly bond returns on the H1 H2 seasonal and U.S. 
inflation shows that U.S. inflation can explain the seasonal pattern in international bond 
returns. 
The seasonal pattern in U.S. inflation is primarily caused by a similar seasonal pattern 
in fuel prices. The fuel price increase in the first half of the year is likely caused by more 
demand for heating oil during the winter months and more demand for gasoline caused by the 
U.S. summer driving season. 
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5. Forecasting sovereign default risk with Merton’s model 
 
Based on Duyvesteyn and Martens (2015), published in the Journal of Fixed Income. We 
thank Erwin Hazeveld for excellent research assistance. We are grateful for the useful 
comments from Bastiaan van Eerden, Dale Gray, Lars Norden (discussant), Evangelos 
Vagenas-Nanos (discussant), and seminar participants at the 16th (2013) Annual Conference 
of the Swiss Society for Financial Market Research in Zurich, the 34th (2014) International 
Symposium on Forecasting in Rotterdam, and the Erasmus University Rotterdam. 
5.1 Introduction 
 
In Merton's (1974) structural model, the equity of a firm is modeled as a call option on the 
market value of the assets with a strike price equal to the debt of the firm. As such, the model 
provides a theoretical relationship between equity and corporate bond prices. Gray et al. 
(2007) adapt Merton's model to apply it at the aggregate level to the sovereign balance sheet. 
The basic idea is that the local currency debt can be seen as the equity of a sovereign given 
the ability of a country to create new money.  The foreign currency debt is similar to a 
corporation's debt because a country cannot easily create more foreign currency and practice 
shows that foreign currency debt is senior to local currency liabilities (Sims, 1999).  
 Several studies provide an empirical analysis of the sovereign structural model. Gray 
and Jones (2006), Gray et al. (2007), Keller et al. (2007) and Gapen et al. (2008) test the 
model on a combined 13 emerging countries. In general these studies find that the model 
outcomes make sense in that there is a large correlation between model-implied spreads (or 
the distance to defaults) and market spreads. Kalteier and Posch (2013) use market Credit 
Default Swap (CDS) data of 14 developed markets to calibrate the model parameters. They 
find that spreads of higher leveraged countries react more to global equity markets, whereas 
spreads of less leveraged countries react more to political stability. 
 In this study we focus on dynamics in spreads that are implied by the sovereign 
structural model. How long does it take before model implied spread changes and changes in 
other model outcomes are incorporated into the CDS market? This is different from what 
existing studies do. For example, Gapen et al. (2008) find a –83 percent correlation between 
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distance-to-default and CDS spreads for 12 emerging countries. We, however, only find a 
correlation of –9 percent between 1-month changes in distance to defaults and 1-month 
changes in CDS spreads for 14 emerging countries. The correlation rises to –20 percent when 
comparing 3-month changes instead of 1-month changes. Hence, this is a clear indication that 
the CDS market is only slowly adapting to changes in the creditworthiness of a country 
picked up by the sovereign structural model. This is further underscored by our finding that 
past changes in the distance to default can predict future changes in CDS spreads. The 
predictive power is significant both statistically and economically. 
 One possible explanation for the found inefficiency in CDS markets is that the 
structural model outcomes are invisible to market participants. So what about the inputs? In 
the sovereign structural model we need to express the local currency liabilities of a sovereign 
in U.S. Dollars. Hence there is an important role in the model for both exchange rates and 
exchange rate volatility. Of course exchange rate returns are directly visible in the market so 
that should not cause predictive ability. Indeed we do find a strong contemporaneous 
correlation of about 50 percent between exchange rate returns and changes in CDS spreads, 
regardless of using the 1-month or 3-month sampling frequency. And indeed we do not find 
any predictability from exchange rate returns to changes in CDS spreads. 
 However, exchange rate volatility and the interaction with assets and debt in the 
sovereign structural model are not visible to market participants. In fact we find that model 
implied spread changes, changes in the probability of default and distance to default can all 
predict changes in CDS spreads. Even changes in exchange rate volatilities predict changes in 
CDS spreads. These results echo those of Bharath and Shumway (2008) for corporations. 
They show that the Merton distance to default measure can predict the actual default 
probability54. 
                                                
54
 For corporations Avramov et al. (2007) and Zhang et al. (2009) find a significant contemporaneous 
correlation between changes in equity volatility and changes in CDS spreads. But these studies do not 
investigate whether changes in equity volatility predict changes in CDS spreads. We also find a significant 
contemporaneous correlation between changes in exchange rate volatility and changes in CDS spreads. Carr and 
Wu (2007) find that CDS spreads of Mexico and Brazil co-vary with their respective currency option implied 
volatilities. They argue that the credit quality of a country is linked to the volatility of the currency because they 
are both positively linked to a country specific risk factor. The structural model provides such a link through the 
market value of the country’s assets: A rise in exchange rate volatility will reduce the distance to default and 
hence increase the credit risk. 
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 There is however also an important difference with the findings for corporations. 
Gebhardt et al. (2005b) find that equity returns predict corporate bond returns of the same 
firm. They attribute this finding to the debt market being less informational efficient than the 
equity market, among other factors due to stocks being more actively traded than corporate 
bonds. Hilscher et al. (2014) report that the equity market is also more efficient than the CDS 
market. The CDS market is more efficient than the corporate bond market according to 
Blanco, Brennan and Marsh (2005). The equity in the sovereign structural model is 
equivalent to the local currency debt expressed in dollars. Hence ‘equity returns’ depend on 
local currency debt returns and exchange rate returns. These returns, however, cannot predict 
emerging sovereign debt issued in dollars or changes in CDS spreads.  
 The remainder of this chapter is as follows. Section 5.2 describes the structural model 
for sovereign countries. Section 5.3 provides details on the data. The results are presented in 
Section 5.4. Finally, Section 5.5 concludes. 
5.2 Sovereign structural model and testable implications 
 
Gray et al. (2007) adapt Merton's (1974) model for corporations to make it applicable to 
sovereign countries. They start with formulating the combined balance sheet of the 
government and the central bank, see Table 5-1. The assets of the sovereign country consist of 
four items: (i) Foreign currency reserves including actual reserves and contingent reserves 
from international financial institutions such as the IMF and other governments; (ii) The net 
fiscal assets which equal the government's budget surplus or deficit on taxes and revenues 
minus expenditures; (iii) Credit to other sectors such as the corporate, financial and 
household sector; and (iv) Other public assets such as the equity of public enterprises. 
 
Table 5-1: Combined balance sheet of the government and the central bank 
Assets Liabilities 
Foreign reserves Guarantees 
Net fiscal assets Foreign currency debt 
Credit to other sectors Local currency debt 
Other public assets Monetary base 
Note: the equity of the country is represented by the sum of the local currency debt and the monetary base 
which we call local currency liabilities (LCL). The debt of the country is represented by the foreign currency 
debt. Financial guarantees are hard to measure and are therefore not explicitly included in the analysis. 
Implicitly the guarantees are subtracted from the asset side of the balance sheet, similar to Bodie and Brière 
(2014). 
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 The liabilities also contain four items: (i) (Implicit) financial guarantees to the so-
called too-big-to-fail entities as we have seen in the government support and bailouts of large 
financial institutions during the financial crisis of 2008 to 2012; (ii) Foreign currency debt 
which is issued by the public sector and denominated in a foreign currency; (iii) Local 
currency debt which is issued by the public sector and denominated in the local currency; and 
(iv) The monetary base which is related to the money supply in the country's economy. The 
monetary base consists of the commercial banks' reserves maintained in accounts of the local 
central bank plus the total currency circulating in the public. 
Gray et al. (2007) argue that the balance sheet of the country’s public sector and the 
balance sheet of a corporation show important similarities in both structure and priority of the 
claims. Local currency debt and the monetary base are called local currency liabilities and 
have certain features similar to the equity of a corporation. The public sector controls the 
money supply and therefore they have the option to repay their local currency debt by 
creating more domestic currency. However, expansion of the money supply can cause 
inflation, which lowers the real value of the payments to the local currency debt holders. This 
is similar to equity of corporations because excessive issuance of shares dilutes existing 
holders’ claims and reduces the price per share on the balance sheet of a corporation.  
 The foreign currency debt is analogous to the risky debt of a corporation because here 
the public sector cannot easily create more foreign currency since excessively creating 
domestic currency will lower the demand of the domestic currency and hence depreciate the 
foreign exchange rates. Moreover, Sims (1999) considers foreign currency debt to be senior 
to local currency liabilities because in stress situations most governments prefer to inflate 
local currency debt instead of defaulting on foreign currency debt. Finally, financial 
guarantees are hard to measure and are therefore not explicitly included in the analysis. 
Implicitly the guarantees are subtracted from the asset side of the balance sheet, similar to 
Bodie and Brière (2014). 
 The sovereign Contingent Claims Approach (CCA) model is similar to the corporate 
CCA model with local currency liabilities modeled as an implicit call option on the country’s 
assets and foreign currency debt modeled as a distress barrier minus an implicit put option on 
the country’s assets. The distress barrier is based on the book value of the foreign currency 
debt using the empirical rule that it is equal to the short-term debt plus fifty percent of the 
long-term debt.  
47_Erim Duyvesteyn BW Stand.job
 
89 
 
 An important feature of the sovereign CCA model is that the balance sheet items are 
measured in one currency unit, commonly a “hard” currency such as the U.S. Dollar or the 
Euro, with the corresponding risk-free interest rate. This means that the local currency debt 
and the monetary base are converted to the U.S. dollar using the market price of the foreign 
exchange rate. 
 Essentially, the sovereign CCA model is the same as the corporate CCA model. We 
get two equations with two unknowns, the market value of the assets (A) and the volatility of 
the market value of the assets (σA). The market value of the equity of the corporation is 
replaced by the market value of the local currency liabilities (LCL), the equity volatility by 
the volatility in LCL (σ LCL), and the distress barrier (Bf) is based on the book value of the 
foreign currency debt. We then get the following two equations: 
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r is the risk-free rate of interest and N(.) is the cumulative normal distribution function. To 
test the model we analyze the contemporaneous correlation between the model implied credit 
spread and 5-year CDS spread changes. We also use the model spread changes to predict 
CDS returns in a trading strategy. Ang and Longstaff (2013) argue that the CDS spread is a 
more direct measure of sovereign credit risk than a spread based on government bonds. 
Sovereign debt spreads contain more noise from other factors like changes in the supply of 
the underlying bond and illiquidity effects in sovereign debt prices. To maintain consistency 
for the maturity of the CDS contracts we set T to be equal to 5 in the model. 
The foreign exchange rate is indirectly an important input parameter because it 
largely influences the value and volatility of the assets and the local currency liabilities. All 
input parameters are directly observable except for the market value and volatility of the 
assets of the sovereign which, therefore, can be estimated from equations (5-1) and (5-2).  
 There are a few important risk measures that can be derived from the model output. 
First, the risk-neutral probability of default of the sovereign is equal to N(−d2). Second, the 
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distance to default is d2. Finally, to find the model-implied credit spread we first need to find 
the current value of the risky debt with promised payments Bf. The value of the risky debt at 
time T is exactly the same as Bf minus the payoff of a put option on the assets, with exercise 
price equal to Bf. Since the liabilities of the sovereign are equal to the assets of the sovereign, 
we could also derive the value of the risky debt Df by subtracting the value of the local 
currency liabilities from the assets: 
LCLAD f −=  
Then the yield-to-maturity of the risky debt is 
T
DB
y ff
)/ln(
=   
and the model-implied credit spread is equal to the difference between this yield and the risk-
free rate, r, 
rys −=                            (5-3) 
In this study we are interested how fast information from the sovereign CCA model is 
incorporated in CDS spreads. We formulate two testable implications of the sovereign 
structural model: 
 
Hypothesis 1: model spreads are correlated with market spreads 
The changes of the sovereign credit spread based on the structural model are empirically 
correlated to the changes of sovereign market spreads during the same time period.  
 
Hypothesis 2: Estimated model spreads contain useful information about future market 
spread dynamics 
The model spread may contain information that is not priced in yet by the sovereign market 
spread. Using the model spread dynamics we may be able to predict future changes of the 
market spreads.  
 
In the analyses we will not only focus on changes model spreads but also on changes in the 
other model outputs, the distance-to-default and the probability of default. We will also 
compare changes in credit spreads with changes in exchange rate returns. The latter is an 
input in the sovereign CCA model. 
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5.3 Data 
 
We apply the model of Gray et al. (2007) to emerging markets. There are several reasons 
why the sovereign CCA model is not applicable to developed countries. First, developed 
countries have direct access to large and liquid international markets to issue debt in their 
domestic currency and that is why developed countries have no or only a small amount of 
foreign currency debt. Therefore, the foreign distress barrier of most developed countries will 
be zero. Moreover, countries from the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) have very 
limited control over the money supply of the European Central Bank (ECB) and therefore the 
analogy between local currency liabilities and equity disappears. This leads us to the 
conclusion that emerging countries with a considerable amount of foreign currency debt are 
the best test cases to apply the sovereign CCA model to. 
The empirical analysis includes fourteen emerging market (EM) countries: Argentina, 
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Hungary, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, the Philippines, 
Poland, South Africa, South Korea and Turkey. This choice is based on the availability of 
local and external debt as covered by JP Morgan and Barclays indices and the liquidity and 
nature of the emerging currencies and credit default swap (CDS) contracts: a country enters 
the dataset when its currency is floating and when the CDS contract is liquid. CDS liquidity 
is based on the inclusion of countries in the Markit CDX emerging market index. The CDX 
index is a weighted index of country CDS contracts and rolls semi-annually in March and 
September. A wide dealer and industry support allows for significant liquidity in all market 
conditions and the CDX index is accepted as a key benchmark of the overall market credit 
risk in emerging markets. We use the same dates as De Zwart et al. (2009) to determine when 
a currency becomes floating. Since 2009 no new relevant emerging currencies became 
floating55. 
The six countries China, Czech Republic, Egypt, India, Slovakia and Thailand do 
have outstanding local and external debt, but have not been included in the historical 
composition of the CDX index. The four countries Bulgaria, Venezuela, Panama, and 
                                                
55
 Perhaps an exception could have been made for Russia, which according to the Central Bank of the Russian 
Federation (BIS Papers No 57, http://www.bis.org/publ/bppdf/bispap57u.pdf) has gradually moved toward a 
floating currency. Including Russia from March 2009 onwards does not materially affect our results and 
conclusions. 
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Ukraine which are or have been included in the CDX index are not included in our research 
because of not having local or external debt listed in the JP Morgan and Barclays indices. 
Romania was recently added to the local debt index, but is no longer included in the CDX 
index. Table 5-2 shows the data availability for the 14 countries included in the analysis. 
 
Table 5-2: Data availability and regions 
First month Last month Region 
Argentina Sep 2005 Jun 2014 Latam 
Brazil May 2002 Jun 2014 Latam 
Chile Mar 2014 Jun 2014 Latam 
Colombia Jan 2003 Jun 2014 Latam 
Hungary Mar 2009 Mar 2013 EMEA 
Indonesia Mar 2006 Jun 2014 Asia 
Malaysia Jul 2005 Jun 2014 Asia 
Mexico Jan 2002 Jun 2014 Latam 
Peru Oct 2006 Jun 2014 Latam 
the Philippines Oct 2010 Jun 2014 Asia 
Poland Feb 2004 Sep 2004 EMEA 
South Africa Dec 2001 Jun 2014 EMEA 
South Korea Feb 2002 Apr 2004 Asia 
Turkey Apr 2004 Jun 2014 EMEA 
Note: the data availability is based on the availability of local debt, external debt, the monetary base, the 
composition of the CDX index and whether the country has a fully floating FX rate. Hungary is dropped from 
the CDX index in April 2013, Poland is dropped from the CDX index in October 2004 and South Korea is 
dropped from the JP Morgan EMBI global index in May 2004 (and in March 2006 also from the CDX index). 
 
We obtain daily data from Bloomberg for the period from December 2001 to June 
2014 on exchange rates, 5-year CDS spreads and U.S. 5-year government bond yields for the 
risk free discount factor in the model, assuming a 5-year horizon to match the CDS maturity. 
We collect data on the market value of local currency bonds from the JP Morgan GBI EM 
broad index (broadest local currency index with longest data history) and the Barclays 
Emerging Markets Inflation Linked Bond Index for respectively the nominal and inflation-
linked bonds. The inclusion of inflation linked bonds is important. According to Swinkels 
(2012) less than 1% of the emerging market local currency bonds were inflation linked in 
2003, but that percentage increased to more than 14% in 2011. Local currency bond data for 
South Korea are obtained from the JP Morgan GBI broad index for developed markets56. The 
                                                
56
 According to the World Bank classification South Korea is considered to be a developed market. The major 
index providers JP Morgan and FTSE therefore decided to include the country in their developed markets index 
universe for respectively bonds and equities. Due to accessibility issues and in particular a lack of full currency 
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local currency liabilities, LCL, are the sum of the market values of the local currency nominal 
and inflation-linked debt. For all countries we express these local liabilities in U.S. dollars. In 
addition we add the size of the monetary base (M0) based on IMF data57. The sum of the 
LCL and M0 act in the same way as the market value of the equity does in the application of 
the Merton model for corporations. 
 For the default barrier, Bf, we use the market value of the foreign currency debt. We 
aggregate the debt in USD and EUR as included in the JP Morgan EMBI global and the Euro 
EMBIG indices58. Bf is also expressed in U.S. Dollar terms.  
 The final input parameter is the volatility of LCL. The volatility is defined as the 
standard deviation of daily returns of LCL over the past three months giving it both some 
stability but also being able to timely react to new information. Note that this volatility will 
depend on the volatility of the market value of the local debt and the exchange rate volatility. 
As one would expect the main driver of the volatility is the exchange rate volatility. One 
discomforting aspect of the volatility of LCL is that there are jumps due to the redemption or 
issuance of new local debt. For computing the volatility of LCL we try to remove such jumps 
when they are likely connected to redemptions or new issuance by excluding daily changes of 
LCL (in local currency) larger than 5% removing about 0.6% of all observations. We will 
analyze the sensitivity of our results to the chosen threshold level of 5%. 
 Table 5-3 shows the average and standard deviation of the CDS spreads, the amount 
of LCL, Bf and the standard deviation of the exchange rates (FX volatility). The average CDS 
spread of the fourteen countries is 270 basis points, with the Latin American region having 
the largest spreads and the Asian region the smallest. Latin America is also the region with 
on average the relatively largest size of hard currency debt at USD 19.5 billion and the lowest 
ratio of local divided by hard currency debt of 4.8. The EMEA region has the largest average 
currency volatility at 12.0%, compared to 8.8% for Latin-America and 8.6% for Asia. EMEA 
also has the largest monetary base of 47.1 billion USD on average. 
                                                                                                                                                     
convertibility two other major index providers Barclays and MSCI consider South Korea as emerging market 
for respectively bonds and equities. 
57
 For Argentina and South Korea we use data from the local central bank, and for Peru and the Philippines we 
use M1 instead of M0 since we could not obtain M0 data from Bloomberg. In addition to the monetary base M1 
also includes demand deposits, but not savings accounts. 
58
 Book values of the Euro EMBIG country indices are not available, and we use the market value instead. We 
checked the robustness of results using the book value of the EMBI global mixed with the market value of the 
Euro EMBIG, results are robust and somewhat stronger. We use the market value of the EMBI global and the 
Euro EMBIG indices in the remainder of the paper. 
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Table 5-3: Average and standard deviation spreads, debt and FX volatility 
  Latam EMEA Asia Portfolio 
CDS  
spread (bp) 
Avg 375.5 228.9 153.9 270.3 
St dev 438.0 156.6 96.2 302.3 
      
LCL Avg 110.7 100.5 91.9 101.5 
bln USD St dev 141.2 65.4 75.5 93.7 
      
Bf Avg 19.5 10.3 8.2 12.2 
bln USD St dev 17.0 10.4 6.3 12.0 
      
Ratio LCL / Bf Avg 4.8 17.9 14.4 12.6 
bln USD St dev 2.5 13.8 20.2 14.1 
      
M0 Avg 39.2 47.1 30.3 39.8 
bln USD St dev 53.2 49.0 10.7 41.9 
      
FX volatility 
Avg 8.8% 12.0% 8.6% 9.9% 
St dev 3.6% 4.4% 4.1% 4.2% 
Note: Sample averages and standard deviations CDS spread (basis points), local currency liabilities in bln USD 
(LCL), default barrier in bln USD (Bf), the ratio between LCL and Bf, monetary base in bln USD (M0) and the 
annualized FX volatility from December 2001 - June 2014. The final column is the equal weighted average of 
the fourteen countries. Latam (Latin America) is the equal weighted portfolio of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, Mexico and Peru. EMEA includes Hungary, Poland, South-Africa and Turkey. Asia includes 
Indonesia, Malaysia, The Philippines and South-Korea. 
 
5.4 Testing the implications of the sovereign structural model 
 
In Section 5.4.1 we report on the contemporaneous correlations between CDS spread changes 
and changes in variables based on the structural model. The outcomes of various trading 
strategies based on the structural model are presented in Section 5.4.2. We prefer using 
trading strategies over predictive regressions following the arguments of Thornton and 
Valente (2012)59. Moreover applying a standard regression approach is not straightforward 
for the changing composition of our dataset with countries entering and leaving over time. 
5.4.1 Correlations CDS spread changes and structural variables 
We first analyze the correlations between 1-month and 3-month changes in model inputs and 
outputs with 1-month and 3-month changes in market CDS spreads. By looking at two 
different frequencies we can observe whether input for and information from the sovereign 
                                                
59
 Thornton and Valente show that the Cochrane and Piazzesi’s (2005) forward rates factor, found to be 
successful in in-sample predictive regressions for excess bond returns, actually has no economic value in a true 
real-time exercise. 
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CCA model is immediately incorporated in market CDS spreads or with a delay. A similar 
correlation at the two frequencies suggests an immediate response of market CDS spreads, 
whereas a higher correlation at the 3-month frequency suggests market CDS spreads only 
slowly adopt information from the CCA model. The results are shown in Table 5-4. As 
expected, the changes in the distance-to-default, d2 from equation (5-1), are negatively 
correlated with the changes in CDS spreads. A larger distance-to-default implies a lower 
probability of default and hence a lower CDS spread. As expected the changes in the model-
implied probability of default, N(−d2), are positively correlated with changes in CDS spreads. 
The positive correlations between changes in exchange rate volatility and LCL volatility (of 
the LCL expressed in local currency) with CDS spreads are also logical as an increase in 
either the currency or the interest rate volatility makes it more likely the distance-to-default 
can be bridged and hence increases the probability of default, all else equal. The negative 
correlation between changes of the local debt and CDS spreads also makes sense given the 
lower implied probability of default for a higher level of the local debt. Finally, the positive 
correlation between CDS spreads and FX returns (measured as local currency units expressed 
in U.S. dollars) is as expected given that a weaker currency is linked to a higher CDS spread. 
 
Looking at Panel A and B in Table 5-4 it is clear that correlations are rising when increasing 
the window from 1 to 3 months implying noise in the shorter windows and possibly a delayed 
response of either model-variables or market CDS spreads. We will investigate the latter in 
the next section. We get the highest positive correlations at 51 and 33 percent between and 3-
month changes in CDS spreads and respectively the 3-month spot return of the exchange 
rates and the changes in exchange rate volatility. Hence a substantial amount of the change in 
CDS spreads can be explained by changes in the level and volatility of exchanges rates. The 
level of the correlation between CDS spread changes and FX volatility changes is similar to 
the 36 percent correlation found in Avramov et al. (2007) between changes in corporate bond 
spreads and changes in idiosyncratic equity volatility. The 3-month correlation between 
changes of the distance to default and the CDS spread is also -20% and significant. On a one 
month horizon the correlation is insignificant though, indicating a potential delayed response 
of either the distance to default or the market CDS spread. The correlations with the model 
spread, the model implied probability of default and the change in the local current debt 
volatility are not significantly different from zero for both the 1-month and 3-month changes 
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for the portfolio of all countries. We conclude that the first hypothesis that model spreads are 
correlated with market spreads must be rejected. Perhaps the information in the model spread 
is able to forecast the market spread. We will investigate that question in the next section. 
 
Table 5-4: Correlations of CDS spread changes with model inputs and outputs 
 Latam EMEA Asia Portfolio 
Panel A: 1-month changes 
Spread
 
-1% 1% 3% 0% 
N(-d2) 0% 2% 3% 1% 
d2 -12% -10% -5% -9% 
EFG 21%** 21%** 20%** 20%** 
FX 49%*** 57%*** 49%*** 49%*** 
EHIJ  8% -2% 5% 5% 
Local debt -22%*** -10% -4% -15%* 
 
Panel A: 3-month changes 
Spread
 
9% 9% 14%* 10% 
N(-d2) 12% 11% 15%* 12% 
d2 -18%** -31%*** -20%** -20%** 
EFG 30%*** 37%*** 38%*** 33%*** 
FX 50%*** 60%*** 46%*** 51%*** 
EHIJ  13% 15%* 13% 13% 
Local debt -30%*** -10% -2% -20%** 
Note: Correlations between the relative change in 5-year CDS spreads and (i) the change in the model-implied 
spread from equation (5-3); (ii) the change in the model-implied probability of default, N(-d2); (iii) the change 
in the model-implied distance-to-default, d2; (iv) the change in the exchange rate volatility, σFX; (v) FX, the spot 
return of local currency units expressed in U.S. dollars; (vi) the change in the LCL volatility expressed in the 
local currency, σDebt; (vii) and Local debt, the relative change in the value of the local currency liabilities 
expressed in local currency. In the upper panel we look at 1-month changes, in the lower panel at 3-month 
changes. Latam is short for Latin America, and represents the equal weighted portfolio of Argentina, Brazil, 
Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru. EMEA includes Hungary, Poland, South-Africa and Turkey. Asia includes 
Indonesia, Malaysia, The Philippines and South-Korea. The sample period is December 2001 to June 2014 
resulting in 151 monthly observations. Overlapping data are used for 3-month changes, every time shifting time 
by one month. The 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels the correlations are denoted by ***, ** and *. The test 
is based on the standard significance test for correlation 5K. = LM( LN)(O ), where & is the correlation and 3 is 
the number of observations. The significance of the test depends on the t-distribution with 3 − 2 degrees of 
freedom. 
  
5.4.2 Trading strategies 
Analogous to the analysis of Gebhardt et al. (2005b) for corporations we test whether the 
Merton model can forecast CDS spread changes for countries. The test comprises two 
different trading strategies. 
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5.4.2.A Relative strategies 
In the trading strategies we will predict the relative movement of the CDS spreads for each 
pair of countries. Reason for a relative strategy is that we want to benefit from the dynamics 
predicted by the Gray et al. (2007) model while hedging against a market-wide spread 
widening or tightening as a consequence of global (event) risk (see Pan and Singleton, 2008) 
or global risk appetite or changing global economic conditions (see Baek et al., 2005; Weigel 
et al., 2006; and Longstaff et al., 2011). The correlation between monthly changes of CDS 
spreads between countries is 59% on average and positive for all regions60.  
 We use 3-month changes of the seven model in- and outputs analyzed in Table 5-4 to 
predict the relative return of two CDS contracts in the next month. For example, if the 
exchange rate volatility in Brazil has declined more than in Hungary, we expect the CDS 
spread of Brazil to decline relative to the CDS spread of Hungary. We therefore take a short 
position in the Brazilian CDS (selling default protection), and a long position in the 
Hungarian CDS (buying default protection). Since we have data for fourteen countries, each 
country is compared to thirteen other countries leading to a potential amount of 91 unique 
relative trades in total. 
 Ben Dor et al. (2007a; 2007b) show that the risk of a CDS contract depends on the 
level of the spread times the duration. Given that we enter 5-year CDS contracts for both 
countries and hence durations are approximately equal we simply scale the positions by the 
CDS spreads. If, for example, the CDS spread is 300 basis points for Brazil and 50 basis 
points for Hungary this scaling implies the position in the CDS for Hungary is 6 times as 
large as the one for Brazil. Added benefit is that the periodic spread payments add up to zero 
as we have a matching long and short position. Hence the profit of the trade only depends on 
the spread changes in both countries and we create a zero-investment strategy. In equation 
form we get the following expression for the 1-month return in month t from the opposing 
CDS positions in countries i and j, 
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 This is similar to the finding of a large common component for corporate bonds by Collin-Dufresne and 
Goldstein (2001) and Elton et al. (2001). 
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where Dt-1 is the duration (5 years), 1−tposition  is a scaling factor related to the total position 
size, and itCDS  is the CDS spread in month t in country i. For the Sharpe ratio the total 
position size does not matter. The risk-scaling to match the risks (and payments) of the two 
CDS positions is reflected in the denominators in equation (5-4).  
 For the position size we can take simple long/short positions ( 1−tposition = ±1), but 
alternatively we can let the position size depend on the magnitude of the changes in the 
predictive variables over time. The larger the change, the more spread movement we can 
expect. We set the position size proportional to a standardized value by computing the 
current difference in 3-month changes of for example model spreads or exchange rate 
volatilities, deducting its own average over the previous 5 years and dividing by its own 5-
year standard deviation.  
 
5.4.2.B Relative strategy results 
Table 5-5 shows the Sharpe ratios for the CDS strategy based on 3-month changes of the 
seven model in- and outputs analyzed in Table 5-4. The results are positive for all seven 
indicators. The best indicator is the change of the model spread with a Sharpe ratio of 0.52. 
Results are strong for EMEA, but weaker for Latin America and Asia. An explanation may 
be the lower currency volatility. Also, results for one region may be influenced by the other 
regions because all positions in one country are vis-à-vis another country. In the next section 
we investigate the results for individual countries.  
This strong result proves that the sovereign CCA model of Gray et al. (2007) is a nice 
step toward better understanding sovereign credit risk. Furthermore this result shows that the 
market does not fully incorporate information from the aggregate sovereign balance sheets in 
the CDS market. The low contemporaneous correlation between the changes in model 
spreads and market spreads in Table 5-4 already indicated that the market does not react 
directly on the information embedded in the model spread.  
The Sharpe ratios of the change of the probability of default (N(-d2)) and the change 
of the distance to default (d2) are respectively 0.49 and 0.48 and similar to the Sharpe ratios 
of the change of the model spread, showing that the sovereign Merton model has a robust 
predictive power for CDS returns.  
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Table 5-5: CDS relative strategy 
 Latam EMEA Asia Portfolio Return p-value 
Spread
 
-0.06 0.71 0.19 0.52 3.0% 0.13 
N(-d2) -0.09 0.75 0.09 0.49 2.8% 0.15 
d2 0.25 0.63 -0.07 0.48 2.2% 0.02 
EFG -0.17 0.76 -0.01 0.25 1.0% 0.42 
FX 0.02 0.21 -0.40 -0.04 -0.2% 0.88 
EHIJ  0.04 0.65 -0.09 0.29 1.6% 0.28 
Local debt 0.15 0.03 0.27 0.28 1.4% 0.30 
Note: Sharpe ratios for the relative strategy trading market CDS country spreads based on seven model in- and 
outputs (see Table 5-4). For the portfolio the return and the Newey-West corrected p-values have been added. 
At the end of each month we compute the 3-month change in the model spread for each country. For each 
country pair we compute the difference in the 3-month changes, as well as the 5-year average and the 5-year 
standard deviation of these differences. The resulting z-score is used as position size in equation (5-4). The 
movements in the CDS spreads in the next month (t) are used to compute the performance of the trade using 
equation (5-4). We follow this strategy from December 2001 to June 2014. The table shows the Sharpe ratios of 
the three regions and the average portfolio of all the fourteen countries. Latam is short for Latin America, and 
represents the equal weighted portfolio of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru. EMEA 
includes Hungary, Poland, South-Africa and Turkey. Asia includes Indonesia, Malaysia, The Philippines and 
South-Korea. 
 
Finally, the FX factor (the spot return of local currency units expressed in U.S. 
dollars) achieves the weakest Sharpe ratio of -0.04. The FX factor also shows the highest 
correlation with the CDS market spread changes in Table 5-4. The high correlation may 
indicate that direct FX returns are priced in more efficiently by the CDS market, contrary to 
the information embedded in the model spread. The results support the second hypothesis 
that indicators based on the model contain useful information about future sovereign default 
spread changes. 
 
5.4.2.C Directional strategies 
The directional strategy intends to profit from the movement of the CDS spread of an 
individual country. Contrary to the relative strategy, the directional strategy is subject to a 
market-wide spread widening or tightening and the return of the directional strategy depends 
on the carry of the CDS contract. 
 For the direction of the trade we look at 3-month changes in the same seven model in- 
and outputs. For example, if the exchange rate volatility in Brazil has declined we expect the 
Brazilian CDS spread to decline as well. We therefore take a short position in the Brazilian 
CDS contract (selling default protection).  
Similar to the relative strategy the position size is proportional to the CDS spread in order to 
obtain a similar risk per country. In equation form we then get the following expression for 
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the 1-month return in month t from the CDS position (long position is buying default 
protection) in country i, 
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where D is the duration (5 years), 1−tposition  is a scaling factor related to the total position 
size, and itCDS  is the CDS spread in month t in country i. For the success ratio and Sharpe 
ratio the total position size does not matter. Because the size of the position is adjusted for the 
level of the CDS spread, the carry return is the same for each month and each country: the 
position size divided by 12.  
  
5.4.2.D Directional strategy results 
Table 4-6 shows the Sharpe ratios for the CDS strategy based on changes in the seven model 
in- and outputs. Except for the directly observable sovereign CCA model inputs, local debt 
and exchange rate returns, the results are strong for all other model in- and outputs with 
Sharpe ratios between 0.34 and 0.54. Compared to the relative strategy, the Sharpe ratio of 
the local interest rate volatility has a much higher Sharpe ratio of 0.54. Contrary to the 
relative strategy, Sharpe ratios are more positive for Latam and Asia. The strategy does not 
suffer from the larger risk exposure to market-wide changes and is more stable over the 
regions.  
Again the explanation for the weaker predictive results for local debt and currency 
returns is the higher contemporaneous correlation we find in Table 5-4. Hence directly 
observable quantities are efficiently incorporated in market CDS spreads. But the not directly 
observable currency volatility and all sovereign CCA outputs are not efficiently incorporated 
in CDS spreads.  
Hence also the directional strategies support the second hypothesis that the change in 
the model spread and its related indicators contain important information for future spread 
changes. 
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Table 5-6: CDS directional strategy 
 Latam EMEA Asia Portfolio Return p-value 
Spread
 
0.22 0.66 0.41 0.49 10.7% 0.13 
N(-d2) 0.21 0.69 0.32 0.48 10.3% 0.13 
d2 0.21 0.67 0.25 0.48 6.3% 0.04 
EFG 0.13 0.57 0.27 0.34 6.3% 0.20 
FX 0.05 0.00 -0.39 -0.07 -1.6% 0.77 
EHIJ  0.25 0.72 0.21 0.54 6.5% 0.07 
Local debt -0.16 -0.29 -0.31 -0.31 -4.2% 0.39 
Note: Sharpe ratios from the directional strategy trading market CDS based on seven model in- and outputs (see 
Table 5-4). For the portfolio the return and the Newey-West corrected p-values have been added. At the end of 
each month we compute the 3-month change in the model spread. We compute the average and the standard 
deviation of these 3-month changes in the past 5 years. The resulting z-score is used as position size in equation 
(5-5). The movement in the CDS spread in the next month (t) is used to compute the performance of the trade 
using equation (5-5). We follow this strategy from December 2001 to June 2014. The table shows the Sharpe 
ratios of the three regions and the average portfolio of all the fourteen countries. Latam is short for Latin 
America, and represents the equal weighted portfolio of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru. 
EMEA includes Hungary, Poland, South-Africa and Turkey. Asia includes Indonesia, Malaysia, The Philippines 
and South-Korea. 
 
5.4.3 Robustness analyses 
We have investigated the sensitivity of the results for the threshold level we use to omit 
redemptions or issuance of new local debt. In addition we analyze whether the investment 
strategy returns are significant and not subsumed by the term, default and liquidity premiums 
in bond markets.  
 
5.4.3.A Sensitivity analysis threshold level 
We have analyzed the sensitivity of the results61 to the threshold level we use to omit large 
daily changes in the LCL input factor. The default threshold level has been chosen at a level 
of 5% removing about 0.6% of all observations. We analyze the results of different threshold 
levels for both the relative and directional trading strategies based on the three month change 
of the model spread. 
Large changes of the LCL may have been caused by a redemption or issuance of new 
local debt and are not necessarily a sign of higher risk. Therefore, removing these jumps may 
improve the effectiveness of the model in predicting future CDS spread changes. Since we 
                                                
61
 We focus on the results for the trading strategies. The correlations in Table 5-4 are also robust for the 
threshold level but are not included here to safe space. Results are available upon request. 
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cannot directly observe redemptions and new issuance in our database we simply omit 
extreme absolute changes of the LCL.  
Results are shown in Figure 5-1: Results strategies based on the model spread. The 
highest Sharpe ratios are obtained at the threshold level of 8% for both the relative and 
directional strategies. Without a threshold (far right in Figure 5-1: Results strategies based on 
the model spread) the directional strategy becomes weaker with a Sharpe ratio of 0.22, while 
the relative strategy still obtains a reasonable Sharpe ratio of 0.36. With a low threshold (far 
left in Figure 5-1: Results strategies based on the model spread) of 1% about 7% of 
observations are omitted and the predictive power of the model is robust. A low threshold 
also omits large moves of the interest rate markets, muting the volatility and leaving out 
valuable information from the model. The default setting of 5% seems reasonable and results 
are robust for this choice. 
 
Figure 5-1: Results strategies based on the model spread 
 
Note: the LCL input of the model contains jumps due to the redemption or issuance of new local debt. In the 
calculation of the volatility of the LCL we try to remove such jumps by excluding daily changes of LCL larger 
than 5%, removing about 1% of all observations. We show the sensitivity of the Sharpe ratio (y-axis) of the 
relative and direct trading strategies based on three month changes in model spreads for different threshold 
levels (shown on x-axis) over the period from December 2001 to June 2014. The Sharpe ratios of the trading 
strategies and the percentage of observations are shown in bars. 
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5.4.3.B Regression analysis 
Gebhardt et al. (2005b) find that the term premium and default premium are priced risk 
factors for corporate bond returns. Longstaff (2004) finds a priced liquidity measure based on 
the market cap weighted excess return of RefCorp62 compared to U.S. treasuries. We run the 
following regression of the returns of the relative and directional strategies on the default 
premium, term premium and liquidity premium: 
 = α+ +  +  +         (5-6) 
where  are the relative or directional strategy returns based on the seven model in- and 
outputs analyzed in Table 5-4, α the unexplained return,  the default premium,  
the term premium and  the liquidity premium. Over the sample period from December 
2001 to June 2014 the term premium is 2.83% per annum, the default premium 5.98% per 
annum and the liquidity premium -0.03% per annum. The results of the regression in 
equation (5-6) are presented in Table 5-7 (relative strategy return) and Table 5-8 (directional 
strategy returns). 
 
Table 5-7: Regression relative strategy 
 ! 8 − C2>:5 !     
Spread
 
2.4% 0.14 0.02 0.14 -0.19 2% 
N(-d2) 2.3% 0.17 0.03 0.14 -0.19 2% 
d2 2.4% 0.02 -0.04 0.03 -0.05 1% 
EFG 1.5% 0.20 -0.12*** 0.07 0.16 10% 
FX 0.7% 0.51 -0.16*** 0.00 -0.25** 10% 
EHIJ  1.2% 0.42 0.00 0.14* 0.05 2% 
Local debt 1.5% 0.28 -0.02 0.00 -0.26* 1% 
Note: This table presents the alphas of the regression in equation (5-6), 
 
 = α+ +  +  +  
  
 is the return of the portfolio formed by the relative strategies (see Table 5-5 for more information and 
details),  is the return of the EMBI+ market index over U.S. Treasuries.  is the return of U.S. 
Treasuries over cash.  is the excess return of RefCorp bonds over maturity matched U.S. Treasuries. The 
constant (!) is expressed per annum, its p-value is denoted in the second column. The 1%, 5% and 10% 
significance levels for  and   are denoted by ***, ** and *, respectively. We use Newey-West standard 
errors to correct for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. The sample period is from December 2001 to June 
2014.  
 
                                                
62
 RefCorp is short for the Resolution Trust Corporation which is a U.S. government corporation established to 
rescue savings and loan institutions that failed during the savings and loan crisis. RefCorp provided liquidity to 
these organizations by issuing bonds. RefCorp’s bonds have the same standing as Government bonds in case of 
a credit event. Hence price differences are only due to liquidity differences. 
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Table 5-8: Regression directional strategy 
 ! 8 − C2>:5 !     
Spread
 
12.4% 0.05 -0.07 -0.46 -1.37 2% 
N(-d2) 12.0% 0.05 -0.07 -0.44 -1.30 2% 
d2 7.9% 0.01 -0.19 -0.21 0.45 2% 
EFG 9.5% 0.04 -0.33 -0.51* 0.19 4% 
FX 6.2% 0.31 -0.96*** -0.84** 0.80 20% 
EHIJ  6.0% 0.10 0.08 0.00 0.04 0% 
Local debt -1.8% 0.65 -0.43** 0.01 0.41 10% 
Note: This table presents the alphas of the regression in equation (5-6), 
 
 = α+ +  +  +  
  
 is the return of the portfolio formed by the directional relative strategy (see Table 5-6 for more information 
and details),  is the return of the EMBI+ market index over U.S. Treasuries.  is the return of U.S. 
Treasuries over cash.  is the excess return of RefCorp bonds over maturity matched U.S. Treasuries. The 
constant (!) is expressed per annum, its p-value is denoted in the second column. The 1%, 5% and 10% 
significance levels for  and   are denoted by ***, ** and *, respectively. We use Newey-West standard 
errors to correct for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. The sample period is from December 2001 to June 
2014. 
 
For the relatively strategies in Table 5-7 only the ones based on currency returns and  
changes in currencies volatility have a significant negative loading on the default premium. 
Given the positive default premium this actually adds to the alpha but these alphas are not 
significantly different from zero. The relative strategy based on the changes in the volatility 
of local debt returns loads significantly on the term premium which reduces alpha. The only 
statistically significant alpha (p-value 0.02) is the one for the relatively strategy based on the 
distance-to-default. The returns of this strategy do not load on the default and term premium, 
and the alpha is equal to 2.4% per annum. The other model outcomes, spreads and 
probabilities of default, have similar alphas as the distance-to-default but these are not 
significant.  One possible explanation is that the distance to default can take values with a 
more uniform distribution compared to the model spread and probability of default. The 
probability of default is equal to zero in 44% of the observations and has a maximum of 
9.3%. The skewness of the probability of default is also extreme with a value of 13.3, 
whereas the skewness of the distance to default is more benign with a value of 3.0. The 
distance to default is therefore better able to distinguish a safe country from a safer country. 
 For the directional strategies in Table 5-8, the one based on past local debt returns 
significantly loads on the default premium with a coefficient of -0.43. This benefits the alpha 
but it does not overcome the large negative total return of -4.2% in Table 5-6. In terms of the 
alphas all but the ones based on currency and local debt returns are significant at least at the 
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10% significance level. Also here the directional strategy based on the distance-to-default is 
the most significant with a p-value of 0.01. Its (insignificant) negative loadings on the default 
and term premiums make sense since the strategy invests in countries with a declining 
implied credit risk. 
Hence, corrected for the market and default premiums not all information from the 
aggregate sovereign balance sheets is fully incorporated in the CDS market. The strongest 
significance is visible for the strategies based on changes in the distance-to-default.  
5.5 Conclusion 
 
We provide an extensive empirical study into the Gray et al. (2007) structural model for 
sovereigns. We show that the structural approach for emerging countries that issue both local 
and foreign currency denominated debt has its merits. In the model the exchange rate 
dynamics play an important role. Specifically, the model predicts a close link between 
exchange rate returns and volatility changes on the one hand, and market CDS spread 
movements on the other hand. 
The model outcomes such as the distance-to-default, the default probability, and 
spreads are strongly correlated with market CDS spreads. Also exchange rate dynamics, an 
important input for these model outcomes, are strongly correlated with market CDS spreads. 
This is a similar role to what other studies find for equity returns and volatility in Merton’s 
structural model for corporations. The results reject our first hypothesis that the changes of 
the sovereign credit spreads based on the structural model should be empirically correlated to 
changes of sovereign market spreads during the same time period. 
 The second hypothesis is that information embedded in the model spreads may 
contain information that is not priced in yet by the sovereign market spreads. Because the 
currency market is more efficient than the sovereign CDS market, exchange rate information 
could have predictive power for future CDS spread changes. We build strategies based on the 
model spreads that indeed show a strong and significant performance. This indicates that the 
market does not fully price the sovereign balance sheet information into CDS spreads.  
 For further research it will be interesting to look for improvements to the Merton 
framework applied to sovereigns. The structural model may be improved with suggestions 
from the study of Eom et al. (2004) on corporations regarding the use of a different model 
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set-up allowing for a stochastic interest rate and a recovery at default among others. In 
addition, Aktug (2014) applies the Merton model to three emerging markets and argues that 
more precise data on the debt and the addition of other volatility measures like the equity 
market volatility may help.  
Finally, including alternative factors in a reduced form model set-up like Ang and 
Longstaff (2013) use for EMU countries is another possibility for further research. 
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6. Riding the swaption curve 
 
Based on Duyvesteyn and de Zwart (2015), published in the Journal of Banking and Finance. 
We thank Robert Berry for excellent research assistance. We are grateful for the useful 
comments from the participants of the 2008 2nd Investing and Trading in Volatility 
conference in New York, the 2012 15th Annual Conference of the Swiss Society for Financial 
Market Research in Zurich, the 2013 EFA Meetings in Cambridge, seminar participants at 
Robeco, Guido Baltussen, Kees Bouwman, Nick Firoozye, Winfried Hallerbach, Roy 
Hoevenaars, Roger Lord, Kasper Lorenzen, Martin Martens, Philippe Mueller (discussant), 
Sebastian Paik (discussant), Patrick Verwijmeren, Yu-Min Yen and three anonymous 
referees. 
6.1 Introduction 
 
Previous research in equity and fixed income show that the market price of volatility risk is 
negative for both markets. In contrast, investors trade volatility very differently in these 
markets. The commonly used trading instrument in the equity market is the variance swap 
(Carr and Wu, 2009), which pays the difference between realized variance and a benchmark 
variance rate that is set at the start of the contract.63 On the other hand, institutional investors 
in the fixed income market hardly use variance swap contracts, but are very comfortable 
trading over-the-counter (OTC) swaptions to get volatility exposure. An important reason 
behind this might be a lack of clear benchmark points for volatility trading in the fixed 
income market. This is illustrated by a gap of 20 years between the introduction of the VIX 
in 1993 (Whaley, 1993) as a benchmark in the equity markets and the recent introduction of 
the SRVX index as the first interest rate-based volatility index (Mele and Obayashi, 2012). 
Only recently, equity variance swaps have been generalized to the fixed income market by 
Trolle (2009), Mele and Obayashi (2013), Mueller et al. (2013), Li and Song (2013) and 
Trolle and Schwartz (2014). This is most likely because of the 'non-trivial design issues' (Li 
and Song, 2013) and a lack of public data due to the OTC market structure. This might 
explain why, apart from Mueller et al. (2013), these studies focus on studying and replicating 
                                                
63
 See Carr and Wu (2009) for a detailed discussion on variance swaps in equity markets. 
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variance swap contracts at a single maturity and pay little attention to the term structure of 
the volatility risk premium. However, swaptions naturally give rise to a maturity term 
structure.64 
This paper complements the literature by providing a comprehensive empirical 
analysis of the term structure in the volatility risk premium for the four major swaption 
markets (USD, JPY, EUR and GBP).65 We build on Low and Zhang (2005), who relate the 
volatility risk premium to straddle returns by proving that the average return of a delta-
neutral straddle must not be zero if volatility risk is priced. We argue that conclusions can be 
inferred on the term structure of the volatility risk premium by studying the average return of 
a long-short combination of two delta-neutral straddles with different maturities. In 
particular, we study long-short straddle combinations which are either delta-gamma or delta-
vega neutral. We are the first to apply these two strategies in the fixed income market. Hence, 
we provide results showing it is plausible that the delta-gamma and delta-vega neutral 
strategies can be linked to volatility risk and jump risk respectively, corroborating the equity 
market findings of Cremers et al. (2015). Since sellers of volatility risk might also desire a 
jump risk premium to compensate for sudden and extreme losses caused by the unexpected 
nature of jumps, we use this link to better understand our empirical results. The presence of a 
jump risk premium is not unlikely because there is evidence for the presence of jumps in 
interest rates. Johannes (2004) reports a significant impact of jumps on the pricing of fixed 
income derivatives on Treasury bills. Dungey et al. (2009) relate jumps in the fixed income 
market to the release of macroeconomic data and show that about 2/3 of jumps can be 
explained by these releases. Using variance swaps, Li and Song (2013) show that jump tail 
                                                
64
 A seemingly related, but nonetheless unrelated, line of previous work studies riding strategies on the yield 
curve instead of the swaption volatility curve. Yield curve-riding strategies are popular investment approaches 
for fixed income managers to achieve additional returns and have been widely documented; see for example the 
study of Dyl and Joehnk (1981). Basically ‘yield curve-riding’ or ‘rolling down’ strategies buy longer-dated 
bonds and sell before maturity. When these bonds approach maturity and the yield curve is upward-sloping, 
they will be valued at a lower yield. A profit will be realized when the bond is sold at the higher price. In 
contrast to these yield curve-riding strategies, this study is the first empirical research on the significance of 
long-short straddle combinations that ‘ride’ the swaption curve. Riding the swaption curve and riding the yield 
curve thus have in common that their respective forward curves are not realized over time. 
65
 Straddles are typically used to speculate on future changes of volatility. A straddle has zero delta exposure at 
inception. Straddles comprise a combination of a call option (receiver swaption) and a put option (payer 
swaption) on a swap with the same maturity and the same underlying strike rate. A receiver swaption is a call 
option on a receive fixed swap where the swaption holder has the right to receive a fixed rate on a swap in the 
future. A payer swaption is a call option on a pay fixed swap (or a put option on a receive fixed swaption) where 
the holder has the right to pay a fixed rate on a swap in the future. 
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risk is time varying in the swaption market. 
Our research provides a number of new results. We use a large data set of at-the-
money implied volatility quotes on the 10-year swap rate and 1 to 12-month swaption 
maturities between April 1996 and December 2011 to calculate the returns of the long-short 
straddle strategies. First, our main finding is that we find statistically significant returns for 
all markets and for both delta-gamma and delta-vega neutral strategies. This finding is 
consistent with an upward-sloping term structure in the volatility risk premium implying a 
less negative premium for longer-term swaption maturities. The strategy returns consistently 
decrease across maturities, which suggests that the risk premium curve flattens for longer 
maturities. The low, although increasing, correlations between the delta-gamma and delta-
vega neutral strategies, that is -23% for the 3 vs 6-month maturity strategy, -4% for 6 vs 9-
month and 38% for the 9 vs 12-month, indicate that the two strategies are uncorrelated and 
probably capture different effects. This suggests that the term structure of the volatility risk 
premium is affected by both jump risk and volatility risk, especially at short-term maturities. 
In general, all these empirical findings are consistent across the four individual markets. 
Second, it is important to recognize that our strategy is based on the Black (1976) 
model to estimate the risk exposures for hedging and to calculate the returns. We re-run our 
strategies on the Vasicek (1977) model for all markets and on the stochastic volatility model 
proposed by (Hagan et al., 2002) for the vega neutral strategy in the USD market.66 The 
Hagan et al. (2002) model is also known as the Stochastic Alpha Beta Rho (SABR) model. In 
the Vasicek (1977) framework we find comparable summary statistics to our main findings 
for all markets. The vega neutral returns under the SABR model seem, in general, 
comparable to the returns under the Black model. For example the 3 vs 6-month strategy has 
a return (Sharpe ratio) of 0.89% (0.60) under the SABR model and 0.85% (0.54) under the 
Black model. Additionally, we do robustness checks of our findings on the 2-year swap rate 
and the USD swaption smile, we analyze the impact of macroeconomic announcements, and 
we empirically check the exposure of the strategy returns to the underlying swap rate. 
Third, we study the economic importance of our results. For example, the average 
return across the four markets for the 3 versus 12-month delta-gamma neutral strategy is 
1.89% (t-stat = 4.33) and an annualized Sharpe ratio of 1.35. The delta-vega neutral strategy 
                                                
66
 The additional data which is required to estimate the SABR model is not available for other markets. 
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reports a return of 1.14% (t-stat = 3.69) and an annualized Sharpe ratio of 0.95. However, 
after calculating break-even costs and comparing these with expected trading costs, we 
conclude that the returns of the strategies are not realizable by investors and therefore are not 
economically significant. This corroborates the findings for equity option strategies obtained 
by Santa-Clara and Saretto (2009). 
Our research relates to several strands of the literature. Most importantly, our study is 
directly related to the literature on the volatility risk premium in fixed income. Earlier 
studies, such as Goodman and Ho (1997) and Duarte et al. (2007), examine the presence and 
sign of the volatility risk premium in the fixed income market by analyzing the returns of a 
delta-hedged investment strategy. Since then, Almeida and Vicente (2009) have studied the 
volatility risk premium of fixed income Asian options, and Fornari (2010) has studied the 
volatility risk premium by calculating the difference between the implied volatility and 
forecast of realized volatility using a GARCH model. Recently, a growing body of literature 
which explores variance swap contracts in fixed income markets is emerging. Variance swap 
contracts provide model-free estimates of the variance risk premium because no assumptions 
are made about the price process of the underlying swap rate. Trolle (2009) studies the 
variance risk premium in the U.S. Treasury market by estimating variance swaps under 
simplifying assumptions and concludes that the variance risk premium is negative. Merener 
(2012) studies a variance strategy on forward swap rates. Mueller et al. (2013) and Mele and 
Obayashi (2013) both analyze variance contracts on Treasury futures. Mele and Obayashi 
(2013) mainly focus on the theoretical derivation of the contract. Mueller et al. (2013) 
introduce a variance contract that is robust to jumps and can be replicated in the market at 
daily frequency. This approach helps them to empirically analyze the variance premium 
across the maturity and tenor spectrum, and leads them to conclude that the variance risk 
premium is negative, but less negative for longer maturities (increasing in maturity), and 
more negative for longer-term swap rates (decreasing in tenor). We see our work 
complementing theirs, because our data is on swaptions which is a different market, we focus 
on a straddles trading strategy and we make a distinction between volatility and jump risk. 
Trolle and Schwartz (2014) and Li and Song (2013) both study variance swaps in the 
swaption market and both have large and proprietary 'swaption cube' data sets from different 
providers that include data along three dimensions: swap tenors, swaption maturities and 
strike rates. Li and Song (2013) focus on jump risk and conclude that jump risk is time 
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varying, while Trolle and Schwartz (2014) study variance and skewness risk premiums which 
are reported to be time varying and negative. 
Our paper is also related to the strand of literature on test design for the existence of 
volatility risk premiums. An important contribution in this field includes Branger and Schlag 
(2008) who provide a detailed discussion on the limitations of hedging-based strategies. In 
particular, discrete trading and model misspecification may cause tests to yield unreliable 
results. Doran (2007) demonstrates that delta-gamma hedged option portfolios are less 
subject to these discrete trading and model misspecification problems than traditional delta-
hedged portfolio tests. Since we construct our long-short straddle combinations so that they 
are either delta- gamma or delta-vega neutral, our strategy returns are most likely less prone 
to the limitations raised by Branger and Schlag (2008). 
Finally, our paper is related to Aït-Sahalia et al. (2012) who study the term structure of 
variance swaps in the equity market and reveal a significant jump component embedded in 
the variance swaps, especially at short-term maturities. Their analysis leads them to the 
conclusion that the variance risk premium is negative, becoming more negative for longer 
maturities, but we do not find this result in the fixed income market. 
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 6.2 addresses our 
methodology and Section 6.3 describes the data. Section 6.4 presents our main empirical 
findings for the delta-gamma and delta-vega hedged long-short straddle combinations. 
Section 6.5 provides a robustness and sensitivity analysis on the efficiency of the delta-
hedge, scheduled macroeconomic announcements, choice of the pricing model and additional 
data sets. Section 6.6 discusses the economic importance of our results and we conclude in 
Section 6.7. 
6.2 Methodology  
 
Straddles are commonly used to speculate on, or to hedge for, future volatility changes 
because they give exposure to volatility and have no exposure to the underlying. In this study 
we analyze long-short combinations of at-the-money swaption straddles with different 
maturities. The purpose of this section is to describe the valuation of swaption straddles, the 
method to calculate the straddle risk parameters and to determine the hedge ratios for long-
short straddle combinations that are either delta-gamma or delta-vega neutral. 
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6.2.1 Computing straddle returns  
A swaption straddle is a combination of a payer swaption plus a receiver swaption, both with 
the same exercise level.67 In order to value the straddle we follow market practice and use the 
Black (1976) pricing model to convert quoted implied volatilities into straddle prices (Chaput 
and Ederington, 2005). To do so, consider a specific payer swaption giving the right to pay 
the fixed swap strike rate (G) and to receive the floating rate in a swap contract that will last 
n years (the tenor), starting in T years (the maturity), with m coupon payments per year and 
principal L. Let .Q =  + ,/2 be the times of each of the coupon payments. Then, the 
contribution of the value of each individual cash flow (coupon payment) of the underlying 
swap to the swaption is: 
STF,Q = UV 5 LWWX(Y) − G(Y)Z          (6-1) 
where F is the forward swap rate with the same maturity as the swaption, N is the cumulative 
normal distribution function, Y = [O\
F F]^ _`aNb/
a√b , Y = Y − E√ and &Q.Q  is the spot rate 
that corresponds to the maturity of cashflow i at ti. The sum of the values of the individual 
cash flows determines the total value of the payer swaption (Vp): 
Sd = ∑ Sfg,QQ = UhV X(Y) − G(Y)Z          (6-2) 
Where 7 = ∑ 5 LWWQ . Here the presumption made by Black (1976) is that the forward swap 
rate follows a geometric Brownian motion (Yi) where the volatility is a constant: 
   YG = EGYi, G(0) = -         (6-3) 
The value of a corresponding receiver swaption giving the right to receive strike rate Gand 
pay the floating rate in a swap contract is equal to (VR): 
Sj = UhV X−(−Y) + G(−Y)Z           (6-4) 
The value of a straddle, @, (both long receiver and long payer swaption) with the same strike 
rate Gis given by the sum of (2) and (4): 
   @ = Sd + Sj = UhV X(2(Y) − 1) − G(2(Y) − 1)Z     (6-5) 
Notice that the Black model is a model and therefore does not necessarily have a 
perfect fit with empirical data. The basic premise of a constant volatility is not supported by 
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 At inception, the ATM swaption strike rate is set equal to the swap forward rate. 
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market dynamics, because swaption implied volatilities tend to vary for different strikes and 
swaption maturities (swaption smile). We discuss our data set later, but at this stage we 
emphasize that we only have swaption smile data for the USD and not for the other markets 
in our data set. As such we assume a horizontal smile and rely on the Black model (Black, 
1976) to convert implied volatility quotes into prices. We will use USD swaption smile data 
for a robustness analysis in Section 6.5.4. 
We calculate the return of a straddle as follows. Let St be the value of a particular straddle 
position at time t. Then the return of holding the straddle position, including funding costs, 
during the period from t - 1 to t is: 
    = kl klmn\`
#pqrsl,lmn
tuv QLlmn_
U          (6-6) 
Where ,&  is the annualized floating interest rate that is paid to borrow money to buy the 
swaption straddle position for the period from t - 1 to t which comprises #29K,  number 
of days. In calculating the returns we ignore the bid-offer spread as well as impact of margin 
that would be required to back the straddle trades and limit the ability to leverage. Since 
trading costs and collateral requirements can be substantial for short option positions, as 
shown by Santa-Clara and Saretto (2009), we separately analyze the economic importance in 
Section 6.6. In this section we also discuss how the swaption market changed after the Global 
Financial Crisis (GFC) in 2008. 
6.2.2 Calculating the risk parameters  
Next to the valuation of the swaption straddles we also want to estimate the associated risks 
for hedging purposes and exposure analysis. These risk parameters are collectively known as 
the `Greeks' and quantify the influence of changes in market factors on the straddle value. 
Using the Black model, the analytical delta, gamma and vega can be obtained in closed-form 
formulas (Martellini et al., 2003). 
 
Delta (∆), describes the price change of a straddle with respect to the underlying swap 
forward rate. Technically speaking it is the first derivative of the straddle price with respect 
to the swap forward rate: 
   ∆= wkwF =
Uh
V X(Y) − (−Y)Z                   (6-7) 
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At inception an at-the-money delta-neutral straddle position has a delta equal to zero 
according to the Black model. This means that the straddle value is not sensitive to a small 
change in the underlying swap forward rate. Straddle exposures to the other Greeks are, 
however, not zero. 
 
Gamma (Γ) is the second derivative of the straddle to the underlying swap forward rate and is 
the rate of change of the delta to the underlying swap forward rate: 
Γ = wkNwFN =
Uh
VFa√b Xx(Y) + x(−Y)Z                 (6−8) 
where x is the probability density function of the normal distribution. 
 
Vega (v) is the sensitivity of the straddle price to the implied volatility. In fact a straddle is 
quite vulnerable to volatility changes. Technically, vega is the first derivative of the straddle 
price with respect to the volatility parameter E: 
v = wkwa =
UhF√b
V Xx(Y) + x(−Y)Z                  (6-9) 
Note that under the assumptions of the Black model vega is a comparative statistic and not a 
sensitivity to a variable that is dynamic such as delta or gamma. 
 
We use the Black model in this study because of limitations on data availability for 
the EUR, GBP and JPY markets. However, just because financial markets quote implied 
volatility in the Black framework does not imply that risk parameters should be calculated 
from the Black model without an adjustment for the presumption of constant volatility across 
strike rates. Hence, as discussed by Levin (2004), the return distribution of swap rates is not 
necessarily lognormal as assumed by the Black model. We use USD swaption smile data for 
robustness analysis in Section 6.5.3 and 6.5.4 and show that our results are robust. 
6.2.3 Specification of the hedging-based strategy  
Low and Zhang (2005) relate the volatility risk premium to straddle returns by proving that 
the average return of a delta-neutral straddle must not be zero if volatility risk is priced. 
Following Low and Zhang (2005) we argue that studying the returns of a long-short 
combination of delta neutral straddles with different maturities will enable us to analyze the 
difference between the volatility risk premium across swaption maturities. Then, the obvious 
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question is: what should be the ratio between the two straddles? In the spirit Cremers et al. 
(2015) we construct two combinations which are orthogonal and either exposed to volatility 
risk (delta-gamma neutral combination) or to jump risk (delta-vega neutral combination). 
This approach does not only enable us to analyze the term structure of the volatility risk 
premium but we might also be able to infer conclusions on the drivers of the term structure. 
A long-short straddle strategy constructed to be delta and gamma neutral is vega positive and 
would be subjected to volatility risk but almost not impacted by jump risk. Since gamma is 
not constant in time to maturity we construct the delta-gamma neutral strategy using the 
Black risk parameters. The strategy consists of two positions (i) a short position in 1 delta-
neutral straddle contract with maturity y and (ii) a long position in [yz{VV{ delta-neutral 
straddle contracts with maturity [ with y < [ . [yz{VV{ is chosen such that the long 
straddle position creates an overall position in the long-short straddle combination that is not 
only delta but also gamma neutral (Equation 6-8): 
   [yz{VV{ = Mb} a}F}MbsasFs                    (6-10) 
where y is the swaption maturity, Ey is the implied volatility and y the swap forward rate of 
the short straddle position and [, E[, and [ are the swaption maturity, the implied volatility 
and the swap forward rate of the long straddle position respectively. The shorter dated 
swaptions have larger gammas such that the number of straddles bought to offset the gamma 
exposure of the short position is more than 1 ([yz{VV{ > 1). This results in a positive vega 
exposure for the long-short combination because vega is increasing in time to maturity such 
that the shorter dated straddle has a smaller vega than the longer dated straddle. Doran (2007) 
also emphasizes the importance of controlling a delta hedged portfolio for gamma exposure 
to enable a more precise inference on the volatility risk premium. 
Analogously, a long-short straddle strategy constructed to be delta and vega neutral is gamma 
negative and would be subjected to jump risk but almost not impacted by volatility risk. 
Since vega is not constant in time to maturity we construct the delta-vega neutral strategy 
using the Black risk parameters. The strategy consists of two positions (i) a short position in 
one delta-neutral straddle contract with maturity y and (ii) a long position in [yIz{ delta-
neutral straddle contracts with maturity [ with y < [ . [yIz{ is chosen such that the long 
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straddle position creates an overall position in the long-short straddle combination that is not 
only delta but also vega neutral (Equation 9-9): 
   [yIz{ = Mbs FsMb}F}                    (6-11) 
Since the shorter dated straddle has a smaller vega, the number of straddles bought to offset 
the vega exposure of the short position is less than 1 ([yIz{ < 1). This results in a negative 
gamma exposure because shorter dated swaptions have larger gammas. 
In the remainder of this study we analyze the profitability of these long-short straddle 
combinations for various swaption maturities. The long-short portfolio is formed at month 
end and rebalanced monthly in the spirit of Broadie et al. (2009). Intra-month, we neither 
change the two straddle positions nor delta-hedge the long-short portfolio using the 
underlying swap forwards. All risk exposures that get into the straddles during the month are 
supposed to cancel out as a result of offsetting long and short straddle positions. 
Notwithstanding, we do analyze the risk exposures on a daily basis in Section 6.5.1. 
We follow Bakshi and Kapadia (2003) and Low and Zhang (2005) to apply a t-test for 
testing the null hypothesis that the long-short profit or loss is zero. We adjust the t-statistics 
according to Newey and West (1987, 1994) to correct for heteroscedasticity and serial 
correlation. Positive average returns of the strategy would suggest that the volatility risk 
premium for the shorter term swaption maturity is higher than the longer-term maturity. 
There would be evidence for a downward-sloping term structure in the volatility risk 
premium if the long-short returns show positive returns along a range of subsequent long-
short straddle maturities. 
6.3 Data and volatility risk premium  
 
In this section we first describe our data set. We then provide empirical estimates of the 
volatility risk premium across different swaption maturities. 
6.3.1 Data description  
We use an extensive data-set of swap forward rates and swaptions that we obtain from 
Bloomberg and an anonymous major broker dealer. The advantage of two data sources is that 
this enables cross-checking to get a high quality data-set. If available we use Bloomberg data, 
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otherwise broker data. The Bloomberg data are based on the most recent trades and quotes 
from multiple pricing sources for each country, among other ICAP which is the largest inter-
dealer broker in the swap rate derivative market Trolle and Schwartz (2014). We may 
therefore expect the quotes to be timely and accurate. Given the average swaption trading 
volume in excess of USD 150 billion notional, we assume that the Bloomberg data represent 
quotes that can be traded in practice. 
Our sample covers the four largest and most liquid swap markets and spans a period 
of almost 16 years, from April 1996 to December 2011. Daily close prices (midpoint) of the 
implied Black volatility are available for at-the-money (ATM) swaptions with maturities of 
one, three, six, nine and twelve months for USD, EUR, JPY and GBP swaptions.68 Before 
1999 the EUR data are based on Germany, the most liquid fixed income market in the 
European Monetary Union. Bloomberg only provides ATM data because ATM swaptions are 
actively quoted in the market. Data on other strike rates is proprietary and broker dealer 
specific.69 Furthermore, we focus on the 10 year swap tenor because swaption contracts for 
this maturity are the most liquid.70 
Figure 6-1 plots the time series behavior of the implied volatility of 3-month 
swaptions and shows that its' values have varied greatly over the course of the sample. We 
make two observations. Firstly, markets seem to show common moves with spikes during 
major stress events in the market in 1998 (unwinding LTCM), 2001 (bursting IT bubble and 
subsequent recession), 2008 (Lehman Brothers default) and 2011 (FED announced a stimulus 
policy that was called Operation Twist). Secondly, we note historically high values for the 
Japanese implied volatility in 2003. This jump is related to the sharp rise of the 10-year swap 
rate in Japan. On June 12th, 2003 the Japanese 10-year swap rate had an all time low at 
0.43%. One month later it had more than doubled to a level at about 1%, while the rate 
further increased to 1.5% in September. The sharp increase was aggravated by many 
Japanese banks who were forced to sell government bonds due the limits on their value-at-
                                                
68
 At inception, the ATM swaption strike rate is set equal to the swap forward rate. We use the New York close, 
which is at EST 17:00, as the closing price for all four markets. 
69
 In addition, our broker-dealer provides 5 strikes for USD swaptions (ATM, ATM ± 50, ATM ± 100). In 
section 6.5.4 we use this USD data to test the robustness of our empirical findings. 
70
 This is illustrated by the options on the 10 year U.S. Treasury futures contracts. Open interests and daily 
volumes of the options on the 2y, 5y and 30y futures contracts options are up to ten times lower than for the 10y 
futures. Source: CME Group, www.cmegroup.com. 
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risk; see BIS (2003) for more details.71 
 
Figure 6-1: Time series of swaption implied volatility 
 
This figure shows the time series of the at-the-money Black's implied volatility of 3-month maturity swaptions 
with 10-year swap tenor for the USD, EUR, GBP and JPY markets. The sample period is from April 1996 to 
December 2011 and the EUR quotes before 1999 are implied volatility quotes for 3-month maturity swaptions 
on the German (DEM) swap rate. 
 
Table 6-1 reports the summary statistics of the swaption data across different 
maturities. We report the mean, standard deviation, skewness, kurtosis, minimum, and 
maximum for the month end implied volatility quotes in our sample. The number of monthly 
observations in each series is 189. We make several observations. The average volatility of 
Japanese swaptions is about twice as high as the volatility of the other three markets, as we 
already have seen in Figure 1. Furthermore, implied volatilities for shorter maturities are 
higher and more volatile than for longer maturities in all four markets. This higher standard 
deviation gradually decreases for longer maturities. Finally, we also notice that the range 
between the minimum and maximum is the largest for the shortest maturities and narrows 
when maturity goes up. Together, this illustrates a higher risk embedded in shorter maturity 
                                                
71
 A similar but smaller effect can be observed in the U.S. data for the same period. The USD 10-year swap rate 
was at a low of 3.46% on June 13th, 2003 and rose back to about 5% in only two months due to mortgage 
hedging activity (see Duarte (2008)). 
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swaption contracts. Low and Zhang (2005) argue that this higher risk warrants a decreasing 
volatility risk premium in maturity. 
 
Table 6-1: Summary statistics of swaption implied volatilities 
 Maturity Mean Stdev Skew Kurt Min Max 
USD 1m 23.5% 12.2% 1.88 4.87 9.7% 94.8% 
 3m 23.2% 10.8% 1.53 2.97 10.2% 80.6% 
 6m 22.6% 9.6% 1.32 1.81 11.0% 67.4% 
 9m 22.1% 8.9% 1.25 1.44 11.3% 61.4% 
 12m 21.6% 8.1% 1.18 1.07 11.6% 55.6% 
        
EUR 1m 17.2% 8.1% 2.08 4.53 6.5% 54.9% 
 3m 16.9% 7.5% 2.02 4.21 7.6% 52.6% 
 6m 16.5% 6.8% 1.93 3.84 8.8% 50.2% 
 9m 16.2% 6.4% 1.87 3.57 9.4% 47.8% 
 12m 15.8% 6.0% 1.83 3.36 9.4% 45.3% 
        
JPY 1m 34.4% 11.9% 1.54 3.65 15.0% 97.0% 
 3m 34.3% 10.3% 1.23 2.68 15.0% 84.0% 
 6m 33.2% 9.1% 0.82 1.41 14.0% 77.0% 
 9m 32.1% 8.2% 0.64 1.04 14.6% 71.0% 
 12m 31.3% 7.7% 0.40 0.59 13.0% 67.0% 
        
GBP 1m 17.2% 7.2% 1.98 4.34 9.1% 49.5% 
 3m 16.8% 6.4% 1.98 4.35 9.3% 45.9% 
 6m 16.5% 5.7% 1.90 4.03 9.4% 42.3% 
 9m 16.3% 5.2% 1.85 3.89 9.5% 40.3% 
 12m 15.9% 4.7% 1.90 4.48 9.7% 38.2% 
Note: This table reports summary statistics of annualized, at-the-money swaption implied volatilities on the 10-
year swap forward yield for four markets (USD, EUR, GBP and JPY). For each combination of market and 
swaption maturity, the table shows the sample mean (Mean), standard deviation (Stdev), skewness (Skew), 
kurtosis (Kurt), minimum (Min), and maximum (Max) of implied volatility mid-quotes for maturities ranging 
from one to twelve months. The number of observations in each series is 189 and runs from April 1996 to 
December 2011. Data are obtained from Bloomberg and an anonymous broker. 
 
So far, we analyze the data separately and do not address the issue of commonalities 
between the four markets. To address this question we compute the correlations between the 
swap yields and between the implied volatilities. Table 6-2 presents the correlation between 
pairs of monthly changes in the swap yield (below diagonal) and between pairs of monthly 
changes in the implied volatility (above diagonal). We can observe a strong and positive 
correlation (0.70 - 0.79) between the monthly changes in the USD, EUR and GBP swap rates, 
indicating that these markets comove strongly. We make a similar observation for the 1-
month change in the implied volatilities. In a similar vein we document a weak relationship 
between these three markets and the JPY market. The 0.15 correlation between the monthly 
changes of the USD and JPY implied volatility is a good example of this. This latter result 
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suggests that the JPY swap rate and implied volatility move rather independently from the 
other three markets. 
 
Table 6-2: Correlation ∆10Y swap rate and ∆ implied volatility 
 USD EUR JPY GBP 
USD - 0.59 0.15 0.57 
EUR 0.74 - 0.20 0.68 
JPY 0.27 0.26 - 0.22 
GBP 0.70 0.79 0.19 - 
Note: This table reports correlation statistics between the four markets in our sample (USD, EUR, JPY and 
GBP). Correlations between the monthly changes in the 10 years swap rate are presented below the diagonal. 
Correlations between the monthly changes in the implied volatility are presented above the diagonal and 
averaged across the 3, 6, 9 and 12 month swaption maturities. The EUR data before 1999 is from Germany. The 
number of monthly strategy return observations is 189 and each series runs from April 1996 to December 2011. 
 
A potential concern about our data set could be that the data characteristics suggest 
that the assumptions of the Black model are violated. It seems that implied volatilities are not 
log-normally distributed and that jump dynamics are probably in play. The counterfactual on 
Black does not influence its ability to follow market practice and convert implied volatility 
quotes into prices but may influence the effectiveness of hedging on basis of the Black 
model. To alleviate concerns on the hedge ratios we analyze the robustness of our results 
when the greeks are based on the Vasicek (1977) model and on a stochastic volatility model 
(SABR) in Section 6.5.3. Moreover, implied volatility from the Black model tends to have a 
negative correlation with the underlying swap rate (Chan et al., 1992). This might impact the 
delta-neutrality of our straddles. We work with the constraints of the data by investigating 
delta-neutrality in section 6.5.1. 
6.3.2 Delta hedged straddle returns  
Using our swap forward and swaption data, we empirically examine the compensation for 
volatility risk following the method proposed by Bakshi and Kapadia (2003) and Low and 
Zhang (2005), based on gains/losses by a delta-hedged strategy. We compute daily delta-
hedged returns of swaption straddles for various maturities and re-sample the returns at a 
monthly frequency. After one month the straddle and swap forward position will be closed 
and a new straddle will be initiated. It is important to note that we have a holding period of 
one month for all maturities, whereas most academic studies either limit their analysis to a 
single short maturity (1-month) or study hold-to-expiration effects. In our view, hold-to-
expiration returns for maturities longer than one month raise issues that complicate the 
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interpretation of straddle returns versus the maturity. The main issue is that hold-to-
expiration returns for maturities larger than one month overlap and might bias any analysis 
on the relationship between the swaption maturity and the volatility risk premium. 
Table 6-3 gives the summary statistics for daily delta-hedged straddle returns 
maturing in either 1, 3, 6, 9 or 12 months with a one month holding period. Not surprisingly, 
the average hold-to-expiration returns for the 1-month maturity swaption straddles are 
negative for all markets and statistically significant at the 1% level for the USD, JPY and 
GBP swaptions. This result is consistent to those in Duarte et al. (2007), Fornari (2010) and 
Mueller et al. (2013) who also report average delta-hedged returns which are negative. 
Fornari (2010) also finds negative returns for Euro swaptions, which are not statistically 
significant. Second, for all markets we observe a term structure in the average returns which 
is similar. The term structure is upward-sloping with the largest negative return for the 1-
month maturity. However, unlike Mueller et al. (2013) and Fornari (2010), who report 
negative volatility risk premiums across all swaption maturities up to 12 months, we find 
average returns which are positive for the longest maturities. A potential explanation for this 
is our one month rebalancing frequency against the hold-to-expiration set-up in the latter two 
studies. 
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Table 6-3: Pricing of volatility risk 
 Maturity Mean t-stat Stdev Skew Kurt AC(1) Sharpe 
USD 1m -1.49% -2.60 2.66% 0.16 6.68 -13.20% -0.56 
 3m -0.43% -0.66 2.14% 1.87 8.93 19.80% -0.20 
 6m 0.53% 0.71 2.42% 2.51 15.39 22.70% 0.22 
 9m 0.99% 1.25 2.62% 2.88 19.88 20.30% 0.38 
 12m 1.56% 1.82 2.78% 2.90 20.57 22.20% 0.56 
         
EUR 1m -0.42% -0.87 1.68% -0.05 3.10 6.00% -0.25 
 3m 0.11% 0.24 1.32% 1.47 5.01 27.70% 0.08 
 6m 0.73% 1.47 1.52% 2.12 9.00 20.70% 0.48 
 9m 0.95% 1.84 1.65% 2.20 9.80 13.90% 0.57 
 12m 1.14% 2.09 1.75% 2.26 9.99 16.20% 0.65 
         
JPY 1m -1.05% -2.53 1.71% 0.74 4.08 -7.60% -0.61 
 3m -0.82% -2.43 1.25% 1.07 2.73 -2.70% -0.66 
 6m -0.05% -0.14 1.39% 1.16 2.94 -9.10% -0.04 
 9m 0.22% 0.60 1.38% 1.08 2.48 -6.30% 0.16 
 12m 0.45% 1.24 1.45% 0.84 3.22 3.60% 0.31 
         
GBP 1m -1.39% -3.24 1.61% 0.16 3.64 4.50% -0.86 
 3m -0.70% -1.66 1.39% 1.17 2.36 25.30% -0.50 
 6m 0.21% 0.46 1.48% 1.35 3.07 27.40% 0.14 
 9m 1.23% 2.11 1.87% 2.18 9.41 29.20% 0.66 
 12m 1.01% 1.97 1.60% 1.44 3.25 26.70% 0.63 
         
EQW 1m -1.09% -3.03 1.35% -0.22 3.69 3.50% -0.81 
 3m -0.46% -1.21 1.14% 1.32 2.64 33.40% -0.40 
 6m 0.36% 0.81 1.29% 1.75 4.75 33.70% 0.28 
 9m 0.85% 1.82 1.40% 1.78 5.42 32.80% 0.61 
 12m 1.04% 2.11 1.43% 2.07 7.85 36.80% 0.73 
Note: This table reports annualized summary statistics of non-overlapping monthly returns on a swaption 
straddle strategy with daily delta hedging and a one month holding period. The maturities of the underlying 
swaptions are 1, 3, 6, 9 and 12 months, respectively. We set the notional value of the straddle position equal to 
one and compute the returns from a long straddle perspective. In addition to the USD, EUR, JPY and GBP 
markets, we compute the summary statistics of an equally-weighted (EQW) portfolio. Summary statistics 
include annualized sample mean (Mean), annualized standard deviation (Stdev), skewness (Skew), kurtosis 
(Kurt), first-order autocorrelation (AC(1)) and annualized Sharpe ratio. t-statistics are adjusted according to 
Newey and West (1987) to correct for heteroscedasticity and serial correlation up to four lags. The number of 
observations in each series is 189 and runs from April 1996 to December 2011. 
6.4 Empirical results Riding the swaption curve  
 
Following the strategy set-up that was discussed in Section 6.2, we now calculate the 
empirical returns of the delta-vega and delta-gamma neutral strategies. We report the 
outcomes for four swaption maturity combinations: short 3-month and long 6-month maturity 
straddles (3 vs 6), 6 vs 9, 9 vs 12 and 3 vs 12. For each maturity combination we report the 
return statistics per individual market and for an equally weighted portfolio that comprises all 
four markets. Table 6-4 shows the summary statistics, including the average annualized 
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return, standard deviation, t-statistic, skewness, kurtosis, Sharpe ratio, first order 
autocorrelation and the hit ratio. 
Most importantly, Table 6-4 shows consistent positive average returns across all 
maturities and markets for both delta-gamma and delta-vega neutral strategies. All of the 
delta-gamma neutral returns have statistically significant means, while 13 out of 16 average 
returns for the delta-vega neutral strategy are statistically significant. For example, focusing 
on the 3 vs 6-month delta-gamma neutral strategy average annualized returns are between 
0.64% (JPY) and 0.94% (USD), and Sharpe ratios between 0.72 (JPY) and 0.89 (GBP). For 
the delta-vega neutral strategies returns are slightly wider dispersed with average returns 
between 0.52% (EUR) and 1.09% (GBP), and Sharpe ratios between 0.54 (USD) and 1.21 
(GBP). The Sharpe ratios are comparable to those reported by Cremers et al. (2015) for a 
similar strategy in the U.S. equity market.72 In light of our research question, to analyze the 
term structure of the volatility risk premium, the positive returns are intuitively consistent 
with an upward-sloping term structure in the volatility risk premium. This is consistent with 
Fornari (2010) and Mueller et al. (2013) who both report negative risk premiums and a 
downward-sloping term structure of the volatility risk premium (in absolute terms) for the 
fixed income market. 
Next, note that looking across the maturity spectrum, we observe the largest average 
returns for the shortest maturity combination (3 vs 6-month) and then a decreasing pattern. 
This pattern is consistent for all markets. For example, the equally weighted portfolio that 
comprises all four markets earns 0.75% per year on average (t-stat of 3.65) with a Sharpe 
ratio of 1.18 for the 3 vs 6-month delta-gamma neutral portfolio. The returns for the 6 vs 9-
month and 9 vs 12-month portfolios are 0.40% (t-stat of 3.89) and 0.35% (t-stat of 4.25), 
respectively. Comparable, we see the equally weighted portfolio returns decrease with the 
maturity for the delta-vega neutral strategy with average annualized returns of 0.81% (t-stat 
of 4.23) for the shortest maturity combination, 0.29% (t-stat of 2.50) and 0.23% (t-stat of 
2.51). Based on this, we conclude that our results suggest that the term structure of the 
volatility risk premium is concave. 
Table 6-4: Summary statistics for long-short straddles trading strategies 
                                                
72
 Cremers et al. (2015) report a Sharpe ratio of -0.55 for a 1vs2-month delta-gamma neutral strategy and -0.93 
for a 1vs2-month delta-vega neutral strategy. Note that these strategies are 'long-short' while our strategies are 
'short-long' which explains the opposite sign. 
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 Maturity Mean t-stat Stdev Skew Kurt AC(1) Sharpe Hit 
Panel A: Delta-Gamma neutral combination      
          
USD 3 vs 6 0.94% 2.68 1.20% 2.33 14.88 13.99% 0.78 55% 
 6 vs 9 0.62% 3.19 0.76% 2.38 19.42 -2.71% 0.81 62% 
 9 vs 12 0.47% 3.35 0.56% 0.33 1.06 -1.65% 0.84 56% 
 3 vs 12 2.57% 3.29 2.71% 1.86 11.89 9.46% 0.95 62% 
          
EUR 3 vs 6 0.72% 2.99 0.88% 2.01 9.06 -3.32% 0.81 60% 
 6 vs 9 0.29% 2.54 0.55% 0.92 9.35 -20.67% 0.53 58% 
 9 vs 12 0.34% 2.92 0.49% 1.23 5.74 -4.14% 0.69 61% 
 3 vs 12 1.72% 3.41 2.07% 2.50 14.66 -11.06% 0.83 61% 
          
JPY 3 vs 6 0.64% 2.72 0.89% 1.71 8.90 -6.79% 0.72 59% 
 6 vs 9 0.32% 2.13 0.55% 0.82 3.64 -1.68% 0.59 51% 
 9 vs 12 0.35% 2.53 0.56% -0.01 2.46 -7.32% 0.62 59% 
 3 vs 12 1.66% 3.1 2.06% 1.34 6.77 -8.70% 0.81 62% 
          
GBP 3 vs 6 0.69% 2.97 0.78% 0.88 1.51 13.10% 0.89 56% 
 6 vs 9 0.37% 2.53 0.55% 0.00 1.52 1.40% 0.68 57% 
 9 vs 12 0.23% 1.71 0.50% -0.40 3.52 -2.49% 0.45 55% 
 3 vs 12 1.60% 3.02 1.72% 0.95 1.78 15.78% 0.93 58% 
          
EQW 3 vs 6 0.75% 3.65 0.63% 1.36 3.26 19.31% 1.18 59% 
 6 vs 9 0.40% 3.89 0.37% 1.34 5.51 4.64% 1.10 63% 
 9 vs 12 0.35% 4.25 0.29% 0.28 1.88 10.98% 1.17 66% 
 3 vs 12 1.89% 4.33 1.40% 1.65 5.37 16.42% 1.35 63% 
 
 Maturity Mean t-stat Stdev Skew Kurt AC(1) Sharpe Hit 
Panel B: Delta-Vega neutral combination      
          
USD 3 vs 6 0.85% 2.51 1.57% -2.73 12.81 -6.74% 0.54 70% 
 6 vs 9 0.36% 1.84 0.91% -3.05 16.74 -1.52% 0.40 67% 
 9 vs 12 0.26% 1.76 0.67% -1.27 5.65 0.62% 0.39 62% 
 3 vs 12 1.25% 2.34 2.47% -2.87 14.05 -3.68% 0.51 69% 
          
EUR 3 vs 6 0.52% 2.17 0.90% -1.48 5.63 3.83% 0.58 65% 
 6 vs 9 0.11% 0.73 0.54% -1.61 6.32 8.51% 0.20 64% 
 9 vs 12 0.14% 1.27 0.45% -0.13 6.44 3.24% 0.32 59% 
 3 vs 12 0.68% 1.78 1.39% -1.76 7.11 7.59% 0.48 64% 
          
JPY 3 vs 6 0.79% 3.17 1.06% -2.65 12.60 -8.50% 0.75 74% 
 6 vs 9 0.23% 1.29 0.74% -2.48 16.14 -7.03% 0.31 64% 
 9 vs 12 0.29% 2.09 0.50% -1.15 6.30 5.57% 0.58 65% 
 3 vs 12 1.10% 2.71 1.68% -2.96 16.02 -5.87% 0.65 71% 
          
GBP 3 vs 6 1.09% 5.05 0.90% -2.46 12.00 -0.63% 1.21 74% 
 6 vs 9 0.44% 3.50 0.55% -0.77 2.22 -3.28% 0.80 67% 
 9 vs 12 0.21% 1.65 0.45% -0.11 2.30 7.04% 0.47 59% 
 3 vs 12 1.52% 4.46 1.34% -2.08 9.37 4.90% 1.13 72% 
          
EQW 3 vs 6 0.81% 4.23 0.76% -2.01 8.32 6.00% 1.07 68% 
 6 vs 9 0.29% 2.50 0.44% -1.76 6.44 10.78% 0.66 64% 
 9 vs 12 0.23% 2.51 0.34% -0.91 2.89 6.31% 0.66 61% 
 3 vs 12 1.14% 3.69 1.19% -1.99 7.72 8.94% 0.95 67% 
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Note: This table reports annualized summary statistics of non-overlapping monthly returns on long-short 
swaption straddles strategies. Each month a swaption straddle with the lowest maturity is sold with a notional of 
one, and held for one month. At the same time an additional long straddle position, with a higher maturity, is 
bought at a notional that either neutralizes the vega or gamma exposure of the combined long-short position. 
The straddles are initiated on the last business day of the month. In addition to the USD, EUR, JPY and GBP 
markets, we compute the summary statistics of an equally-weighted (EQW) portfolio. Summary statis-tics 
include annualized sample mean (Mean), annualized standard deviation (Stdev), skewness (Skew), kurtosis 
(Kurt), first-order autocorrelation (AC(1)), annualized Sharpe ratio and the percentage of months with a positive 
return (Hit). t-statistics are adjusted according to Newey and West (1987, 1994) to correct for heteroscedasticity 
and serial correlation up to four lags. The number of observations in each series is 189 and runs from April 1996 
to December 2011. 
 
In the spirit of Cremers et al. (2015) we conjecture that the consistent positive strategy 
returns reported in Table 6-4 suggest that both volatility risk (delta-gamma) and jump risk 
(delta-vega neutral) contribute to the term structure in the volatility risk premium. In the 
remainder of this section we investigate the difference between the delta-gamma and delta-
vega neutral strategies in more detail. 
In Table 6-5 we present the pairwise correlations between the delta-gamma and delta-
vega neutral strategies for each maturity-market combination. The mean correlation across 
the four markets is -23.2% for the 3 vs 6-month strategy. This indicates that the two strategies 
are uncorrelated and probably capture a different effect. The increasing correlations (-3.6% 
and 37.8%) for longer maturities suggest that both strategies are distinctive but get more in 
common when maturity increases. The maturity structure in the correlations may be linked to 
how volatility and jump risk is perceived by investors. Aït-Sahalia et al. (2012) for example 
find that a jump component is embedded in the volatility risk premium in the U.S. equity 
market and that "short-term variance risk premiums mainly reflect investors' fear of a market 
crash, rather than the impact of stochastic volatility on the investment opportunity set". 
 
Table 6-5: Pairwise correlations 
 3 vs 6 6 vs 9 9 vs 12 3 vs 12 
USD -38.4% -30.0% 30.7% -34.7% 
EUR -19.5% -8.2% 28.2% -32.0% 
JPY -31.1% 0.6% 40.3% -33.7% 
GBP -3.8% 23.3% 51.8% -21.4% 
average -23.2% -3.6% 37.8% -30.5% 
Note: This table reports pairwise correlations between the delta-gamma and delta-vega neutral strategy returns. 
Correlations are computed separately for the combinations of market and swaption maturities. The number of 
monthly strategy return observations is 189 and each series runs from April 1996 to December 2011. 
 
 
Next, we investigate the link between jump risk and the delta-vega neutral strategy in 
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more detail. The delta-vega strategy has negative gamma exposure. We expect the strategy to 
make a large negative return when a jump occurs and will analyze the strategy returns during 
jumps. In Figure 6-2 we show the time-series of the daily changes in the 10-year USD swap 
rate. The vertical lines in Panel A indicate the 1% largest daily changes (absolute) in the daily 
swap rate. Some of these largest changes could however coincide with periods of high 
volatility, which might misclassify an observation as a jump. For this reason the vertical lines 
in Panel B indicate realized jumps according to the non-parametric jump test of Lee and 
Mykland (2008). If we take out these jump days from our delta-vega strategy returns we 
expect the returns to be higher. This aligns with our results in Panel B in Table 6-6. In this 
table we take out the 1% days with the largest change in the 10-year swap rate from the 
strategy returns. We do the same for the days with realized jumps according to Lee and 
Mykland (2008). In both analyses we observe consistent higher returns than the full sample 
results presented in Table 6-4. From this finding we infer that there seems to be a link 
between jump risk and the delta-vega neutral strategy returns. From Panel A in Table 6-6 we 
also observe that the returns of the delta-gamma neutral strategy are hardly affected by taking 
out the jumps. 
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Figure 6-2: Time series of daily swap rate changes and realized jumps 
(a) Realized jumps defined as 1% largest absolute changes 
 
(b) Realized jumps according to Lee and Mykland (2008) 
 
This figure illustrates the difference between detection methods for jumps in the times series of daily changes of 
the 10 years swap rate for the USD market. The vertical, dashed lines in Panel A represent realized jumps 
defined as the 1% largest absolute changes in the daily swap rate (41 observations). The vertical, dashed lines in 
Panel B represent realized jumps (22 observations) according to Lee and Mykland (2008). The sample runs 
from April 1996 to December 2011 and includes 4,110 daily observations. 
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Finally, we investigate the link between volatility risk and the delta-gamma neutral 
strategy in more detail. The delta-gamma strategy has positive vega exposure and is 
constructed such that it makes a positive return if the market expectation of future volatility 
rises. For this reason we expect the delta-gamma strategy returns to be lower if we take out 
the months with the largest increase in volatility. This is what we find in Panel A in Table 6-6 
where we take out the strategy return for the 5% months with the largest increase in realized 
volatility. We note that all maturity combinations have mean returns lower than the full 
sample results presented in Table 6-4. For example, the average return for the 3 vs 6-month 
USD delta-gamma neutral strategy decreases from 0.94% to 0.47%. This result suggests that 
there might be a link between the delta-gamma strategy returns and the volatility risk 
premium. From Panel B in Table 6-6 we also observe that the returns of the delta-gamma 
neutral strategy are positively affected by taking out the 5% months with the largest increase 
in realized volatility. It may be the case that these months (partly) overlap with jumps in the 
underlying swap rate. 
 
Table 6-6: Effect of jumps on strategy returns  
Panel A: Delta-Gamma  
neutral combination 
excl. Jumps(1%)  excl. Jumps(LM2008)  excl. ∆Vol(5%) 
Mean t-stat Sharpe  Mean t-stat Sharpe  Mean t-stat Sharpe 
USD 3 vs 6 0.84% 2.54 0.76  0.90% 2.51 0.77  0.47% 1.74 0.50 
 6 vs 9 0.52% 2.86 0.74  0.59% 3.29 0.79  0.36% 2.29 0.61 
 9 vs 12 0.43% 3.13 0.75  0.43% 3.13 0.76  0.37% 2.80 0.68 
 3 vs 12 2.27% 3.31 0.97  2.42% 3.23 0.94  1.56% 2.50 0.72 
EUR 3 vs 6 0.54% 2.83 0.70  0.71% 3.02 0.81  0.30% 1.66 0.46 
 6 vs 9 0.27% 2.62 0.53  0.29% 2.50 0.52  0.07% 0.79 0.17 
 9 vs 12 0.30% 2.57 0.61  0.35% 2.89 0.71  0.22% 2.06 0.51 
 3 vs 12 1.44% 3.38 0.79  1.73% 3.42 0.84  0.80% 2.07 0.53 
JPY 3 vs 6 0.34% 1.85 0.44  0.56% 2.42 0.65  0.28% 1.47 0.40 
 6 vs 9 0.21% 1.86 0.39  0.26% 1.65 0.48  0.17% 1.28 0.34 
 9 vs 12 0.37% 2.36 0.53  0.89% 1.50 0.38  0.28% 2.04 0.52 
 3 vs 12 1.26% 2.86 0.63  2.47% 2.00 0.50  0.95% 2.22 0.56 
GBP 3 vs 6 0.65% 3.03 0.83  0.68% 2.94 0.85  0.33% 1.87 0.51 
 6 vs 9 0.26% 1.74 0.48  0.38% 2.61 0.70  0.23% 1.70 0.44 
 9 vs 12 0.28% 1.91 0.53  0.22% 1.65 0.43  0.11% 0.89 0.22 
 3 vs 12 1.50% 2.93 0.86  1.59% 3.02 0.91  0.84% 2.11 0.58 
EQW 3 vs 6 0.59% 3.51 1.04  0.71% 3.49 1.13  0.33% 1.46 0.77 
 6 vs 9 0.31% 3.38 0.90  0.38% 3.89 1.07  0.19% 1.80 0.75 
 9 vs 12 0.34% 4.27 1.09  0.47% 2.77 0.73  0.23% 3.10 0.91 
 3 vs 12 1.62% 4.34 1.26  2.05% 3.96 1.16  0.98% 2.48 1.06 
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Panel B: Delta-Vega  
neutral combination 
excl. Jumps(1%)  excl. Jumps(LM2008)  excl. ∆Vol(5%) 
Mean t-stat Sharpe  Mean t-stat Sharpe  Mean t-stat Sharpe 
USD 3 vs 6 1.43% 4.29 1.13  1.05% 3.24 0.70  1.32% 3.80 0.97 
 6 vs 9 0.64% 4.19 0.87  0.45% 2.27 0.52  0.68% 4.00 0.90 
 9 vs 12 0.42% 3.05 0.67  0.30% 2.08 0.46  0.46% 2.96 0.75 
 3 vs 12 2.11% 4.56 1.10  1.53% 3.01 0.66  2.05% 3.86 0.97 
EUR 3 vs 6 0.76% 3.28 0.91  0.60% 2.56 0.70  0.65% 2.78 0.79 
 6 vs 9 0.30% 2.38 0.61  0.15% 1.00 0.28  0.23% 1.61 0.47 
 9 vs 12 0.24% 2.39 0.56  0.17% 1.59 0.38  0.27% 2.48 0.65 
 3 vs 12 1.10% 3.17 0.87  0.79% 2.16 0.60  0.96% 2.62 0.76 
JPY 3 vs 6 1.11% 5.53 1.45  0.83% 3.37 0.82  1.09% 5.27 1.25 
 6 vs 9 0.48% 3.75 0.90  0.25% 1.48 0.35  0.47% 2.82 0.78 
 9 vs 12 0.49% 3.61 0.86  0.79% 1.62 0.40  0.46% 4.31 1.08 
 3 vs 12 1.70% 5.50 1.41  1.43% 3.53 0.78  1.66% 5.04 1.24 
GBP 3 vs 6 1.31% 6.21 1.60  1.18% 5.62 1.43  1.36% 6.59 1.87 
 6 vs 9 0.49% 4.28 0.93  0.49% 3.99 0.94  0.64% 5.58 1.33 
 9 vs 12 0.35% 2.51 0.75  0.23% 1.85 0.51  0.33% 2.71 0.79 
 3 vs 12 1.85% 5.66 1.50  1.65% 4.99 1.34  1.99% 6.36 1.83 
EQW 3 vs 6 1.15% 6.48 1.81  0.91% 5.06 1.29  1.05% 5.92 1.71 
 6 vs 9 0.48% 5.66 1.26  0.34% 3.08 0.81  0.48% 5.15 1.41 
 9 vs 12 0.38% 4.73 1.17  0.38% 2.72 0.63  0.36% 5.62 1.25 
 3 vs 12 1.69% 6.46 1.71  1.35% 4.86 1.17  1.57% 5.97 1.67 
Note: This table reports annualized summary statistics of non-overlapping monthly returns on long-short swap-
tion straddles strategies for three differently truncated samples. First, we take out the days on which the absolute 
daily change in the 10-year swap rate belongs to the 1% largest changes in our sample period (excl. 
Jumps(1%)). Secondly, we take out the days on which the 10-year swap rate jumped (excl. Jumps(LM2008)) 
according to Lee and Mykland (2008). Thirdly, we take out the 5% months with the largest increase in realized 
volatility (excl. ∆Vol(5%)). The realized volatility is calculated as the standard deviation of daily changes of 10 
years swap rate during the month. Summary statistics include annualized sample mean (Mean), t-statistics (t-
stat) and annualized Sharpe ratio (Sharpe). t-statistics are adjusted according to Newey and West (1987, 1994) 
to correct for heteroscedasticity and serial correlation up to four lags. The samples run from April 1996 to 
December 2011. 
 
The evidence presented in this section, which essentially shows that long-short 
swaption straddles strategies produce positive average returns that decrease in maturity, is 
consistent with a concave, upward-sloping term structure in the volatility risk premium. The 
fact that both delta-vega and delta-gamma neutral strategies earn positive returns that seem 
uncorrelated suggests that the term structure of the volatility risk premium is affected by both 
jump risk and volatility risk. This finding contributes to recent studies on the pricing of jump 
and volatility risk in the fixed income market such as Trolle and Schwartz (2014) and Li and 
Song (2013). 
6.5 Robustness and Sensitivity analysis  
 
In this section we present a variety of additional sensitivity and robustness analysis of our 
main findings. We first test the delta-neutrality of our strategy and analyze the empirical 
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relationship between the strategy returns and rate changes. Moreover, we investigate the 
impact of macroeconomic releases. Next, we check if our main results can be confirmed 
using the Vasicek (1977) model and a stochastic volatility model. Finally, we re-run our 
strategies on two additional data sets which include the 2-year tenor and swaption smile data 
for the USD. 
6.5.1 Hedging Efficiency  
A potential concern might be that our straddles are not delta neutral but exposed to changes 
in the underlying swap rate. This exposure could originate from at least two channels: 
monthly rebalancing instead of daily rebalancing and a violation of the assumptions of the 
Black model in our data set. To examine the impact of monthly rebalancing, we graphically 
analyze the daily intra-month Black risk exposures for the 3- vs 6-month strategies. Next, to 
investigate the exposure to the underlying empirically, we regress the strategy returns on the 
rate changes. The specification of this model is: 
   @ =  + ∆@ +                   (6-12) 
where @ is the return of the long-short straddles strategy in month t and ∆@ is the 
difference between the 10-year swap rate in month t and t - 1. 
Most likely, risk exposures will change during the month because of the changes in 
the underlying and in the implied volatility. This could potentially impact the strategy returns 
and bias our conclusions. To address this discretization error, as highlighted by Branger and 
Schlag (2008), Figure 6-3 plots the average daily risk exposures for the USD 3 vs 6-month 
strategies and illustrates how the Black delta, gamma and vega develop between two monthly 
rebalances.73 Each panel plots a single risk exposure and shows the 5% percentile, median 
and 95% percentile across all months in our data sample. Most importantly, we note that the 
median delta exposures for both the delta-vega hedge (Panel E) and the delta-vega hedge 
(Panel F) stay very close to zero and are 0.04 and 0.06 respectively after one month. 
Notwithstanding, the 90% bandwidth for the delta-gamma neutral strategy is smaller than for 
the delta-vega neutral strategy. Based on this observation, we conclude that it seems unlikely 
that the outcomes are the result of a large exposure to the underlying. 
 
                                                
73
 The results for the other maturities and markets are similar and available upon request. 
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Figure 6-3: Strategy risk exposures (“Greeks”) during the month  
  
(a) Vega – vega neutral (b) Vega – gamma neutral 
  
(c) Gamma – vega neutral (d) Gamma – gamma neutral 
  
(e) Delta – vega neutral (f) Delta – gamma neutral 
 
This figure plots the average (over time series) risk exposures (`Greeks') of the Delta-Gamma and Delta-Vega 
neutral 3 vs 6 month calendar spread straddles strategy in the USD market. For each working day of the month, 
the Greeks are calculated using the Black model. Delta is the sensitivity of the straddle to the underlying swap 
forward rate, vega is the sensitivity to the implied volatility and gamma is the sensitivity of the delta to the 
underlying swap forward rate. 
 
Continuing on the exposure to the underlying, Table 6-7 reports the results from 
estimating Equation 6-12 and shows some interesting features. For the delta-gamma-neutral 
strategy we observe negative estimates for , that are statistically significant for the USD, 
EUR and GBP markets. The coefficients for JPY are not statistically significant. This being 
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said, 15 out of 16 estimates for  are statistically significant, indicating that the strategy 
returns do not appear to be explained by exposure to the underlying swap rate. These results 
contrast with the results for the delta-vega neutral strategy. Here we see only two positive 
estimates for , that are statistically significant; all other coefficients are not statistically 
significant. The strategy returns after correcting for the change in the swap rate remain 
statistically significant for 13 out of 16 strategies and are very close to the unadjusted returns 
reported in Table 6-4. 
 
Table 6-7: Regression of strategy returns on swap rate changes 
  Gamma neutral  Vega neutral 
   t-stat  t-stat    t-stat  t-stat  
USD 3 vs 6 0.83% 2.71 -0.35 -1.74 0.09  0.88% 2.52 0.09 0.27 0.00 
 6 vs 9 0.51% 3.38 -0.36 -3.31 0.22  0.36% 1.87 0.00 -0.01 0.00 
 9 vs 12 0.43% 3.14 -0.15 -2.75 0.07  0.28% 1.76 0.04 0.30 0.00 
 3 vs 12 2.23% 3.35 -1.12 -2.89 0.17  1.28% 2.35 0.11 0.20 0.00 
EUR 3 vs 6 0.57% 2.72 -0.52 -2.92 0.14  0.60% 2.48 0.28 1.46 0.04 
 6 vs 9 0.19% 2.05 -0.37 -3.68 0.18  0.15% 0.99 0.14 1.20 0.03 
 9 vs 12 0.25% 2.41 -0.31 -4.00 0.16  0.16% 1.46 0.09 1.02 0.01 
 3 vs 12 1.29% 3.16 -1.58 -3.59 0.23  0.79% 2.08 0.43 1.37 0.04 
JPY 3 vs 6 0.68% 2.73 0.29 1.04 0.03  0.72% 2.77 -0.44 -1.15 0.05 
 6 vs 9 0.32% 2.06 0.01 0.08 0.00  0.17% 0.94 -0.38 -1.35 0.07 
 9 vs 12 0.34% 2.35 -0.03 -0.21 0.00  0.26% 1.74 -0.17 -1.07 0.03 
 3 vs 12 1.70% 2.95 0.25 0.40 0.00  0.98% 2.29 -0.79 -1.23 0.06 
GBP 3 vs 6 0.62% 2.93 -0.20 -1.93 0.03  1.23% 5.95 0.37 1.84 0.08 
 6 vs 9 0.30% 2.28 -0.19 -2.86 0.06  0.50% 4.26 0.15 1.52 0.04 
 9 vs 12 0.17% 1.35 -0.13 -2.31 0.04  0.25% 2.14 0.10 1.51 0.02 
 3 vs 12 1.34% 2.86 -0.67 -2.94 0.08  1.72% 5.52 0.53 1.79 0.08 
Note: This table presents estimated results for the contemporaneous regression of the monthly strategy returns 
on the monthly change of the 10-year swap rate 
 
@ =  + ∆@ +  
 
where RLSt is the return of the long-short straddles strategy in month t and ∆SRt is the difference of the 10-year 
swap rate (@  )in month t and t-1. For each market and long-short maturity combination we estimate the 
model separately. t-statistics are adjusted according to Newey and West (1987, 1994) to correct for 
heteroscedasticity and serial correlation up to four lags. The number of observations in each series is 189 and 
runs from April 1996 to December 2011. 
 
Finally, we expand the model in Equation 6-12 with three additional factors; the monthly 
change of the slope of the yield curve (∆10)3), the monthly change of the implied 
volatility (∆E), and the delta-hedged return of a 1-month short straddle position (yL{[I). 
We define the slope of the yield curve as the difference between the 3-month rate and the 10-
year swap rate. That is, the model is given by 
@ =  + ∆@ + ∆10)3 + ∆E + yL{[I +     (6-13) 
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The four factor model is estimated and the estimation results are reported in Table 6-8.  Most 
importantly, we observe that 15 out of 16 and 11 out of 16 estimates for the intercept, , are 
statistically significant at a 10% level for the delta-gamma neutral and delta-vega neutral 
strategies respectively. This suggests that the strategy returns do not appear to be explained 
by the four factors. Additionally, we see negative sensitivities for the change in volatility and 
positive sensitivities for the 1-month straddle returns for the delta-vega neutral strategy. 
Furthermore, the returns for the delta-gamma neutral strategy are positively correlated with 
the change in the implied volatility, as evidenced by the positive and significant estimates of 
. Finally, the estimates for the coefficients of the change of the 10-year yield and the slope 
are insignificant for the majority of maturity-market combinations. 
We close this section by concluding that the evidence presented in this section suggest 
that it seems unlikely that the strategy returns can fully be explained by exposures to the 
underlying swap rate, the slope of the yield curve, the implied volatility or 1-month delta-
hedged returns. 
 
Table 6-8: Regression of strategy returns on swap rate, yield curve steepness and relative 
volatility changes and the daily delta-hedged straddle return 
Panel A: Delta-Gamma neutral combination 
   t-stat  t-stat  t-stat  t-stat  t-stat  
USD 3 vs 6 0.80% 3.36 -0.11 -1.06 0.16 2.17 0.06 5.54 -0.01 -0.31 0.55 
 6 vs 9 0.51% 3.99 -0.15 -2.64 0.04 0.82 0.04 6.38 -0.01 -0.61 0.53 
 9 vs 12 0.39% 2.90 -0.09 -1.64 0.03 0.86 0.02 2.54 0.01 0.78 0.12 
 3 vs 12 1.99% 3.97 0.06 0.28 0.32 1.96 0.29 8.85 0.03 0.56 0.69 
             
EUR 3 vs 6 0.54% 3.52 -0.11 -1.07 0.10 1.49 0.08 10.72 0.04 1.46 0.65 
 6 vs 9 0.17% 2.28 -0.09 -1.65 -0.01 -0.25 0.05 9.06 0.01 0.74 0.51 
 9 vs 12 0.23% 2.36 -0.15 -2.26 0.01 0.39 0.03 4.91 0.03 1.13 0.31 
 3 vs 12 1.14% 4.48 0.02 0.12 0.04 0.33 0.32 8.64 0.08 1.26 0.83 
             
JPY 3 vs 6 0.54% 2.76 0.01 0.03 0.22 1.23 0.04 8.22 0.08 2.02 0.52 
 6 vs 9 0.32% 2.46 -0.27 -1.04 0.35 1.32 0.02 4.23 -0.02 -0.62 0.24 
 9 vs 12 0.33% 2.11 0.19 0.86 -0.14 -0.65 0.02 4.08 0.01 0.23 0.12 
 3 vs 12 1.59% 3.13 0.78 1.29 0.59 1.10 0.14 6.43 0.01 0.17 0.55 
             
GBP 3 vs 6 0.52% 3.52 0.03 0.32 0.12 1.37 0.08 9.36 0.04 1.40 0.56 
 6 vs 9 0.24% 2.34 -0.07 -1.13 0.06 1.27 0.04 4.70 0.03 1.18 0.26 
 9 vs 12 0.19% 1.55 -0.12 -1.70 0.09 2.30 0.02 1.94 -0.02 -1.15 0.11 
 3 vs 12 1.11% 4.04 0.19 0.85 0.16 0.92 0.32 13.48 0.10 1.85 0.74 
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Panel B: Delta-Vega neutral combination 
   t-stat  t-stat  t-stat  t-stat  t-stat  
USD 3 vs 6 0.72% 2.44 -0.21 -0.85 -0.12 -1.04 -0.06 -3.69 0.12 2.90 0.35 
 6 vs 9 0.32% 2.15 -0.21 -1.56 -0.14 -2.11 -0.05 -5.19 0.06 3.08 0.46 
 9 vs 12 0.23% 1.77 -0.18 -1.90 -0.04 -1.29 -0.04 -6.94 0.04 2.41 0.37 
 3 vs 12 0.96% 2.04 -0.41 -1.11 -0.32 -1.78 -0.13 -3.57 0.28 5.61 0.32 
             
EUR 3 vs 6 0.51% 2.80 0.04 0.28 -0.02 -0.16 -0.03 -2.01 0.20 3.28 0.32 
 6 vs 9 0.11% 0.99 -0.02 -0.19 -0.08 -1.41 -0.03 -3.68 0.11 3.15 0.37 
 9 vs 12 0.14% 1.54 -0.11 -2.03 -0.02 -0.55 -0.03 -5.66 0.07 5.83 0.35 
 3 vs 12 0.64% 2.23 0.07 0.28 -0.12 -0.81 -0.07 -1.97 0.36 5.45 0.32 
             
JPY 3 vs 6 0.56% 2.54 -0.33 -0.75 -0.09 -0.28 -0.02 -2.16 0.19 2.64 0.35 
 6 vs 9 0.09% 0.57 -0.49 -1.36 0.07 0.27 -0.02 -2.43 0.09 2.29 0.39 
 9 vs 12 0.20% 1.45 -0.01 -0.04 -0.25 -1.40 -0.01 -1.66 0.06 3.33 0.20 
 3 vs 12 0.57% 1.46 -0.72 -0.90 -0.31 -0.59 -0.03 -1.36 0.40 4.42 0.30 
             
GBP 3 vs 6 0.89% 4.52 0.30 1.54 -0.11 -0.76 -0.02 -1.38 0.24 5.26 0.34 
 6 vs 9 0.34% 3.49 0.02 0.30 -0.03 -0.62 -0.03 -3.92 0.11 5.85 0.37 
 9 vs 12 0.20% 1.97 -0.05 -0.97 0.01 0.13 -0.04 -6.14 0.04 2.49 0.32 
 3 vs 12 1.18% 4.33 0.34 1.28 -0.14 -0.72 -0.05 -2.32 0.38 7.66 0.39 
Note: This table presents estimated results for the following contemporaneous regression model 
@ =  + ∆@ + ∆10)3 + ∆E + yL{[I +   
where @  is the return of the long-short straddles strategy in month t, ∆@ is the difference of the 10-year 
swap rate (@) in month t and t-1, ∆E is the difference of the relative implied volatility (E) in month t and t-
1 and yL{[I  is the daily delta-hedged return on a delta neutral straddle in month t. For each market and long-
short maturity combination we estimate the model separately. t-statistics are adjusted according to Newey and 
West (1987, 1994) to correct for heteroscedasticity and serial correlation up to four lags. The number of 
observations in each series is 189 and runs from April 1996 to December 2011. 
6.5.2 Day of the month  
Several studies have documented that bond markets respond to scheduled macroeconomic 
announcements, even more strongly than the stock markets (see e.g. Andersen et al. (2007)). 
In this section we consider a possible day-of-the-month effect because the majority of these 
macroeconomic measures is released around the turn of the month. Since the scheduled 
macroeconomic announcements impact bond yields but also the volatility risk (Fornari, 
2010) and jump risk (Li and Song, 2013) premiums, these announcements might also 
influence the returns of the delta-vega and delta-gamma neutral strategies. Announcements 
might have a larger impact on the long-short returns when the position is not delta, gamma or 
vega neutral. Therefore, the specific day of the month that we have chosen to open and close 
our positions may impact our earlier results. Until now, we used the data of the last trading 
day of the month to open new straddle positions and to close the previous straddle positions. 
To assess whether our earlier results are impacted by macroeconomic announcements we 
initiate the monthly straddle combinations for each individual working day of the month. For 
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example, we open the long-short straddles position on the first day of the month instead of 
the last day, etc. 
In Figure 6-4 we plot the average strategy returns across different inception days of 
the month. For the delta-gamma neutral strategy (Panel A) we observe almost no differences 
between the average returns across different days of the month. In contrast, we see a small 
day-of-the-month effect in the returns for the delta-vega neutral strategy (Panel B). Average 
returns are somewhat higher around month end and lower in the middle of the month, but all 
returns are statistically significant. Further analysis (not shown) indicates that volatilities of 
the returns are stable over the month implying that the differences between returns are not 
caused by a higher risk. As Dungey et al. (2009) relates jumps to the release of 
macroeconomic data in the fixed income market, the day-of-the-month results seem to 
confirm the link between the delta-vega hedged results and jump risk. Overall, the day-of-
the-month analysis which essentially shows statistically significant and positive returns for 
all days of the month, indicates that our results are not driven by a specific choice of the 
inception day. 
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Figure 6-4: Day-of-the-month return effect 
(a) Delta-gamma neutral strategy 
 
 
(b) Delta-vega neutral strategy 
 
This figure shows the portfolio returns of the long-short straddles strategies across inception days at different 
working days of the month. Portfolio returns are the equally weighted (EQW) average returns for the USD, 
EUR, GBP and JPY markets. The number of observations in each series is 189 and runs from April 1996 to 
December 2011. t = 0 is the last working day of the previous month. 
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6.5.3 Beyond Black's model  
To address the concern that the assumptions behind the Black model can be violated in 
practice and might affect the effectiveness of our hedges, we analyze the robustness of our 
main findings by re-running our strategies on the Vasicek (1977) model and the SABR 
model. 
 
6.5.3.A Vasicek model  
The assumptions behind the Vasicek model are almost equal to the Black model. The only 
difference is that the Vasicek model assumes a constant absolute volatility (normal 
distribution) while the Black model assumes a constant relative volatility (lognormal 
distribution).74 The consequence is that the gamma of a straddle in the Vasicek model differs 
from the gamma of the Black model: 
ΓVasicek = wkNwFN =
Uh
Vaqs√b X
x(Y) + x(−Y)Z                (6-14) 
where E{Jy is the absolute volatility that is equal to E. Numerically the delta-gamma neutral 
hedge on basis of the Vasicek model is exactly the same as the delta-gamma neutral hedge on 
basis of Black's gamma (see Section 6.2.3). The delta-vega neutral hedge ratio is different 
though. The vega risk parameter on basis of the Vasicek model is equal to: 
v
 Vasicek = wkwaqs =
Uh√b
V Xx(Y) + x(−Y)Z                 (6-15) 
To obtain a delta-vega neutral hedge we can now derive that the hedge ratio on basis of the 
Vasicek model should be equal to √bMb 
Table 6-9 shows the return statistics for the delta-vega neutral strategies. For all 
markets we find comparable statistics to our main findings reported in Table 6-4. This 
suggests that our findings are robust for assuming a constant absolute volatility. 
 
                                                
74
 In the Vasicek model the volatility is measured as an absolute value and not relative to the underlying swap 
forward as in the Black model. For example, a volatility of 50% for a swap rate of 2% implies an absolute 
volatility of 100 bp. The same absolute volatility of 100 bp leads to a relative volatility of 20% for a swap rate 
of 5%. 
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Table 6-9: Summary statistics for trading strategies on the Vasicek model 
  Vega neutral 
  Mean t-stat Stdev Sharpe 
USD 3 vs 6 0.86% 2.60 1.53% 0.56 
 6 vs 9 0.38% 2.10 0.85% 0.45 
 9 vs 12 0.25% 1.70 0.68% 0.37 
 3 vs 12 1.28% 2.44 2.41% 0.53 
      
EUR 3 vs 6 0.52% 2.21 0.88% 0.59 
 6 vs 9 0.11% 0.79 0.52% 0.22 
 9 vs 12 0.15% 1.40 0.43% 0.35 
 3 vs 12 0.69% 1.85 1.36% 0.51 
      
JPY 3 vs 6 0.78% 3.32 1.01% 0.78 
 6 vs 9 0.23% 1.41 0.69% 0.34 
 9 vs 12 0.27% 2.04 0.48% 0.56 
 3 vs 12 1.10% 2.84 1.61% 0.68 
      
GBP 3 vs 6 1.09% 5.06 0.90% 1.21 
 6 vs 9 0.44% 3.57 0.54% 0.82 
 9 vs 12 0.22% 1.76 0.44% 0.50 
 3 vs 12 1.52% 4.54 1.32% 1.16 
      
EQW 3 vs 6 0.81% 4.34 0.74% 1.09 
 6 vs 9 0.29% 2.73 0.41% 0.71 
 9 vs 12 0.22% 2.53 0.33% 0.67 
 3 vs 12 1.15% 3.82 1.16% 0.99 
Note: This table reports annualized summary statistics of non-overlapping monthly returns on long-short 
swaption straddles strategies. Each month a swaption straddle with the lowest maturity is sold with a notional of 
one, and held for one month. At the same time an additional long straddle position, with a higher maturity, is 
bought at a notional that neutralizes the vega exposure of the combined long-short position according to the 
Vasicek (1977) model. The straddles are initiated on the last business day of the month. In addition to the USD, 
EUR, JPY and GBP markets, we compute the summary statistics of an equally-weighted (EQW) portfolio. 
Summary statistics include annualized sample mean (Mean), annualized standard deviation (Stdev), skewness 
(Skew), kurtosis (Kurt), first-order autocorrelation (AC(1)), annualized Sharpe ratio and the percentage of 
months with a positive return (Hit). t-statistics are adjusted according to Newey and West (1987, 1994) to 
correct for heteroscedasticity and serial correlation up to four lags. The number of observations in each series is 
189 and runs from April 1996 to December 2011. 
 
6.5.3.B SABR model  
This section considers a stochastic volatility model as alternative to the deterministic 
volatility models that we have used so far. We select the SABR model, introduced in Hagan 
et al. (2002), because it is widely used in the market (Rebonato et al., 2009). 
The SABR model allows for a relation between the implied volatility (E) and the underlying 
swap forward rate F. For this reason the delta in the SABR model (∆khj) differs from the 
delta in the Black model. We use the (Bartlett, 2006) modified SABR delta. 
   ∆khj= ∆ + v wawF +
wa
w
ν
F                  (6-16) 
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where ∆ and v on the right hand side are the original Black delta (7) and Black vega (9) 
respectively. 
According to the SABR model, the at-the-money straddle position is not necessarily delta 
neutral. Therefore, we analyze a SABR delta neutral strategy using a long-short combination 
of two straddles, instead of a delta-gamma neutral strategy. Likewise, we also analyze a 
SABR vega neutral strategy using the adjusted vega formula from Bartlett (2006) with the 
caveat that the vega hedge on basis of the SABR model is not necessarily delta neutral under 
the SABR model. 
   vkhj = v waw +
wa
wF
F
ν
                  (6-17) 
Similarly to our main analysis, we take a short position of one straddle contract in the 
shorter-term maturity and a long position in the longer-term maturity with a hedge ratio that 
either neutralizes the estimated SABR delta or SABR vega. For the empirical analysis we 
have gathered swaption smile data for USD swaptions from JP Morgan because we need 
smile data to estimate the SABR model. We estimate the parameters of the SABR model with 
a fixed beta parameter of 0.5, which seems to be market practice in the U.S. according to 
Rebonato et al. (2009). 
 
Table 6-10: Summary statistics for trading strategies on SABR model 
      Delta neutral       Vega neutral   
 
Mean t-stat Stdev Sharpe 
 
Mean t-stat Stdev Sharpe 
USD 3 vs 6 0.96% 2.36 1.75% 0.55 0.89% 2.42 1.48% 0.60 
6 vs 9 1.27% 1.79 3.42% 0.37 0.31% 1.77 0.91% 0.34 
 
9 vs 12 0.46% 1.19 1.19% 0.39 
 
0.19% 1.01 0.63% 0.30 
 3 vs 12 1.77% 2.14 2.84% 0.62   1.21% 2.10 2.40% 0.50 
Note: This table reports annualized summary statistics of non-overlapping monthly returns on long-short 
swaption straddles strategies using the SABR model for hedging. The combined long-short straddles position 
either neutralizes the vega or the delta exposure according to the SABR greeks. The straddles are initiated on 
the last business day of the month. Summary statistics include annualized sample mean (Mean), annualized 
standard deviation (Stdev), skewness (Skew), kurtosis (Kurt), first-order autocorrelation (AC(1)), annualized 
Sharpe ratio and the percentage of months with a positive return (Hit). t-statistics are adjusted according to 
Newey and West (1987, 1994) to correct for heteroscedasticity and serial correlation up to four lags. The 
number of observations in each series is 189 and runs from April 1996 to December 2011. 
 
Table 6-10 tabulates the summary statistics for the delta neutral and vega neutral 
long-short strategies using the SABR model for hedging. The average returns are positive 
across all maturities for both delta and vega neutral strategies. Both strategies have 
statistically significant means for 3 vs 6 and 6 vs 9-month maturity combinations at a 90% 
confidence level. In general, the vega neutral returns and Sharpe ratios under the SABR 
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model seem comparable to the returns and Sharpe ratios under the Black model. For example 
the 3 vs 6-month strategy has a return (Sharpe ratio) of 0.89% (0.60) under the SABR model 
and 0.85% (0.54) under the Black model. Based on these results we conclude that our main 
findings are robust. 
6.5.4 Swaption smile and 2-year tenor  
As a final robustness check of our main findings we re-run our analysis on two additional 
data sets, (i) USD data for 5 different strike levels (ATM, ATM ± 50, ATM ± 100) and (ii) 
implied volatility data for at-the-money (ATM) swaptions on 2-year swap rates. 
Table 6-11 reports USD summary statistics for the delta-vega and delta-gamma 
neutral strategies where the straddles are valued on an implied volatility data set with 5 
different strike levels. For the delta-gamma neutral strategy we see that the average returns 
and Sharpe rations are higher than in our main findings (Table 6-4) for all maturity 
combinations. A possible explanation for the higher returns is that the strategy has positive 
vega exposure in combination typical higher out-of-the-money volatilities (smile or smirk 
pattern). For the delta-vega neutral strategy we observe a similar return and Sharpe ratio for 
the 3 vs 6-month strategy and slightly lower returns for the other two maturity combinations. 
Overall we conclude that our main findings are confirmed after controlling for the existence 
of an implied volatility smile or smirk. 
 
Table 6-11: Summary statistics for trading strategies on swaption smile 
    Gamma neutral     Vega neutral   
 
 
Mean t-stat Stdev Sharpe 
 
Mean t-stat Stdev Sharpe 
USD 3 vs 6 1.50% 3.31 1.64% 0.91  0.89% 2.39 1.49% 0.60 
6 vs 9 0.89% 3.40 1.01% 0.88  0.29% 1.71 0.92% 0.31 
9 vs 12 0.62% 3.43 0.57% 1.08  0.18% 0.92 0.64% 0.28 
  3 vs 12 3.76% 3.48 3.71% 1.01  1.19% 2.06 2.42% 0.49 
Note: This table reports annualized summary statistics of non-overlapping monthly returns on long-short 
swaption straddles strategies for the USD market. Each month a swaption straddle with the lowest maturity is 
sold with a notional of one, and held for one month. At the same time an additional long straddle position, with 
a higher maturity, is bought at a notional that either neutralizes the vega or gamma exposure of the combined 
long-short position according to the Black (1976) model. The results differ from the results in Table 6-4 because 
swaption smile data is used to calculate the returns. Swaption data is available at 5 different strike levels (ATM, 
ATM ±50, ATM ±100). Summary statistics include annualized sample mean (Mean), t-statistics (t-stat), 
annualized standard deviation (Stdev) and annualized Sharpe ratio. t-statistics are adjusted according to Newey 
and West (1987, 1994) to correct for heteroscedasticity and serial correlation up to four lags. The number of 
observations in each series is 189 and runs from April 1996 to December 2011. 
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Table 6-12: Summary statistics for trading strategies on 2-year tenor 
  Gamma neutral  Vega neutral 
  Mean t-stat Stdev Sharpe  Mean t-stat Stdev Sharpe 
USD 3 vs 6 0.22% 2.12 0.37% 0.58  0.06% 0.84 0.34% 0.19 
 6 vs 9 0.18% 2.96 0.25% 0.70  0.03% 0.67 0.22% 0.15 
 9 vs 12 0.07% 1.39 0.22% 0.33  -0.04% -0.96 0.19% -0.23 
 3 vs 12 0.61% 2.48 0.98% 0.62  0.06% 0.48 0.55% 0.11 
EUR 3 vs 6 0.17% 2.13 0.27% 0.63  0.05% 0.76 0.25% 0.21 
 6 vs 9 0.07% 1.54 0.19% 0.38  -0.01% -0.21 0.16% -0.06 
 9 vs 12 0.09% 2.18 0.17% 0.52  0.03% 0.62 0.17% 0.15 
 3 vs 12 0.44% 2.23 0.68% 0.64  0.05% 0.48 0.40% 0.14 
JPY 3 vs 6 0.08% 1.17 0.25% 0.30  0.03% 0.89 0.18% 0.19 
 6 vs 9 -0.02% -0.31 0.21% -0.09  -0.02% -0.80 0.12% -0.19 
 9 vs 12 0.29% 3.70 0.22% 1.31  0.51% 2.27 0.85% 0.61 
 3 vs 12 0.70% 3.68 0.60% 1.16  0.23% 2.15 0.43% 0.54 
GBP 3 vs 6 0.07% 0.82 0.30% 0.24  0.15% 1.80 0.28% 0.53 
 6 vs 9 0.07% 1.23 0.22% 0.30  0.07% 1.44 0.21% 0.34 
 9 vs 12 0.10% 2.19 0.19% 0.54  0.08% 1.83 0.16% 0.48 
 3 vs 12 0.35% 1.68 0.72% 0.48  0.23% 1.79 0.45% 0.51 
EQW 3 vs 6 0.13% 2.09 0.20% 0.65  0.07% 1.54 0.17% 0.43 
 6 vs 9 0.07% 1.89 0.14% 0.53  0.02% 0.58 0.11% 0.16 
 9 vs 12 0.14% 5.10 0.11% 1.24  0.14% 2.20 0.24% 0.60 
 3 vs 12 0.52% 3.71 0.49% 1.06  0.14% 1.67 0.30% 0.48 
Note: This table reports annualized summary statistics of non-overlapping monthly returns on long-short 
swaption straddles strategies on a 2-year maturity of the underlying swap rate. Each month a swaption straddle 
with the lowest maturity is sold with a notional of one, and held for one month. At the same time an additional 
long straddle position, with a higher maturity, is bought at a notional that either neutralizes the vega or gamma 
exposure of the combined long-short position. The straddles are initiated on the last business day of the month. 
In addition to the USD, EUR, JPY and GBP markets, we compute the summary statistics of an equally-weighted 
(EQW) portfolio. Summary statistics include annualized sample mean (Mean), t-statistics (t-stat), annualized 
standard deviation (Stdev) and annualized Sharpe ratio. t-statistics are adjusted according to Newey and West 
(1987, 1994) to correct for heteroscedasticity and serial correlation up to four lags. The number of observations 
in each series is 189 and runs from April 1996 to December 2011. 
 
Table 6-12 shows summary statistics for our trading strategies on the 2-year swap 
rate. On this data set, the patterns in the average returns are in general similar to the 10-year 
swap rate data, essentially showing positive returns that decrease in maturity. Yet, we note 
that average returns and Sharpe ratios are lower and in some case slightly negative. For the 
delta-gamma neutral strategy 10 out of 16 strategies have average returns that are statistically 
significant at the 10% level. For the vega-neutral strategy, the average USD and EUR returns 
are not statistically significant and 5 out of 8 strategies for the JPY and GBP. A potential 
explanation might come from Trolle and Schwartz (2014) who analyze the relationship 
between the tenor of the underlying swap rate and the variance risk premium. They document 
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a hump-shaped function and report more negative returns for the 10-year tenor than for the 2-
year tenor in both USD and EUR markets. We leave this issue for future work. 
6.6 Economic importance  
 
In this section we explore the economic importance of our findings. This is motivated by the 
findings of Santa-Clara and Saretto (2009), who show a large disparity between the 
profitability of option strategies in the equity market before and after taking costs into 
account. Transaction costs can be substantial and collateral requirements, to limit 
counterparty default risk, may further reduce profitability. Hence, the tensions in the funding 
markets during the Global Financial Crisis taught swaption dealers that funding costs 
embedded in derivative operations should not be ignored and might result in higher costs for 
investors. 
 
We start from an investor's perspective. So far, the Sharpe ratios of our delta-gamma 
and delta-vega neutral strategies might look appealing to investors. Since the returns of both 
strategies are positive (Table 6-4) and mutual correlations are low (Table 6-5), investors 
might consider combining the two strategies to benefit from diversification. Panel A in Table 
6-13 reports the summary statistics for an equally weighted mix of the two strategies. 
Combining the two strategies proves to be successful, in the sense that returns are strongly 
significant and Sharpe ratios are higher for the combinations. For example, the return of the 3 
vs 12-month maturity portfolio has a Sharpe ratio of 2.22 for the combined strategies 
compared to 1.35 and 0.95 for the individual delta-gamma and delta-vega neutral strategies 
respectively. In addition, Figure 6-5 provides another way of presenting the combined results 
by plotting the cumulative wealth curves for the two individual strategies as well as the 50/50 
combination. It is clear that all three curves show a positive drift. The combination, however, 
shows a further smoothing of the returns. 
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To study the left tail risks in the strategies' returns, we study the worst loss in any 
losing period during the historical simulation. This measure is called the maximum 
drawdown and is defined as the percent retrenchment from a peak-to-trough decline in the 
cumulative return. We analyze the worst three strategy drawdowns for the various countries 
and maturities in our data set. We focus on the 3 vs 12-month strategy, with the results of the 
other maturities generally being in line with this strategy. Table 6-14 presents the maximum 
drawdown and the time between the strategy's retrenchment until a new high is reached. For 
the vega neutral strategy, which is subject to jump risk, we observe large losses that coincide 
with the default of Russia in 1998 and the default of Lehman Brothers in 2008. For the 
gamma neutral strategy, which is subject to volatility risk, we observe the largest drawdowns 
during the steady decline of worldwide volatilities during 2004-2007. The 50/50 mix of the 
two strategies has much smaller drawdowns. The largest drawdown of the equally weighted 
country portfolio is less than 1%, which is less than a seventh of the largest drawdown that 
occurred in the gamma neutral strategy in the U.S.. 
 
Table 6-13: Return statistics and break-even spread for the 3 vs 12m mixed strategy 
 Panel A: 50/50 combination  Panel B: break-even spread  
 Mean t-stat Stdev Sharpe  Gamma neutr. Vega neutr. 50/50 mix 
USD 1.91% 4.77 1.48% 1.29  0.25 0.34 0.3 
EUR 1.20% 4.23 1.05% 1.14  0.22 0.22 0.22 
JPY 1.38% 5.15 1.09% 1.27  0.34 0.65 0.49 
GBP 1.56% 5.39 0.97% 1.61  0.18 0.45 0.31 
EQW 1.51% 7.29 0.68% 2.22  0.24 0.39 0.31 
Note: This table shows summary statistics for a 50% delta-vega and 50% delta-gamma neutral mixed strategy 
(Panel A) and the break-even spread for the delta-gamma neutral, delta-vega neutral and mixed strategies 
respectively (Panel B) for the 3 vs 12-month strategy. The break-even spread is defined as the bid-offer implied 
volatility spread that makes the strategy unprofitable and expressed as implied volatility points. 
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Figure 6-5: Wealth curve swaption riding strategy 
 
This figure shows the wealth curve of a long-short straddles strategies with swaption maturities of 3 months 
(short) and 12 months (long) respectively. Portfolio returns are the equally weighted (EQW) average returns for 
the USD, EUR, GBP and JPY markets. 
 
Considering the economic significance we look at the break-even bid-offer spread for 
the 3 vs 12-month swaption maturity strategy. The break-even spread is defined as the bid-
offer implied volatility spread that makes the strategy unprofitable and is expressed as 
implied volatility points. Panel B in Table 6-13 reports the break-even bid-offer spreads for 
the delta-gamma, delta-vega and combined strategies. The result shows that the break-even 
spreads for the equally weighted portfolio are 0.24, 0.39 and 0.31 volatility points for the 
delta-gamma, delta-vega and 50/50 mix strategies, respectively. These break-even spreads 
are within the bid-offer spreads in the market, which typically is 0.50 volatility points 
according to two major broker-dealers. This leads us to conclude that, taking into account 
trading costs, the returns of the delta-gamma, delta-vega and 50/50 mix strategies are not 
realizable by investors and therefore are not economically significant. This corroborates the 
findings for equity option strategies obtained by Santa-Clara and Saretto (2009). 
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The Global Financial Crisis and subsequent monetary policy decisions by central 
banks have caused derivative dealers to change their dealing practices. This might affect the 
profitability of our strategy. In particular, credit and liquidity risks are now recognized as 
having an impact on the economic value of a derivative security and have changed the 
manner in which derivative trades are conducted. First, the default of Lehman Brothers 
showed that counterparty credit risk cannot be ignored. Counterparty credit risk in a 
derivative trade should be carefully managed and either be priced or mitigated with the help 
of collateral. Today, derivative dealers make a credit value adjustment (CVA) in the pricing 
of a transaction to reflect the counterparty credit risk in uncollateralized transactions. On the 
other hand, fully collateralized transactions will rarely be subject to default risk and therefore 
CVA will be close to zero in these transactions. Second, banks became reluctant to lend to 
one other after the default of Lehman Brothers, and the subsequent liquidity squeeze made 
funding difficult and costly. For quite a while, derivative dealers were faced with a large gap 
between the funding costs of their institution and the risk-free rate in the option pricing 
model for trades that were not collateralized. This resulted in derivative dealers charging a 
funding value adjustment (FVA) to recover their funding costs. From Hull and White (2014) 
we know that the inclusion of FVA is a controversial issue that has resulted in much 
discussion between practitioners, academics and accountants. There are no simple solutions 
to the use of FVA because an FVA violates the law of one price in the market and can lead to 
conflicts between accountants and traders. Hull and White (2014) conclude that “an FVA is 
justifiable only for the part of a company's credit spread that does not reflect default risk.” 
Overall, this gives rise to the question whether the profitability of our strategy is impacted by 
collateralized transactions and potential tensions on funding. We argue that the impact will be 
limited because in our long-short strategy both collateral as well as funding exposures will 
largely be set-off against one another. 
To conclude, a remark on the economic importance should be made. Transaction costs 
have typically not been included in related literature on the volatility risk premium in general, 
nor interest rate derivatives specifically. For example, Trolle (2009) and Doran (2007) both 
indicate that more research in the direction of including trading and commission costs in the 
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implementation could be done in future.75 
Interestingly, our strategy framework motivates us to consider the economic 
importance of our results. Based on the results in this section we conclude that the returns of 
the delta-gamma and delta-vega neutral strategies are not realizable by investors. However, 
the main goal of this chapter is to identify the existence of a difference in the volatility risk 
premium across the term structure of fixed income derivatives. Our results support this for all 
four swaption markets. 
6.7 Conclusion  
 
Existing work has demonstrated that the volatility risk premium is more negative for short-
term maturities than for longer maturities. However, while the existence of the volatility risk 
premium in the fixed income market has recently been analyzed by various papers, the 
maturity effect was only documented by Fornari (2010) and Mueller et al. (2013) and, to our 
knowledge, has not been analyzed in detail. Our paper contributes to the literature by 
providing a strategy framework to test and analyze the maturity effect in the volatility risk 
premium in fixed income markets. Specifically, we analyze the returns of two long-short 
straddle strategies which both ‘ride’ the swaption curve. The straddle combinations are either 
delta-vega neutral and subjected to jump risk, or delta-gamma neutral and subjected to 
volatility risk. 
Using a large database (April 1996 - December 2011) of implied volatility quotes of 
the four major bond markets, we find statistically significant returns, which incrementally 
decrease in swaption maturity for all markets. This finding is consistent with a concave, 
upward-sloping term structure in the volatility risk premium. The fact that both delta-vega 
and delta-gamma neutral strategies earn positive returns that seem uncorrelated suggests that 
the term structure of the volatility risk premium is affected by both jump risk and volatility 
risk. This effect seems most pronounced at shorter maturities. Additional robustness analysis 
indicates that the results seem robust when using the Vasicek (1977) and Hagan et al. (2002) 
SABR models instead of the Black model. The results are also robust for macroeconomic 
announcements, although we do observe a small effect for the day-of-the-month. 
                                                
75
 To our knowledge, the only exception is Duarte et al. (2007) who report returns that are statistically and 
economically significant for their strategy of selling interest rate volatility through delta-hedged caps. 
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Specifically, delta-vega neutral portfolios initiated around the turn of the month report higher 
returns than mid-month portfolios. Finally, our framework allows more detailed assessment 
of the economic importance. Transaction costs and margin requirements are typically not 
included in related literature on the volatility risk premium. Our break-even cost analysis 
points to the conclusion that the returns of the delta-gamma and delta-vega neutral strategies 
are not realizable by investors. This corroborates the findings for equity option strategies 
obtained by Santa-Clara and Saretto (2009). This limit may prevent markets from taking 
advantage of ‘riding the swaption curve’, but does not detract from our established 
conclusion that there is a statistically significant difference in the volatility risk premium 
across the swaption maturity term structure. 
Since the maturity effect of the volatility risk premium seems to have received limited 
attention in the literature, we encourage future research. A prominent issue that requires 
attention concerns the changes in the swaption market after the Global Financial Crisis. Prior 
to the crisis, swaption dealers relied on a single curve to forecast rates depending on an 
underlying index, e.g. LIBOR or Euribor, and to discount cash flows. The changes in market 
conditions and regulations have resulted in a different method for how swaptions are valued 
and risk is managed. In particular, a new multi-curve pricing framework that uses separate 
forecasting and discounting curves became market-standard for new swaption trades. 
Assuming mutual collateral agreements, the market has evolved toward discounting future 
cash flows using Overnight Index Swap (OIS) rates. The separation between the index rates 
and the OIS rates fundamentally changed the framework for swaption modeling. During the 
crisis the market slowly transitioned from the single curve methodology to the multi-curve 
methodology. For example, in September 2010 one of the leading international swaption 
dealers, ICAP, switched to OIS discounting and published both LIBOR- and OIS-based 
swaption implied volatilities. In January 2012, ICAP stopped publishing LIBOR-based 
volatilities and has since then only published OIS-based volatilities (Bianchetti and Carlicchi, 
2013). January 2012 coincides exactly with the end of the empirical data set of this study. 
Further research using OIS-based swaption implied volatilities data post 2011 could give 
important complementary evidence on the consistency of our strategy. This investigation, 
however, lies beyond the scope of this chapter. 
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7. Conclusions 
 
Sovereign fixed income market returns can be attributed to two sources: interest rate income 
and price changes caused by interest rate changes. The influence of interest rate changes on 
the return is very important. For a typical fixed income investment portfolio with a duration 
of 7, it takes 7 years to recover an initial loss from a rising interest rate, also known as the 
immunization period. A better understanding of what is driving interest rate changes and 
what might predict these changes is therefore very relevant. 
 
Academic research on the nature of interest rate changes, the related returns and the price 
efficiency is a more recent development in the literature. Recent studies by Ludvigson and 
Ng (2009), Dahlquist and Hasseltoft (2013), Mylnikov (2014) and Kamstra, Kramer and Levi 
(2015) show that government returns are predictable with factors like macro-economic data, 
forward yields and seasonal patterns. Predictability of corporate bond market returns can also 
be applied to the sovereign fixed income market. Relatively newer parts of the sovereign 
fixed income market such as the local currency debt market for emerging markets and the 
swaption market have been studied less. This dissertation contributes to the literature with 
five studies showing that sovereign fixed income markets are not always price efficient: 
future returns of the sovereign fixed income market can be predicted. This is relevant for 
market participants because it can influence their decisions and goals. 
 
The emerging local currency debt market has grown to a large size of more than 1.5 trillion 
U.S. Dollars at the end of 2012. Chapter 2, “Emerging government bond market timing”, 
confirms that three factors known to predict developed markets can also predict the emerging 
local currency bond markets. Hence, in this respect emerging local currency bond markets 
behave similar to the developed bond markets. The result shows that the emerging 
government bond market does not fully incorporate the information that triggered recent 
bond and equity returns, and that the steepness of the curve contains information about future 
bond returns.  
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A recent study by Bekaert et al. (2014) shows that the level of political risk can explain a 
third of the spread between emerging market dollar bonds and U.S. Treasuries. Chapter 3, 
“Political risk and expected government bond returns”, shows that changes in political risk 
can predict future government bond returns. Countries with improving political risk will 
achieve higher future risk-adjusted returns than countries with deteriorating political risk. The 
result is consistent for both the developed EMU bond market and the emerging dollar debt 
market. Hence, the bond market does not efficiently incorporate changes in political risk.  
 
Kamstra, Kramer and Levi (2015) document a new seasonal pattern in U.S. Treasury returns: 
bond returns are better in the fall when investors get depressed and sell equities for bonds and 
worse in spring when equity and bond positions are reversed. In Chapter 4, “Inflation and 
seasonality in bond returns”, a new and more consistent seasonal pattern in international 
developed government bonds returns is documented. International government bond returns 
are 3.8 percentage points higher in the second half of the calendar year than in the first half of 
the calendar year. This seasonal pattern is largely explained by an opposite pattern in not 
seasonally adjusted U.S. inflation which is 3.0 percentage points lower in the second half of 
the calendar year. Market participants can benefit from this seasonal pattern by structurally 
buying bonds at the end of June and selling bonds at the end of December. 
 
Gray, Merton and Bodie (2007) have adapted the famous Merton model for corporate bonds 
to be able to use it for government bonds. Chapter 5, “Forecasting sovereign default risk with 
Merton’s model”, focuses on predicting the default risk premium using this adapted Merton 
model. Changes in the Merton model spread are correlated with changes in CDS market 
spreads and can even predict these spread changes. Hence, using information from the 
emerging government bond market, the sovereign CDS market returns can be predicted. Our 
finding implicates that the emerging market sovereign CDS market is not fully price efficient. 
 
Finally, Cremers, Halling and Weinbaum (2014) find that the volatility risk and jump risk 
premiums are priced for equity options. Chapter 6 of this dissertation, “Riding the swaption 
curve” confirms the existence of volatility risk and jump risk premiums in fixed income 
markets. Contrary to equity volatility, the model to hedge fixed income volatility related 
instruments like swaptions is not evident. We contribute to the literature showing that the 
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results are robust for alternative swaption models all assuming a different behavior of interest 
rates. Combining the two risk premiums provides a strong diversification. By “riding the 
swaption curve” the market participants can gain positive returns from these two risk 
premiums. 
 
Market participants can benefit from the evidence of the five studies in this dissertation by 
obtaining more stable and higher returns. Other researchers can use the insights by 
incorporating these in their studies and to extend the insights to other markets. A follow-up 
research question could be the relationship between political risk changes and the output of 
the sovereign Merton model. Perhaps both indicators contain overlap or could add mutual 
value when combined. Further research on why fuel and gasoline prices increase in the first 
half of the year would further strengthen our understanding of the new bond seasonal pattern. 
For the option markets it would be interesting to know whether the volatility and jump risk 
premiums are also priced in other markets, like the option market for commodities. Trading 
swaptions and the related transaction costs are also new and interesting terrains for further 
research. 
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Abstract 
The sovereign fixed income market covers more than a third of the total capital market and is 
important for many market participants. Governments need the market to finance their debt, 
central banks for their monetary policy, pension funds and insurance companies for liability 
management and asset managers and investors to achieve positive returns. This dissertation 
presents five studies showing that sovereign fixed income markets are not always price 
efficient. This evidence is relevant for the market participants because it can influence their 
decisions and goals. We summarize the most important insights from the five studies: 
 
The emerging local currency debt market has grown to a large size of more than 1.5 trillion 
U.S. Dollars at the end of 2012. The factors that can predict developed market government 
bond returns can also predict emerging market government bond returns. We have further 
applied the famous Merton model for corporate bonds on government bonds of emerging 
markets. Changes in the Merton model spread can predict country credit default swap returns. 
 
The euro crisis and the October 2013 debate between the Republicans and Democrats on the 
U.S. debt-ceiling highlight the importance of political risk in government bond markets. 
Changes in political risk can predict future government bond returns. Market participants 
should avoid bond markets with higher political risk and rather invest in bond markets with 
lower political risk. 
 
Government bond returns are 3.8 percentage points higher in the second half of the calendar 
year than in the first half of the calendar year. This seasonal pattern is largely explained by an 
opposite pattern in the not seasonally adjusted U.S. inflation rate, which is 3.0 percentage 
points lower in the second half of the calendar year. Market participants can benefit from this 
seasonal pattern by structurally buying bonds at the end of June and selling bonds at the end 
of December. 
 
Swaptions are options on interest rate swaps. The swaption market has become the largest 
non-cleared interest rate derivative market with a (notional) size of 30 trillion USD as of 
April 2014. Although swaption models are different from equity options models, the 
swaption market contains volatility risk and jump risk premiums consistent with equity 
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options. Combining the two risk premiums provides a strong diversification. By “riding the 
swaption curve” the market participants can gain positive returns from these two risk 
premiums. 
89_Erim Duyvesteyn BW Stand.job
 
173 
 
 
Samenvatting 
(Summary in Dutch) 
 
De soevereine vastrentende obligatiemarkt beslaat meer dan een derde van de totale 
kapitaalmarkt en is belangrijk voor veel marktdeelnemers. Overheden hebben de markt nodig 
om hun schulden te financieren, centrale banken voor hun monetair beleid, pensioenfondsen 
en verzekeraars voor het beheersen van verplichtingen (liability management) en 
vermogensbeheerders en beleggers om positieve rendementen te behalen. Dit proefschrift 
omvat vijf studies die laten zien dat de soevereine vastrentende obligatiemarkt niet altijd 
efficiënt is. De vijf studies zijn relevant voor marktdeelnemers omdat het hun beslissingen en 
doelen kan beïnvloeden. Wij vatten de belangrijkste inzichten uit de vijf studies samen: 
 
De markt voor obligaties van opkomende landen in lokale valuta is gegroeid tot een grootte 
van meer dan 1.5 biljoen Amerikaanse dollars eind 2012. De factoren die de rendementen 
voor overheidsobligaties van ontwikkelde markten kunnen voorspellen hebben ook 
voorspelkracht voor obligatierendementen van opkomende markten. Wij hebben ook het 
bekende Merton model voor bedrijven toegepast op overheidsobligaties van opkomende 
markten. Veranderingen van de model spread van het Merton model zijn een goede 
voorspeller voor rendementen van credit default swap instrumenten op landen. 
 
De euro crisis en het debat in oktober 2013 tussen de republikeinen en democraten over het 
schuldenplafond van de V.S. onderstrepen het belang van politiek risico voor de markt voor 
overheidsobligaties. Veranderingen van politiek risico kunnen toekomstige rendementen van 
overheidsobligaties voorspellen. Marktdeelnemers kunnen het beste de landen met gestegen 
politiek risico vermijden en beleggen in de landen met lager politiek risico. 
 
Rendementen van overheidsobligaties zijn 3.8 procentpunt hoger in de tweede helft van het 
kalenderjaar dan in de eerste helft van het kalenderjaar. Dit seizoenspatroon kan grotendeels 
verklaard worden door een tegenovergesteld seizoenspatroon in niet seizoens-aangepaste 
inflatie in de V.S., die 3.0 procentpunt lager is in de tweede helft van het kalenderjaar. 
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Marktdeelnemers kunnen profiteren van dit seizoenspatroon door eind juni structureel 
obligaties te kopen en eind december deze weer te verkopen. 
 
Swaptions zijn opties op rente swaps. De markt voor swaptions is de grootste (niet-geclearde) 
rente derivatenmarkt geworden met een grootte van 30 biljoen Amerikaanse dollars in april 
2014. Hoewel swaption modellen anders zijn dan de modellen voor aandelenopties, bevat de 
swaption markt dezelfde volatiliteitsrisico en jump risicopremies, consistent met de markt 
voor aandelenopties. Een combinatie van de twee risicopremies biedt sterke 
diversificatievoordelen. Door het “berijden van de swaption curve” kunnen marktdeelnemers 
positieve rendementen behalen met deze risicopremies. 
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Resumo  
(Summary in Portuguese) 
 
O mercado de renda fixa soberano cobre mais de um terço do total do mercado de capitais e é 
importante para muitos participantes do mercado. Os governos precisam do mercado para 
financiar suas dívidas, os bancos centrais da sua política monetária, os fundos da pensão e as 
companhias dos seguros para a gestão dos passivos, e gestores dos ativos e os investidores 
para obter retornos positivos. Esta dissertação apresenta cinco estudos que mostram que o 
mercado de renda fixa soberano nem sempre é eficiente. Esta prova é relevante para os 
participantes do mercado, pois pode influenciar as suas decisões e objetivos. Resumimos as 
idéias mais importantes dos cinco estudos: 
 
O mercado dívida emergente em moeda local tem crescido a capitalização maior que 1,5 
trilhão dólares no final de 2012. Os fatores que podem predizer retornos dos títulos do 
governo dos mercados desenvolvidos também podem prever retornos dos títulos do governo 
dos mercados emergentes. Nós também aplicamos o modelo famoso do Merton para títulos 
corporativos em títulos do governo dos mercados emergentes. Mudanças de credit spread do 
modelo do Merton pode prever retornos de credit default swaps dos países emergentes. 
 
A crise do euro e o debate de Outubro 2013 entre os republicanos e democratas sobre a 
dívida teto dos EUA destaca a importância do risco político nos mercados das obrigações da 
dívida pública. As alterações no risco político podem prever retornos futuros dos títulos do 
governo. Os participantes do mercado devem evitar os mercados dos títulos com maior risco 
político e  investir em mercados dos títulos com menor risco político. 
 
Retornos dos títulos do governo são 3,8 pontos percentuais mais elevado no segundo 
semestre do ano do que no primeiro semestre do ano. Esse padrão sazonal é em grande parte 
explicado por um padrão oposto em não inflação ajuste sazonal dos EUA, que é 3,0 pontos 
percentuais menor no segundo semestre do ano. Os participantes do mercado podem 
beneficiar deste padrão sazonal por estruturalmente comprar de títulos no final do junho e 
vender de títulos no final do dezembro. 
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Swaptions são opções sobre swaps de taxas de juro. O mercado de swaptions se tornou o 
maior mercado dos derivativos de taxa de juro (non-cleared) com capitalização (notional) de 
30 trilhão dólares a partir do abril de 2014. Embora os modelos de swaptions são diferentes 
dos modelos das opções das ações, o mercado de swaptions contém o risco da volatilidade e 
risco jump prémios consistente com opções das ações. A combinação dos dois prémios do 
risco fornece uma forte diversificação. Por "Andando a curva de swaptions" os participantes 
do mercado podem obter retornos positivos destes prémios dos dois riscos. 
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l)EMPIRICAL STUDIES ON SOVEREIGN FIXED INCOME MARKETS
This dissertation presents evidence of five studies showing that sovereign fixed income
markets are not always price efficient. 
The emerging local currency debt market has grown to a large size of more than 1.5
trill ion US Dollars at the end of 2012. The factors that can predict developed market
govern ment bond returns can also predict emerging market government bond returns.
Changes in an adapted Merton model for government bonds can predict emerging market
country credit default swap returns.
The euro crisis has highlighted the importance of political risk in government bond
markets. Changes in political risk can predict future government bond returns. Market
participants should avoid bond markets with higher political risk and rather invest in bond
markets with lower political risk. Government bond returns are 3.8 percentage points
higher in the second half of the calendar year than in the first half of the calendar year.
This seasonal pattern is largely explained by an opposite pattern in not seasonally
adjusted U.S. inflation which is 3.0 percentage points lower in the second half of the
calendar year. 
The swaption market has become the largest non-cleared interest rate derivative
market with a (notional) size of 30 trillion USD as of April 2014. Although swaption models
are different from equity options models, the swaption market contains volatility risk and
jump risk premiums consistent with equity options. Combining the two risk premiums in a
“riding the swaption curve” strategy provides a strong diversification.
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